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forum

THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

*The subject of strategic defense has emerged over the past year as a central issue in the ongoing debate over the shape and future direction of U.S. strategic and arms control policies. The subject has generated widespread public controversy, and, among defense professionals, has raised once again fundamental questions concerning the nature of deterrence, crisis stability, and the underlying purposes of U.S. strategic forces. The contributors to this edition of the "*ORBIS *Forum" are:* **Keith B. Payne** *and* **Colin S. Gray** *of the National Institute for Public Policy and* **Adam M. Garfinkle,** *Coordinator of Political Studies at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.*

STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND STABILITY

by KEITH B. PAYNE

The beginning of a transition to a more defense-oriented deterrence policy may be under way in U.S. strategic policy. As President Reagan stated in a televised speech to the nation on March 23, 1983:

> Would it not be better to save lives than to avenge them? . . . What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack; that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?

It should be noted that the president was *not* issuing an immediate call to defensive arms or suggesting a commitment to any specific defensive system. Rather, the president issued a call for the technical community to examine the potential for a comprehensive defense against ballistic missiles. This examination could provide the basis for an informed decision concerning deployment options.

If official U.S. policy comes to endorse a transition to a comprehensive defensive capability, it will represent an unprecedented reorientation of U.S. strategic policy. A serious commitment to defending

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the American homeland in the event of central nuclear war has not been integral to U.S. policy for almost two decades.

A transition to a defense-dominant strategic relationship would, if feasible, take many years to accomplish.[1] One of the critical questions confronting the strategic defense initiative (SDI) concerns whether such a transition could take place without burdening the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship with unacceptable instability. In other words, assuming for the moment that technology will provide the means for a comprehensive defensive capability, could we get from here to there safely?

The initiation of a defense transition could have an impact upon stability in several ways. First, it is conceivable that the Soviet Union would consider the U.S. deployment of space-based weapon systems or components to be so potentially threatening to Soviet interests that it would attempt to interfere militarily with U.S. deployment efforts.[2] The Soviet leadership could decide that the risks of an Osirak-style attack on U.S. space-based defensive system components would be more acceptable than the risks associated with passively accepting U.S. defensive deployments. Such a Soviet attack is an unlikely prospect for a number of reasons. Briefly, unless the Soviet Union is prepared for central war with the U.S. in any event, it is unlikely to pursue an extremely risky tactic that could easily escalate to central war. Unless the overall correlation of forces were conducive to Soviet acceptance of the risks of central war, it is unlikely that they would deny the U.S. access to space for defensive deployments.

Second, a potentially more serious destabilizing effect of a defense transition could be an initial Soviet advantage in ballistic missile defense (BMD) deployment. The Soviet Union appears to have prepared itself for a relatively rapid breakout from the ABM Treaty and deployment of a limited nationwide system for ballistic missile defense.[3] Construction of new Pushkino and Pechora-class BMD radars, production of the Flat Twin tracking and Pawn Shop missile guidance radars for the SH-04 and SH-08 interceptors (also in production), and the development of a network of C^3 (command, control, and communications) systems, air defense and BMD radars, and battle-management radars appears to indicate the potential for rapid Soviet breakout. A recent CIA report concerning Soviet BMD reportedly notes that "the U.S. could be witnessing a Soviet move

[1] See, for example, the discussion in Jeff Hecht, *Beam Weapons* (New York: Plenum Press, 1984), pp. 338-45.

[2] For an extended discussion of this potential threat, see Rebecca Strode, "Space-Based Lasers for Ballistic Missile Defense: Soviet Policy Options," in Keith B. Payne, ed., *Laser Weapons in Space: Policy and Doctrine* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983), pp. 106-51. For an excellent discussion of satellite vulnerability and potential survival aids, see Colin S. Gray, *American Military Space Policy: Information Systems, Weapon Systems, and Arms Control* (Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Books, 1983).

[3] See Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power* (Washington: GPO, April 1984), pp. 33-35.

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to place itself in a position to abrogate the Antiballistic Missile Treaty and rapidly deploy a system to defend key areas." [4] Although the initial Soviet system could not provide a comprehensive nationwide defense, it would significantly complicate U.S. retaliatory target planning. The combination of Soviet offensive pre-emptive capabilities intended to degrade the U.S. retaliatory potential, the deployment of a nationwide BMD system, and the presence of other Soviet active and passive defenses could threaten deterrence stability.

It has frequently been noted that a system for BMD is the only missing element in the Soviet defensive arsenal.[5] Adding that currently missing layer to existing Soviet active and passive defenses could reduce Soviet disincentives to engage in highly provocative behavior. If the Soviet Union did not attempt to exploit its strategic advantage, and if the United States did not behave as if the Soviets possessed an advantage, then the Soviet BMD breakout would likely have no negative implications for stability. However, the United States should not plan to rely on such luck to preserve stability during the initial years of a defensive transition.

A third potential source of instability could arise during that phase of a transition when strategic defenses would be capable of effective area defense against an offensive threat that had been degraded by a previous first strike. Assuming that a comprehensive defense cannot spring forth fully formed, like Athena from the head of Zeus, both superpowers are likely to pass through such a transitional phase unless precautions are taken well in advance. The possibility that they might pass through such a phase (roughly) simultaneously makes this situation potentially even more dangerous. The premium for striking first, and the penalty for waiting, could be powerfully destabilizing factors — particularly during an acute crisis.

This phase of a defense transition, when Soviet strategic defenses would be capable of absorbing a ragged U.S. retaliatory strike, could have particularly destabilizing implications for NATO-Europe. Such a capability would likely be effective against limited U.S. strategic targeting packages, French and British independent nuclear forces, and perhaps NATO long-range theater nuclear forces (TNF). As a result, Soviet defenses would largely undermine the nuclear threat supporting NATO's flexible-response doctrine.

Consequently, the stage of the transition when Soviet defenses would be of limited effectiveness against a full U.S. first strike, but possibly

[4] Quoted in Clarence Robinson, "Soviets Accelerate Missile Defense Efforts," *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* January 16, 1984, p. 14. See, also, Michael Getler, "Soviets Seen Progressing Toward a Missile Defense System," *Washington Post,* January 29, 1984.

[5] See Daniel Goure and Gordon McCormick, "Soviet Strategic Defense: The Neglected Dimension of the U.S.-Soviet Balance," ORBIS, Spring 1980, pp. 103-26.

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effective against NATO theater nuclear forces, independent European forces, or a retaliatory or limited U.S. strike could have destabilizing consequences for NATO-Europe. It might permit the Soviet Union to consider itself less constrained from exploiting its advantages in the European theater because the United States and NATO would be unlikely to wield an effective threat of limited nuclear escalation. During this phase of the transition several destabilizing factors could combine to reduce the disincentives now confronting the Soviet Union in regard to an offensive against NATO. For example, Soviet decisionmakers might perceive that: (1) limited or retaliatory strategic nuclear threats might not be effective against the Soviet Union; (2) the United States would be unlikely to launch a pre-emptive strategic strike against the Soviet Union on behalf of NATO-Europe; (3) long-range TNF and independent European nuclear forces might not be effective against the Soviet Union; and (4) NATO-Europe might be unprepared to stop a Soviet nuclear or nonnuclear offensive. This combination of perceived conditions during a phase of the defense transition could make Europe more vulnerable to Soviet political coercion and the Soviet Union less disinclined to use its military power against NATO. Such perceptions would also have destabilizing implications for direct U.S.-Soviet strategic relations in that the Soviets would be provided with even greater incentives to launch a pre-emptive strike against the United States as a precursor to engaging NATO.

This is not to imply that Soviet leaders would make such monumental decisions lightly or automatically as a result of BMD deployment. Rather, as strategic defenses grew to a point where they could counter a light or retaliatory attack but not a massive first strike, then this kind of pre-emptive thinking could be encouraged during acute crises or before a premeditated invasion of Western Europe.

In summary, during a defense transition several destabilizing factors could exist that U.S. planners would need to take into consideration: the possibility of direct Soviet interference with U.S. deployment of space-based components leading to escalation; the likelihood of an initial Soviet advantage in strategic defenses (including BMD); a phase during the transition when both sides have deployed strategic defenses, yet defenses render retaliatory and limited nuclear threats largely implausible.

Preparations to Counter Transitional Instability

What are the implications of these potentially destabilizing factors for U.S. force posture planning and how might the U.S. prepare to counter them before embarking upon a transition? This will depend,

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in part on how the United States approaches the initial phase of the transition. For example, if the United States provides hard-point defense for its retaliatory assets during the initial phase of a defense transition, the potential for instability should be reduced. Limited coverage for retaliatory forces and selected C^3I assets employing relatively near-term terminal, high-endoatmospheric, and exoatmospheric NNK (nonnuclear kill) defenses could help to ensure stability during subsequent phases of the transition. The potential impact of each of the destabilizing factors discussed above would be lessened by reducing the vulnerability of U.S. retaliatory potential as early as possible in a transition. Consequently, conventional defense systems involving ground-based interceptors should not necessarily be truncated in favor of more effective exotic systems that would probably be available somewhat later. The need to preserve stability during the transition calls for enhancing the survivability of the U.S. retaliatory capability rapidly.

Such a phasing of the defense transition would have the additional benefit of providing an early defense capability that would play a valuable role in and of itself, that is, the defense of deterrent forces. Consequently, if the transition to a comprehensive defense for American cities were interrupted or terminated for technical or political reasons, the initial defenses would have stand-alone value. Later deployment of a comprehensive defense, if technically feasible, would have to survive several administrations, perhaps of strikingly different orientations with regard to strategic defense and defense spending. It is important that the initial phase of a defense transition be valuable without the assumption that the transition will necessarily proceed further. A limited defense capability for retaliatory assets would be valuable from a stability standpoint even if a more effective system capable of protecting urban-industrial areas is never deployed. If the transition does have enough political momentum and technical credibility to continue from point to effective area defense, the initial limited coverage could provide useful layers of defense in the more comprehensive future system.

Enhancing the pre-launch survivability of U.S. retaliatory forces is one method of reducing potential instability during a transition. Complementary measures would be to improve the ability of offensive forces to counter Soviet first-phase defensive systems by augmenting the triad with new systems less susceptible to active Soviet defense efforts.[6] There are various potential active and passive measures to enhance penetration

[6] According to General Forrest McCartney, then commander of the Ballistic Missile Office, Air Force Systems Command, there is little doubt that the United States could retain a capability to target the Soviet Union in the context of likely initial Soviet BMD deployment. (Presentation at National Security Issues 1981 Symposium, Mitre Corporation, Bedford, Mass., October 13, 1981.)

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of Soviet defenses, including penetration aids for ICBMs and SLBMs, booster hardening and proliferation; large numbers of advanced cruise missiles; adding ablative material to ballistic missiles if necessary; and developing a long-range air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) to complicate the Soviet active defense problem. Such systems would further complicate Soviet defenses and help ensure the integrity of a U.S. deterrent. If adopted in whole or in part, they could offset the destabilizing factors that otherwise could exist during the initial phases of a defense transition.

Given Soviet BMD activity, and the reportedly increasing BMD capability of some Soviet air defense systems, the United States should be preparing now for the need to penetrate Soviet active defenses regardless of the state of the U.S. SDI. It should not be forgotten that the Soviet Union may decide to pursue its own SDI whether or not the U.S. decides to follow suit.

It could be argued that U.S. efforts to maintain an offensive capability while seeking to limit its own vulnerability would be destabilizing — particularly during a crisis. This argument would follow a well-known line of reasoning: if the Soviet Union considered its deterrent to be jeopardized by U.S. offensive and defensive preparations, it would have increased incentives for using its weapons pre-emptively in a crisis.[7]

This potential instability should be minimized as long as the United States can preserve a retaliatory capability against the Soviet Union. This retaliatory capability need not necessarily be retained at anything like its current level beyond that phase in the transition when the U.S. deterrent can be predicated upon defensive denial rather than offensive punishment. No matter how exposed or how safe the American population is as a result of strategic defenses, so long as U.S. strategic forces can threaten effective retaliation stability should not be degraded by the defense transition. Deterrence of the Soviet Union is not a result of U.S. vulnerability, but of Soviet vulnerability. If the United States maintains its retaliatory deterrent during the early and middle phases of the transition, the Soviet Union should be deterred from the dangerous initiatives discussed above, and stability should be safeguarded. As John Erickson has observed, "Soviet military opinion cautions against any 'adventurist strategy' which might prematurely initiate a total struggle when the requisite 'correlation of forces' *(sootnosh enie sil)* cannot assure a favorable outcome (even victory) in such a struggle." [8]

[7] This stability argument was employed to oppose ballistic missile defense deployment during the "Great ABM Debate" of 1968-72. For an examination of the policy arguments against BMD, see Colin S. Gray, "A New Debate on Ballistic Missile Defense," *Survival,* March–April, 1981, pp. 60-71.

[8] Quoted in "The Soviet View of Deterrence: A General Survey," *Survival,* November–December, 1982, p. 246.

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An additional danger that cannot be ignored is an effect of the differences in the Soviet and American hierarchy of values.[9] There is little question that the highest values of the U.S. leadership consist of the American people and urban-industrial assets. There is some consensus that the highest values of the Soviet leadership consist of its instruments of military and political control and power.[10] These Soviet assets, being difficult to identify, to some degree redundant, and mobile, are likely to be more easily defended. Consequently, an equivalent level of imperfect defense capability could provide protection for the highest Soviet values, but not the highest American values. This asymmetry in vulnerability stemming from an asymmetry in values would be dangerous. The solution to this potential problem is to ensure that consideration of defensive and offensive capabilities is in terms of *function* and not merely statistical "keep out" or penetration numbers. A statistical *equality* in offensive and defensive capabilities could be extremely disadvantageous for the United States because of this difference in values. Rather, the United States must *at least* achieve a functionally equivalent capability to protect its own highest values and/or to threaten the highest values of the Soviet leadership — recognizing that such a functional equality may well require superior capabilities given the differences in the target sets to be threatened and defended.

The United States could not safely eschew offensive force preparations, even if it were very confident of its capability (eventually) to deploy an impregnable astrodome. Stability following a transition will require the United States to maintain an offensive threat to potential targets outside the Soviet homeland — such as Soviet naval forces and other forces abroad and possibly third-party homelands.

In examining the effects of a defense transition upon stability, several conclusions can be drawn. First, there are four significant thresholds of strategic offensive-defensive efficacy for the United States: (1) a capability to defend effectively both U.S. urban-industrial assets and the retaliatory forces necessary to threaten the highest Soviet values; (2) a capability to defend urban-industrial assets effectively and strategic forces suitable only for targeting Soviet assets largely outside Soviet territory; (3) a defensive capability inadequate to provide comprehensive coverage for urban-industrial assets, but sufficient to help ensure a retaliatory force

[9] This problem is examined in detail in *Critical Issues for the Strategic Defense Initiative*, report prepared for the regents of the University of California, Los Alamos National Laboratory (Fairfax, Va. National Institute for Public Policy, 1984), pp. 50-61.

[10] As stated in the April 6, 1983 report by the bipartisan President's Commission on Strategic Forces (the Scowcroft report): "We must be able to put at risk those types of Soviet targets — including hardened ones such as military command bunkers and facilities, missile silos, nuclear weapons and other storage, and the rest — which the Soviet leaders have given every indication by their actions they value most, and which constitute their tools of control and power." (p. 6.)

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capable of threatening the opponent's highest values; and (4) defenses inadequate to preserve urban-industrial assets or a retaliatory force capable of threatening the opponent's highest values.

Stability is best served by the first condition — with the potential for instability likely to increase, particularly in distant areas, as the strategic environment comes closer to resembling the fourth condition. U.S. active and passive strategic defenses could contribute significantly to ensuring that the strategic environment does not approximate the fourth condition. However, a defense transition wherein both sides compete offensively and defensively and the U.S. does not compete well could facilitate the development of a strategic environment similar to this condition. A basic principle for a defense transition is that stability requires that the United States be capable of posing a retaliatory threat to the highest of Soviet values at least until it can provide a comprehensive defense of its own highest values.

Limited defenses could facilitate the third condition — a defensive capability adequate to help preserve the U.S. retaliatory threat against the highest values of the Soviet leadership. Such a capability could provide an improvement of the current situation, in which the U.S. forces suitable for threatening hardened military and political assets are the most vulnerable.[11] However, to enhance stability would require that the limited Soviet defense capability be incapable of negating the increased U.S. retaliatory potential resulting from additional prelaunch survivability and ability to penetrate Soviet defenses.

As the defense transition progresses, the United States will lose targeting access to a large Soviet target set (assuming competent Soviet defenses); it could become infeasible to pose any type of immediate and comprehensive punitive strategic threat against the Soviet homeland. Consequently, the deployment of extremely effective comprehensive defenses would necessitate a change in the U.S. approach to deterrence. It would no longer be able to pose immediate catastrophic retaliation against the Soviet Union as the ultimate sanction for Soviet misbehavior. This new condition of defense dominance would not end the role of deterrence in U.S.-Soviet relations. Rather, the nature of the U.S. deterrent will be altered.

The implication of an extremely effective defense for extended U.S. deterrence coverage is often presented as a critical problem of the SDI. A defense transition could be seen as a return to "fortress America" and a decoupling of the U.S. commitment to NATO. In the case of

[11] Harold Brown cites 1,000-2,000 prompt hard-target killers as the minimum necessary to threaten Soviet military and political-control facilities. See his *Thinking About National Security* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983), pp. 74-75.

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extended deterrence, however, a transition appears to have a clear potential for enhancing stability. There are two factors that are likely to be highly stabilizing in this regard, but other factors are ambiguous or likely to be destabilizing. Nevertheless, extended deterrence would appear to be served by a transition to an extremely effective defense.

The first factor likely to enhance extended deterrence would be the increased credibility of the U.S. threat to escalate a conflict in Europe to avoid the defeat of NATO. With effective defenses, the U.S. strategic guarantee to NATO should appear very credible to Soviet leaders because the United States would be much less vulnerable to Soviet counterfire than under current circumstances. The short-term effect of the U.S. threat of strategic escalation would be less fearsome given Soviet strategic defenses. But the deterrent effect of the potential for Western military mobilization and a long war with the United States should be useful for the continued functioning of extended deterrence. Under current conditions of U.S. vulnerability, nuclear escalation of a conflict in Europe would be perhaps more likely to decrease than to increase the probability of acceptable war termination for the United States — hence the lack of credibility of the U.S. threat. Consequently, while under current conditions there are strong disincentives to the U.S. threat of escalation, defense dominance would change the U.S. risk calculus and reduce the probability that the Soviet Union would consider it likely that the United States could be coerced into renouncing its extended deterrent commitment. This increased credibility of the U.S. threat of escalation, combined with Soviet anticipation that it would have to preserve its potential gains against a defended and mobilized United States should strengthen extended deterrence.

Second, in a defense-dominant environment the NATO threat to use tactical nuclear weapons to halt Soviet advances should not be paralyzed by the Soviet INF or strategic threat. A defensive deterrent operating at the strategic level would complement a similar deterrent against Soviet designs on Western Europe. An America protected from Soviet strategic strikes would appear more willing to accept the risks of escalation to halt a Soviet blitzkrieg in Europe. If the United States and its allies were protected from the Soviet strategic and INF threat, Soviet forces would be less capable of pre-empting NATO's nuclear forces, and NATO should at least be seen as less reluctant to employ tactical nuclear weapons in self-defense.

The effectiveness of NATO's local stopping power would be extremely important to victory-denial in Europe. The fruit of the U.S. defense-industrial mobilization potential would take some time to come into play in such a conflict, and if Europe had been defeated and occupied

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during that period the United States would have the formidable task of attempting to repeat its World War II performance in an era where a Normandy- or Anzio-style beachhead could be eliminated by one tactical nuclear weapon of relatively low yield. Consequently, NATO's capability to preserve enough time and space for the United States to respond would be crucial. That problem is, of course, little different from current NATO requirements to delay, survive, and repel Soviet attack. The difference is that in a defense-dominant strategic relationship the United States should be seen as more able and willing to react with TNF and a long-term counteroffensive, if necessary. It is the Soviet perception of American will that is important in this consideration of extended deterrence, and the perceived difference between the resolve of a defended America and that of a vulnerable America ought to be considerable. This difference should enhance stability.

Effective Soviet strategic defenses might be thought to degrade extended deterrence by denying the United States limited nuclear employment packages. The United States would not be capable of responding to a Soviet attack on NATO with a credible, limited strategic option. Thus a key to the current thesis of escalation control, that is, the threat of limited escalation, could no longer support extended deterrence. It should be recalled, however, that a primary rationale for limited options, as introduced in the so-called Schlesinger Doctrine of 1974, was to enhance the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.[12] That credibility had waned in the minds of many (particularly the French) because of U.S. vulnerability to Soviet counterstrikes — the rationale being that the United States would be unlikely to initiate a process of escalation on behalf of NATO that could lead to self-destruction. In a defense-dominant strategic environment the credibility of the U.S. commitment to NATO-Europe would be high, even if the U.S. threat of limited strategic counterstrikes were low.

This point underscores the difference between a defended approach to extended deterrence and the current punitive approach. The U.S. threat of "catastrophic retaliation" would no longer provide the ultimate sanction of a flexible-response doctrine (although the U.S. commitment to NATO could still be made manifest by the local stationing of U.S. forces). Rather, extended deterrence would be based upon a multilayered threat: (1) possible escalation of a European conflict to a global conflict wherein Soviet naval forces and other forces abroad would be vulnerable to nuclear attack (horizontal escalation); (2) NATO escalation to the use of tactical nuclear weapons to help deny a local victory to the

[12] See, for example, the testimony by James Schlesinger in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.S./U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, Hearings,* 93rd Cong., 2d sess. (Washington: GPO, 1974), pp. 8, 12-13.

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Soviet Union; and (3) ultimately, a U.S. mobilization that would challenge Soviet control of occupied territory. These sanctions might appear less fearsome than a threat of catastrophic retaliation, but should be much more credible than the current situation where the United States risks annihilation through initiation of nuclear escalation in Europe. There could be little doubt in the credibility of the U.S. commitment to Europe in the context of defense dominance — the United States would have major incentives to abide by its threat of escalation rather than the current massive disincentives.

There are some additional questions concerning whether an extended deterrent could function effectively if the Soviet Union also possessed a "leakproof" astrodome. First, British and French forces would likely lose whatever deterrent effect they now provide Western Europe. This could reduce to some extent Soviet inhibitions concerning Western Europe. Second, the Soviet Union could become less fearful of the U.S. threat of escalation. The Soviet leadership might be more effectively deterred by the "nuclear holocaust" threat than a U.S. threat of a protracted but potentially less dangerous war, even one that could end in Soviet defeat in Western Europe or at home over the long term. If so, defense dominance could, in effect, liberate the Soviet Union to exploit its advantages in locally deployed forces. Third, the threshold for the use of tactical nuclear weapons could be lowered by defense dominance because of possibly reduced Soviet concern for escalation. However, given Soviet respect for the U.S. military-industrial mobilization potential, the threat of Western tactical nuclear employment and horizontal escalation, and the possibility that NATO could deny the Soviet Union its victory aims, it is likely that the Soviet Union would be deterred from initiating an escalating conflict in Europe. NATO "shield" forces would be extremely important, as they are now, to ensure that the Soviet Union could not anticipate a quick and easy victory, whether using tactical nuclear weapons or not.

In short, a defense transition would not terminate the U.S. extended deterrent; it would alter the sanctions supporting that deterrent and affect, in a beneficial fashion, Soviet perceptions concerning the likelihood that those sanctions would be imposed. Whether the extended deterrent for NATO would be much more effective following the transition is impossible to judge with any certainty. However, there is little question that an extended deterrent should still function following the transition.

Extending deterrence following a defense transition could be considered much more appropriate from the U.S. perspective. Current policy purposefully leaves open the possibility that central nuclear war could result from a conflict in Europe — that is, of course, the ultimate

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sanction of extended deterrence. Such a threat could have been considered appropriate at a time when the United States had significant strategic advantages.[13] However, under conditions of parity (at best) and virtually absolute vulnerability, the implementation of that sanction would probably lead to scores of millions of U.S. casualties. A policy that purposefully envisages the possibility of such a central war resulting from an attack upon distant allies could be considered appropriate if that threat provided a certainty of *no* conflict in Europe. That conclusion, however, cannot be drawn with any confidence given the paucity in our understanding of war causation and the existence of two hostile and well-armed blocs in that region.

The problem is severe, and the United States is in the officially endorsed position of making what could well be self-destructive commitments on behalf of interests that, even if lost, would be unlikely to result in national destruction. In the current punitive deterrent relationship, a significant mismatch exists between commitment and interest. This situation is the basis for the lack of credibility for the U.S. extended deterrent; it is also a very dangerous condition for the United States because an escalating conflict might actually break out in Europe. In short, the current condition is unlikely to provide stability that can weather a severe test (the only time that deterrence stability is particularly important) and has potentially terminal consequences for the United States if deterrence fails that test.

An effective defense transition would, in effect, realign U.S. interests and commitments by reducing the perceived risks that the U.S. would run in threatening escalation on behalf of distant allies. The United States would be able to assume extended deterrent responsibilities from a defended position; hence extreme commitments and threats on behalf of NATO allies would then be more consistent and, perhaps more important, seen by Soviet leaders as more consistent with U.S. national security.

In summary, a transition to strategic defense would take several decades and should be implemented in phases that take technological feasibility and policy into consideration. The initial phase of a transition should help provide stability for subsequent phases and be consistent with the overarching policy of a defense transition. Simultaneously, the

[13] There was a time when acknowledging the important role of U.S. strategic advantages was more acceptable than it now seems to be. In 1964, for example, McGeorge Bundy, then special assistant to the president for national security affairs, provided a prescient observation: "The Presidents of the nuclear age . . . have all rejected the gamble of limiting our strategic strength in terms of any absolute concept of what is enough. They have measured our strength against that of the Soviet Union and have aimed at strategic superiority; that superiority has had different meanings at different stages, but seen from the White House its value for peace has never been small." See "The Presidency and the Peace," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1964, p. 355.

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initial phase of the transition should have its own integrity, given the possibility that, for a multitude of reasons, the initial phase could be the only phase to be completed. During the initial phases, defensive coverage could be provided for U.S. retaliatory assets, including selected C^3I facilities. During this initial period of the SDI, defensive forces would not introduce a radical change in strategy or deterrence policy. The U.S. deterrent would retain its offensive, retaliatory orientation — focusing on Soviet military and political control assets. At this point the SDI would serve primarily to help ensure the effectiveness of the U.S. retaliatory threat — in particular, it would enhance the survivability of those U.S. strategic forces most suitable for threatening superhardened point targets. The retention of the U.S. retaliatory threat during this period of a defense transition should safeguard stability. If the SDI is not sustained technically and/or politically, such initial defensive coverage will be valuable on its own merits.

If the defense transition proves technically and politically viable over many years, then the role of the defense and U.S. strategy will be transformed. Soviet access to the U.S. target set will be reduced dramatically, perhaps introducing a capability for "assured survival." Similarly, assuming effective Soviet defenses, U.S. strategic forces will be unable to target high-value Soviet assets. In this case strategic defenses will introduce an approach to deterrence based upon a defensive denial-of-victory threat. Strategic offensive forces will play an important but much reduced role in the U.S.-Soviet deterrence relationship.

A defense transition would usher in a new type of deterrence relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. It would not involve threatening punitive annihilation. This denial approach to deterrence should serve U.S. extended security needs and commitments well and be much more credible than the now-traditional notion of deterrence by threat of massive retaliatory punishment.

DETERRENCE, ARMS CONTROL, AND THE DEFENSE TRANSITION

by COLIN S. GRAY

To date, both proponents and critics of the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) have focused most of their attention on the prospects for technological development. The policy debate over the SDI has yet to begin. Some proponents of the SDI have talked grandly, if somewhat vaguely, of a defense transition that would enable the United

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States to transcend nuclear deterrence—a process that, again vaguely, might be assisted very usefully by a suitable arms control regime.

This article endeavors to help lift policy consideration of the SDI beyond assertion and counterassertion and explore in some detail what the deterrence story might be during and beyond a defense transition. Some have argued that deterrence will not be transcended by defense, but rather that the terms of deterrence may be transformed. Similarly, this analysis seeks to confront directly the question of what arms control could mean for the SDI and what the SDI could mean for arms control. It must be acknowledged that by promoting technology exploration, let alone a defensive transition, the SDI appears to challenge every sacred cow of the arms control community. That community sees more menace in the strategic arms competition itself than in Soviet policy; it views the ABM Treaty of 1972 as the outstanding diplomatic monument to strategic stability; and it regards the proliferation of weapons in outer space as an example of Original Sin.

There is some danger that on both sides of the policy debate on the SDI, an apolitical engineering spirit may dominate analysis of the defense transition. As a consequence, the *strategic* meaning and value of *strategic* forces may be obscured or even neglected entirely. The U.S. security problem with regard to the defense transition is not bounded by a determination to manage the strategic arms competition so that the American homeland (and perhaps the homelands of the principal U.S. allies) achieves the status of impregnability vis-à-vis nuclear assaults of all kinds. The U.S. strategic nuclear force posture, from the late 1940s to the present, has never been charged solely with the deterrence of attacks upon the United States.[1]

The United States, of course, is at liberty to change the roles of its strategic forces, but it should not be forgotten that the offense-dominated posture of today is intended to backstop foreign security commitments. A United States that made a comprehensive, or near comprehensive transition to defensive capability in its strategic posture would be a country equipped solely with shields in the strategic-forces realm. Shields of various kinds, whether hand-carried or in the form of walls, can play an essential part in providing direct physical protection, but they have little utility for the defeat and punishment of invaders able to ignore them.[2]

[1] In the apposite words of Edward Luttwak: "Superpowers, like other institutions known to us, are in the protection business. When they cannot protect clients, they lose influence, not just locally but worldwide." ("On the Meaning of Victory," *Washington Quarterly,* Autumn 1982, p. 18.)

[2] Wars cannot be won by defense alone. A good defense may be employed for the purpose of allowing the enemy so to exhaust himself in the offense that he is weakened to the point of fatal vulnerability to one's offense.

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The U.S. government can choose how large an investment it will make in strategic defensive technologies, and it can select investment strategies with a view to influencing Soviet strategic decisions in desired directions. However, the U.S. government cannot choose, unilaterally, either the terms of the defense transition or the character of the end condition—those will be determined jointly with the Soviet Union.

If the recent past is any guide, a strategic weapon system should be expected to have an operational life of about twenty years. This means that Peacekeeper may still be operational in 2006, Trident D-5 in 2009 or later, and Midgetman in 2012. It follows that engineering- and deployment-mode decisions taken in the 1980s may have a significant influence upon when and to what degree the terms of deterrence alter.

Presuming a firmness in U.S. determination to continue its policy of global containment,[3] the theory of deterrence and the strategy that is logically most appropriate for the development of strategic force requirements over the next several decades are obvious enough. *Faute de mieux,* the decade 1985-95 must see the United States attempt to improve its war-fighting capabilities in fulfillment of the policy guidance reportedly provided in PD (Presidential Directive) 59 and NSDD (National Security Decision Directive) 13. On the offensive-forces side, the United States must invest in agile counterforce, counterleadership, and counter-C^3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence) capabilities, thereby compelling the Soviet Union to make large, expensive, structural alterations in its ICBM-dominated posture, and/or to reconsider the merit of agreeing to negotiate deep reductions in their forces. Given the putative strategic value of the first strike, the predictable inadequacy of plausible U.S. strategic offensive force deployments to close the gap in net strategic prowess, and the increasing elusiveness of hardness of critical Soviet target sets, the United States should begin deploying a terminal point-defense system to help compensate for a deficient offensive capability. U.S. offensive-force modernization programs should also be designed (or in some cases redesigned) to offer a high probability of successfully penetrating Soviet strategic defenses.

During the first decade of the transition it would be essential that strategic offensive capability not be trimmed in anticipation of the eventual arrival of space-based defenses. Far from contradicting the national commitment to homeland defense, a modernized offensive-force

[3] The past and future of U.S. containment policies are discussed in John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: Alternative American Policies Toward the Soviet Union* (San Francisco, Calif.: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1983); Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, "U.S. Strategy for National Security," in Terry L. Heyns, ed., *Understanding U.S. Strategy: A Reader* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1983), pp. 221-39; and John Lewis Gaddis, "The Rise, Fall and Future of Détente," *Foreign Affairs,* Winter 1983-84, pp. 354-77.

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posture would be necessary to protect the transition, to provide a hedge against the transition failing in major respects, and to provide the Soviet Union with a most persuasive reason for negotiating a START regime worthy of the name.

It is possible, even probable, that a U.S. administration in the mid to late 1990s will face a three-way choice: (1) unconstrained competition in offensive and defensive arms; (2) sacrifice of most, if not all, strategic missile defense deployment options in return for Soviet agreement to a large (perhaps very large) reduction in offensive nuclear force levels; or (3) sacrifice of a large portion of its technically plausible (for penetration) offensive-force capability as the price for a great diminution in the quantity and quality of the Soviet offensive threat.

Prominent among the few noncontroversial propositions bearing upon strategic defense is the near-truism that U.S. defenses—whatever they may be—will be more effective if the prospective enemy can be persuaded to reduce his offensive forces significantly. Why might Soviet leaders be so persuaded? Any doubts about Soviet approaches to negotiation should have been resolved by the diplomatic record to date of SALT, INF, and START, which demonstrates clearly that the Soviet Union does not subscribe to the notion that it is acceptable to negotiate unequal reductions (to Soviet disadvantage) for equal results.[4] In addition, as a very important general point, the U.S. government must recognize that no arms control scheme can succeed which implies the negation of Soviet strategy and, by extension, of the Soviet theory of war.

The Soviet Union might agree to a negotiated reduction in its strategic offensive forces only if it: (1) discerns in U.S. offensive forces an intolerably strong challenge to its own strategic defenses and/or to its ability to execute effective first-strike counterforce attacks to suppress U.S. retaliatory capability; (2) is pessimistic over its ability to defeat predicted U.S. defenses even in a Soviet first-strike situation; and (3) is optimistic over its prospective competitive performance in a condition of "walled-city" superpowers. As phrased, these three Soviet judgments would seem to suggest that the United States should choose the path of unconstrained competition. After all, point (1) says U.S. offensive forces will get through; point (2) says Soviet offensive forces will not get through; and point (3) says that the Soviet Union should or will have an important competitive edge in a situation of a defensive standoff.

[4] An excellent treatment of "the Soviet way" in negotiation is U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior, Emerging New Context for U.S. Diplomacy*, Special Studies Series on Foreign Affairs Issues, vol. 1 (Washington: GPO, 1979). Relevant classics include: C. Turner Joy, *How Communists Negotiate* (New York: Macmillan, 1955); and Fred Charles Iklé, *How Nations Negotiate* (New York: Praeger, 1967).

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U.S. analysts must eschew a cost-accounting approach to strategic assessment. One may be able to demonstrate that in some technical senses the United States does better in a war with its unconstrained offensive forces assaulting Soviet defenses, and with its defenses dueling with unconstrained Soviet offensive forces. But, as Marshal Foch and other great soldiers have insisted, the strategic thinker must never lose sight of the objective—*De quoi s'agit-il?*" (What is it all about?)[5] Most emphatically, "it" is not about killing Russians. Moreover, "it" will not be about killing or degrading Soviet target sets that have little ability to harm Americans.

Even if U.S. strategic offensive forces should appear to be considerably more capable against Soviet defenses than Soviet offensive forces appear to be against U.S. defenses, a technically unequal trade (of U.S. for Soviet defense-dueling offensive forces) would probably prove to be a sound bargain for the United States. If the United States could purchase a much-enhanced prospect for successful homeland defense at the price of reducing greatly its ability to defeat Soviet defenses, it should consider such a trade very seriously indeed. Given the prospects for ASAT (antisatellite) prowess (which will degrade the C^3I necessary for real-time battle management), the growing number of imprecisely located targets, and true silo superhardening options, it is less than certain that offense-dominated war-fighting capability will be very effective in the long run.

The purposes of this discussion are (1) to suggest that the prospects for arms control assistance to the defense transition probably are greater than generally has been appreciated; (2) to label as strategically inferior the options of unconstrained offense-defense competition and of abandonment of the defense transition in return for major offensive-force reductions; and (3) to emphasize that the key to long-term success in the transition has to be visible momentum in developing and deploying real defensive- and offensive-force programs.

The United States cannot change the currency of deterrence over the next decade. Pending the maturing of active defense technologies capable of providing multilayered defense of the national territory,[6] the U.S. government has no responsible choice other than to provide an offense-dominated strategic posture that carries the promise, in Soviet estimation, of defeating Soviet strategy. Mobility, superhardening, pene-

[5] Appropriately enough, Bernard Brodie used this question as the title of chapter 1 of his *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973). The importance of thinking strategically is demonstrated brilliantly in Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1982); and Jeffrey Record, "Jousting with Unreality: Reagan's Military Strategy," *International Security,* Winter 1983-84, pp. 3-18.

[6] A useful technical review of prospects for the defense is Stephen Weiner, "Systems and Technology," in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds., *Ballistic Missile Defense* (Washington: Brookings, 1984), chap. 3.

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tration aids, active point defenses, and a capability of real-time battle management for efficient force allocation can all serve to sustain, indeed can greatly improve, the deterrent clout of the U.S. offensive arsenal.

The terms of deterrence may shift significantly in the second phase of the defense transition (1995-2005), which could see the United States embracing a deterrence doctrine consistent with: case (1)—classical counterforce (or war-fighting) capabilities designed to defeat Soviet nuclear forces and to defend the American homeland.[7] This would be a theory of deterrence based on denying the Soviet Union a plausible chance for victory. Even in the absence of cooperative U.S.-Soviet offensive arms reductions, technology and national will permitting, the United States might restore strategic superiority to its arms. The United States would then enjoy "escalation dominance" and the relative freedom of political-military action which that condition implies;[8] case (2)—homeland defenses and mobilization for victory in the context of "walled-city" homelands for the superpowers; case (3)—uncertain, possibly very porous, defenses.

Whereas case (1) posits clearly superior U.S. offensive forces vis-à-vis Soviet defenses and U.S. defensive dominance over Soviet offensive threats and case (2) presumes very, even preclusively, effective defenses on both sides, case (3) identifies a condition wherein both superpowers have deployed incalculably imperfect active defense systems. Cases excluded from the above listing include a condition of Soviet classical counterforce superiority wherein strategic advantage rests unambiguously with Moscow, and a condition of defense impotence wherein it is plain to all parties that Carl Sagan was correct when he wrote in 1983 that "even in the best of circumstances, offense will be more effective and less costly than defense."[9]

To date, both proponents and opponents of homeland defense have failed to address very persuasively the problems of and opportunities for the operation of a deterrence mechanism in a heavily defended world. Among the reasons for this may be the suspicion that rigorously honest analysis could yield some points to the opposing policy camp. Another reason of no less pertinence is that one cannot, today, specify the "most probable" set of future force postures and technical outcomes. Nonetheless, I ask the reader to suspend skepticism and to assume a world in which both superpowers have comprehensive strategic defenses (multi-

[7] On the subject of classical strategy, see Keith B. Payne, *Nuclear Deterrence in U.S.-Soviet Relations* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1982), chap. 8.

[8] "Escalation dominance" is the ability, actual or perceived, to take a conflict to a higher level of violence in the expectation of enforcing an improved outcome.

[9] Carl Sagan, "Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe: Some Policy Implications," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1983-84, p. 282.

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tiered ballistic missile defense (BMD), air-defense, and civil defense) that are judged to be very, very competent, even by their operators, but have, in addition, retained modernized, large-scale offensive forces. How might deterrence work in such a world? What would Soviet leaders be likely to fear?

Catastrophic Failure. There could be no truly realistic tests against worst-case threats. No matter how well the defensive systems would function in the highly contrived tests that both sides would conduct against their own targets and decoys, and no matter how efficiently the system would perform in computer-simulated battles, there would have to be a residual fear that the whole architecture of defense might fail totally and that there would be no time to correct malfunctions.[10] Very complex military systems can function adequately in tests the first time that they are employed, but everyone knows that there may be errors that would only become apparent with actual use. Needless to say, Soviet leaders and their military staffs would be acutely sensitive to known or suspected deficiencies in their defensive systems, many of which would be unknown to U.S. military planners.[11]

Leakage. Even if Soviet leaders and military planners were confident that the probability of a catastrophic failure of their defenses was so low that it should be totally discounted, they still would have to make a conservative estimate of the probable leakage rate. In this connection, they would have to wonder whether the leakage rate might be determined by variables that they could not control. For example, could multisystem performance (for the two, three, or more layers of BMD) be attenuated significantly by surprise, precursor attacks by U.S. ASAT weapons, by a U.S. space-based and possibly nonnuclear terrestrial bombardment system, or by handfuls of "stealthy" cruise missiles? Similarly, even if the Soviet Union did not fear effective, if limited, direct attack upon its BMD architecture, the operational performance of those BMD systems could well be affected very significantly by the scale and orderliness of U.S. offensive missile launches. If Soviet BMD systems, to perform adequately, *require* that the execution of the single integrated operational plan (SIOP) be disrupted, therein lies a major potential vulnerability. This discussion, necessarily, is purely conceptual. However, it is pertinent to a U.S. debate over strategic policy because some people fear that a world

[10] The malfunctions would be as likely to be in command and battle management as in the performance of hardware.

[11] In retrospect, it would seem that the U.S. antiballistic missile (ABM) technologies of the 1960s probably would have worked magnificently well against Soviet missiles of that era. U.S. officials did not know that then, of course; they assumed, prudently if incorrectly, that Soviet warheads were designed to withstand the critical weapon effects of U.S. interceptor missiles.

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of heavily defended superpowers would be a world made "safe" for very large-scale theater war.

One can imagine a strategic context in which the Soviet Union has deployed, or can deploy very rapidly, three tiers of active missile defenses (for boost-phase, mid-course, and terminal interception), each of which — based on the best educated guess of the systems' designers, evaluators, and operators — is expected to achieve 90 per cent attrition of the threat. Against a nominal 10,000-warhead threat (presumed to be launched simultaneously in a single strike for the sake of analytical convenience), this three-tiered Soviet defense architecture should permit only ten warheads to get through (with *each tier* inflicting 90 per cent attrition). But, if the attrition rate were only 50 per cent for each tier, then the Soviet Union would have to absorb damage not from ten nuclear explosions, but from 1,250. There is no way of predicting today just how efficient Soviet leaders and planners would assume their defensive systems to be in the face of unanticipated, but distinctly possible, technical difficulties (in the form of both malfunctions and countermeasures). Nonetheless, it is a certainty that even a confident Soviet Union would anticipate leakage as falling within a range of possibilities, not as a uniquely sized, calculable threat.

The deterrent effect of anticipated leakage, even at a high level, would be considerably less than might be expected, because the attacker will have little, if any, control over which warheads, directed at which targets, will get through. In other words, the attacker — and in large measure the defender also — will not have an "assured arrival" force. The leakage will be random, insofar as penetration prospects are influenced by the performance of boost-phase and mid-course defenses. The attacker can concentrate his fire in the hope of saturating the defenses of very-high-value targets, but late mid-course and endoatmospheric defense tiers could and should be able to impose unpredictable selective attrition by defending particular targets very heavily.

Fear of Tactical Surprise. Military history shows that tactics are at least as important as technology. Indeed, the impact of new technology on warfare tends to be a matter of how it is used to enhance total fighting power. A Soviet or U.S. technical lead in the technologies of strategic offense and/or defense could be thwarted, or transformed into war-winning attributes, by superior tactics. Examples abound: French ships of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period (1793-1815) consistently were of superior design to their British counterparts, yet — just as consistently — the Royal Navy won single-ship or general engagements, almost regardless of the odds. More recently, through superior tactical skills the British army beat the German army in the field in the summer and

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fall of 1918. (The British victories of 1918, culminating in the breaking of the Hindenburg Line on September 29, owed next to nothing to improvements in the quality of tank technology.[12] Similarly, the German victory of May-June 1940 owed nothing worth mentioning to superior technology (which Germany did not possess) but everything to tactical and strategic inspiration.[13]

The point here is not to assert that relative technological prowess is not important. Rather it is to suggest that a defender will be anxious that his adversary may choose to fight in ways that negate much of the utility of even a superior technology. It is worth mentioning that both the Soviet Union and the United States could be vulnerable not only to clever, innovative strategy and tactics, but also to distinctly pedestrian tactics reflecting a rational style in military behavior that would be alien to the other side and hence possibly unanticipated.

As an extension of this point, it is worth mentioning that senior policymakers on both sides should know that there is no such thing as a truly impregnable defense. If walled cities cannot be taken by storm, they sometimes can be taken by treachery, starvation, disease, glider troops on the roof (the Liegé fort of Eben Emael in 1940),[14] an enemy who assaults the fortress on an undefended side (Singapore),[15] or by Trojan horse. Even a Soviet Union defended by a multitiered system would be fearful that, analogically, some postern gate might have been left unguarded.

Local Denial. A heavily defended United States and its allies would need, and should be able *(ceteris paribus),* to deter Soviet invasion by the credible promise of effective local defense on the ground.[16] Given

[12] See John Terraine, *To Win a War: 1918, The Year of Victory* (New York: Doubleday, 1981).

[13] Tactical inspiration included the employment of Junkers 87-B dive bombers as flying artillery, while strategic inspiration was shown in the Manstein Plan's attack through the Ardennes. See Klaus Knorr, "Strategic Surprise in Four European Wars," in Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan, *Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1983), esp. pp. 25-44; and Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning* (Washington: Brookings, 1982), pp. 28-34.

[14] Eben Emael was constructed in 1932 with a view to halting, or at least delaying, a 1914-style German crossing of the Albert Canal (the Belgian border with Holland). On the other hand, the fort had only eight machine guns for protection against air attack.

[15] On British strategic reasoning concerning the role of Singapore in imperial defense in the Far East, see the review written by the Chiefs of Staff in February 1937, reproduced in N. H. Gibbs, *Grand Strategy: vol. I, Rearmament Policy* (London: HMSO, 1976), pp. 420-21. In the mid to late 1930s, the British chiefs of staff believed that Singapore was vulnerable only in the event of the Royal Navy being defeated in a fleet action in the area. At that time there seemed no prospect of Japan being able to concentrate a sufficiently superior fleet off Singapore to stand any very plausible chance of success. The possibility of an overland threat, down the Malayan peninsula, simply was not taken seriously.

[16] See John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Elmar Dinter and Paddy Griffith, *Not Over by Christmas: NATO's Central Front in World War III* (Chichester, Sussex, Eng.: Antony Bird, 1983). An unusually well-balanced discussion is Jonathan Alford, "Perspectives on Strategy," in John Steinbruner and Leon V. Sigal, eds., *Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question* (Washington: Brookings, 1983), pp. 91-105.

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the defense resources of the Atlantic Alliance, there is no very good, and certainly no absolute, reason why the hypothesized stalemate in strategic warfare should not be paralleled by a stalemate in ground warfare that necessarily would work to the defender's advantage.[17] It is true that the Soviet Union enjoys the advantages both of unity of command, in all senses, over Western powers, and (prospectively) of the initiative (NATO should expect to be tactically surprised).[18] But the attacker has to expose himself and, by his movements, declare his objectives. NATO has the economic resources and technological capacity to plan a defense that would, at worst (for NATO), impose a stalemate upon the Soviet Union. Needless to say, a stalemated campaign of aggression in Europe could, and probably would, have profoundly destabilizing consequences for the unity of action of the Warsaw Pact.[19]

Speculation in detail on the prospective local stopping power of technically and tactically modernized NATO forces is beyond the scope of this inquiry. However, there is some reason to be optimistic about the deterrent potential of very capable NATO conventional forces.

The Mobilization Threat. A United States with effective strategic defenses would be a United States that would have purchased the time to conduct wartime defense-industrial mobilization.[20] While the U.S. strategic posture might not be able to exercise deterrent effect through a credible threat to intervene in a theater conflict, it could provide the shield behind which U.S. and U.S.-allied defense industries would build the means for theater victory. Even in a very bad case for the United States, wherein, for example, theater campaigns in Europe and the Persian Gulf were lost,[21] high-technology defense mobilization could be undertaken which would bode great future insecurity for the Soviet Union.[22]

Virtually no matter how one envisages the outcome of an opening theater (or more likely multi-theater) campaign, Soviet leaders

[17] An unusually bold theory of conventional defense, involving a NATO counterinvasion of Pact territory, is presented in Samuel P. Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe," *International Security,* Winter 1983-84, pp. 32-56.

[18] See Peter H. Vigor, *Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory* (New York: St. Martin's, 1983); and Betts, *Surprise Attack,* esp. chaps. 6 and 7.

[19] See Vigor, *Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory,* chap. 1; and Steve F. Kime, "Warsaw Pact: Juggernaut or Paper Tiger?" *Air Force Magazine,* June 1982, pp. 67-69.

[20] On the relevance of defense mobilization, see Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Uri Ra'anan, eds., *The U.S. Defense Mobilization Infrastructure: Problems and Priorities* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1983); and Roderick L. Vawter, *Industrial Mobilization: The Relevant History* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1983).

[21] Provided it did not sign on for a debilitating peace in order to secure the release of American POWs (and civilian internees), and provided it had tolerably secure access to critical strategic energy supplies and raw materials (meaning maritime and maritime air dominance in the Caribbean and the western and South Atlantic).

[22] See James A. Miller: "Strategic Resources, Geopolitics, and U.S. Force Projection Capabilities," *ALARM* (Alert Letter on the Availability of Raw Materials), September 1982; and "The Strategic Mineral Vulnerability of the West: A Soviet Perspective," *ALARM,* September 1983.

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and military planners could not be indifferent to the developments made possible by a U.S. defense mobilization effort heavily focused upon traditional U.S. strengths — naval forces and strategic capability. In essence, the Soviet Union would have shot at the king — and missed. It seems improbable that Soviet planners have failed to note the Japanese error of 1941.[23]

Nuclear Winter. There appears to be an absence of independent Soviet analyses of the climatic and biological consequences of nuclear war. Moreover, even if Western policymakers had access to Soviet analyses that were genuinely independent of Western-derived data and calculations, there would be no way of knowing how seriously Soviet leaders were inclined to take them. To balance that point, Soviet leaders will be uncertain about what, if any, deterrent effect Western analyses of the climatic and biological consequences of nuclear war would have upon a U.S. president in time of crisis.[24]

If, as here, one is examining potential sources of deterrent effect, the possibility of nuclear winter and related nuclear-effect phenomena must be included for discussion.[25] It should be recalled that major sources of a healthy anxiety that should contribute to effective deterrence include catastrophic failure of and leakage through active defense systems. These anxieties feed not only fears of military-political failure, but also acute anxiety over what defensive failures (Soviet and/or U.S.) could mean for the sustainability of life itself. Some of the critics of ballistic missile defense systems, who argue illogically that the addition of BMD weapons on both sides will fuel pre-emptive urges, should be given pause by Carl Sagan's analysis of nuclear winter (though not by all of his assertions).[26] The illogic in their position lies in the strange belief that a U.S. BMD architecture sufficiently awesome in its anticipated performance to persuade the Soviet Union to launch a massive first strike — on the grounds that the offense must perform better against the defense if it attacks on a very large scale and in a highly coordinated way — would not be so awesome as to discourage first-strike adventure altogether.

[23] Japanese leaders knew that they could not defeat a mobilized United States that was determined to fight. But they hoped by their initial victories so to discourage the United States that it would choose to settle the conflict on terms that left Japan largely in control of its gains. See Nobutaka Ike, ed., *Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967).

[24] Prominent among the most useful of the many studies conducted over the years on the effects of nuclear war are U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, *The Effects of Nuclear War* (Washington: GPO, 1980); and A. M. Katz, *Life After Nuclear War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1982).

[25] See R. P. Turco et al., "Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions," *Science,* December 23, 1983, pp. 1283-92; and Paul R. Ehrlich et al., "Long-Term Biological Consequences of Nuclear War," *Science,* December 1983, pp. 1293-1300.

[26] Sagan, "Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe," pp. 257-92.

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Nonetheless, Soviet leaders and U.S. critics of BMD would do well to contemplate the following words of Carl Sagan:

> Very roughly, the level of the world strategic arsenals necessary to induce the climatic catastrophe seems to be somewhere around 500 to 2,000 warheads — an estimate that may be somewhat high for airbursts. The intrinsic uncertainty in this number is itself of strategic importance, and prudent policy would assume a value below the low end of the plausible range.[27]

The nuclear-winter thesis is likely, over the long run, to function as one among many arguments inclining the Soviet Union to subscribe to a strategy that favors a growing degree of dominance of defensive over offensive systems. Soviet political leaders and general staff officers may well be disdainful of strategic advice deriving from liberal-minded Western scientists, but a sentence such as the following may catch their attention:

> If a first strike gains no more than a Pyrrhic victory of ten days' duration before the prevailing winds carry the nuclear winter to the aggressor nation, the "attractiveness" of the first strike would seem to be diminished significantly.[28]

Sagan notices, correctly, that the leading rival ideas for arms control and disarmament are wholly inadequate to effect arsenal reduction on the scale necessary to preclude the possibility of a nuclear winter being triggered. Sagan and his fellow scientists are claiming that the current strategic nuclear arsenals of the superpowers should, in toto, be reduced by between 92 and 98 per cent. Needless to say, "the freeze," the "build-down,"[29] and even "deep cuts"[30] look trivial according to this definition of the scale of the task. I believe that the only path to a nine-tenths or better reduction in strategic nuclear arsenals that would be even remotely feasible politically lies with strategic defense.[31]

The potential sources of Soviet anxiety specified and discussed briefly above are intended to serve as a first answer to the question, "What would Soviet leaders be likely to fear in a heavily defended world?" Plainly, there are grounds for affirming a continuation of deterrence, albeit a deterrence stemming from a different weighting of sources than that familiar today. The "deterrence fuels" specified above are not intended to be exhaustive or individually exclusive. None of them are fanciful or wildly improbable; indeed, unavoidably, some are mundane and obvious (for example, the extent of leakage and anxiety over tactical ingenuity

[27] Ibid., p. 285.

[28] Ibid., pp. 276-77.

[29] See William S. Cohen, "The Arms Build-Down Proposal: How We Got from There to Here," *Washington Post,* October 9, 1983; and Alton Frye, "Strategic Build-Down: A Context for Restraint," *Foreign Affairs,* Winter 1983-84, pp. 293-317.

[30] "Deep cuts" is the approach adopted toward START by the Reagan administration — to which the "build-down" was added in fall 1983.

[31] See Colin S. Gray, "In Defense of Disarmament," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* June 1984.

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that may evade expected BMD lethality). Moreover, even if some or even all of these "deterrence fuels" appear to be weak individually, it should be kept in mind that all six (and probably several more not specified here) may enter *simultaneously* into Soviet calculations and fears.

From time to time the maker of strategic policy has to choose which of two desirable conditions is more in the national interest. U.S. policymakers, one may predict, would like both to hold at assured risk those assets believed to be of highest value in Soviet estimation and to provide physical protection for the American people and their means of livelihood. Looking ahead to the end of the century from the perspective of the mid 1980s, it is possible that the United States might be able to sustain a highly credible offensive threat of a kind and on a scale that would be judged unacceptable to Soviet leaders, and to develop and deploy a multi-tiered strategic defensive weapons system capable of limiting damage to the U.S. homeland to a trivial scale where overall survival of U.S. society is not directly threatened.

However, (1) in practice, the domestic constituency for an offense on the now-traditional scale would suffer dramatic attrition as a consequence of the doctrinal rationales advanced in support of the defense transition; (2) to sustain an adequate offensive capability (against high-value targets) in the face of ever more sophisticated Soviet defensive deployments would require major, and very expensive, changes in the quality and quantity of U.S. offensive forces; and (3) the attractions of START assistance to homeland defenses (necessarily to theirs as well as to ours) would be well-nigh irresistible. Many U.S. analysts and theoreticians, not to mention NATO-European politicians and commentators, are wont to neglect the fact that the most fundamental duty of the U.S. government is the protection of Americans. If they are offered a choice between the ability to limit damage to the United States to a truly significant degree and the ability to sustain a convincing offensive threat against the highest of Soviet values, American politicians may be trusted to choose the former.

To date, making such a choice has not been possible. But, in the mid to late 1990s such a choice may well be the "issue of the decade." Needless to say, definition of the alternatives in this way will depend for its validity upon several key variables, not the least important of which will be the Soviet definition and assessment of the choices available. I believe that there could be a tolerable compatibility of Soviet with American analyses such that a major reduction in offensive forces might be negotiable.[32]

[32] I have argued this case in testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, hearings on the Strategic Defense Initiative, April 26, 1984.

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The choice posed above between a START-managed offense-defense arms competition designed to enhance the performance of active defenses and an unrestrained offense-defense competition is an important one. But the U.S. government may have to face a more immediate choice, perhaps by 1990. U.S. leaders should ask themselves whether it would be worth improving greatly the prelaunch survivability of U.S. ICBMs, manned bombers, and cruise-missile carriers at the price of those surviving forces having problems penetrating Soviet defenses that would not exist if a defense transition were not in progress in the Soviet Union. Which alternative most serves the goal of strategic stability: the one that optimizes the survivability of forces, or the one that optimizes the amount and kind of damage that those forces could inflict (if they were to survive)?

There should be no doubt that the strategically superior option is to choose assurance of prelaunch survivability over assurance of penetration survivability. From the perspectives of prudent defense planning and deterrence psychology, Soviet officials are almost bound to make generous assumptions about the likely performance of U.S. strategic defenses and pessimistic assumptions about the competence of their defenses.

It is not a little ironic that the Soviet Union has a nationwide air defense system, has a treaty-limited ABM system actually deployed (which it is upgrading), is conducting a "creeping breakout" from that treaty with ABM-capable air defense weapons and ABM battle-management radars, and has a very large research and development program under way in all categories of BMD technology — yet it is the United States that is solemnly debating an SDI and a defensive transition. There is a danger that if the United States proceeds in a very relaxed, business-as-usual manner to explore technological possibilities, it will be confronted late in this decade, or early in the 1990s, with a Soviet Union that is willing and able to deploy immediately BMD weapons for a near-term advantage. Americans have no grounds for assuming that the strategic defense *initiative* must be theirs.

THE POLITICS OF SPACE DEFENSE

by ADAM M. GARFINKLE

In the midst of the Second World War, Nicholas J. Spykman observed that "national struggles inevitably become conflicts between good and evil, crusades against sin and the devil. Modern wars can be fought successfully only in an atmosphere of unreality and make-believe." By

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"national struggles" Spykman obviously meant conflicts among nations, but it requires no great leap of imagination to apply his insight about the emotional side of political strife to domestic politics. The debate currently under way about the relative merits and risks of developing and deploying ballistic missile defense systems (BMD)—especially the more ambitious exoatmospheric type designed for area rather than point defense—is certainly a pertinent example.

This essay presents three propositions about the politics of the BMD debate. The first is that notwithstanding the debate among technical experts and strategists, the fate of the Star Wars initiative, as it is popularly known, will be influenced by the contours of domestic politics, as has every major strategic military decision in the past thirty years. (This is one of those points that seems obvious after it is made, but is ignored unless or until it is made.) The second proposition is that insofar as serious thought is given to the Star Wars proposal by politically minded nonexperts, judgments about the initiative will flow from not just two, but at least five distinguishable "strategic theories." It follows that neither advocates nor critics of the initiative share all of the same concerns or assumptions. The third proposition is that the debate over Star Wars may very well lead to the most sensible and successful approach to BMD systems, but not for the most sensible reasons.

Star Wars as Political Theater

President Reagan's Star Wars initiative has been debated extensively and analyzed carefully by technical and strategic experts, as the foregoing pages of this Forum attest. But it is also a subject increasingly bedecked with visceral rhetoric on both sides. As is usually the case when a military policy issue is thrust onto the political stage, one of the first casualties is deliberate thinking.

This transformation was made inevitable by the political context of the Star Wars initiative. The Reagan administration has not conducted business as usual with respect to defense and arms control policies, and while the jury is still out on the consequences of the administration's approach to these matters, both the substance and the image of the president's policies have mobilized opposition to them. The nuclear freeze movement, with its mixed success in the Congress, is one manifestation of this; and the seemingly endless MX debate, reaction to the Scowcroft Commission report, and the quickly forgotten tempest over the firing of Eugene Rostow and the nomination of Kenneth Adelman to

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head the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are others.[1] Thus, when it was proposed on March 23, 1983, Star Wars was praised by supporters of the administration as evidence of its commitment to real arms control, its political bravery, and its intellectual creativity. Detractors saw a disingenuous ploy to divert attention from the nuclear freeze movement, the defense budget debate, and the failure of the administration to negotiate in good faith with the Soviet Union at the START and INF talks.[2] The Star Wars initiative did not produce the plague of partisanship presently afflicting defense policy in general, but seems to have telescoped and supercharged it.

Only the very naive and the very young should be surprised to learn that much of political life is conducted with only a glancing acknowledgement toward dispassion and intellectual clarity. Although many yearn for a rational politics, they have mistaken the subject matter. Any broadly consequential issue is permeated not only by diverse opinion but by deep emotions associated with the credal anchors of that opinion. "Without their credal foundations," said Charles Manning, "politics would be like a play without a plot."[3] Politics is not a technical exercise about the ordering of public life; it is about competition to define the values that underlie social order itself. Most of the time, the tension between competing paradigms of social organization is not an explicit issue in domestic politics and thankfully so, or we should never have any peace. But the most serious questions of public life are rarely if ever solved in perpetuity but only bracketed temporarily out of convenience or mutual exhaustion. Some issues tend to throw more light into these dark corners of venerated agreement than others. Nuclear weapons, strategy, and doctrine, dealing as they do with the most portentous and troubling of matters, are precisely such issues.

The Star Wars debate is not only about nuclear weapons, strategy, and doctrine at the margins, however. Rather, it raises the prospect that the balance of terror with which we have tried to live for some thirty-five years might be subject to easement not through the chimera of disarmament, but through the dynamics of military technology itself. Is this too good to be true, or is it both true and good? On one level at least, the Star Wars debate is about hope, and that is probably why it is so animated. Are we forever doomed—if we are lucky—to a misanthropic peace that persists only because of a mutually credible threat to

[1] For details, see Adam M. Garfinkle, *The Politics of the Nuclear Freeze* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1984), chap. 6.

[2] There was evidently some truth to this contention. See the informed and savvy discussion by Elizabeth Drew, "A Political Journal," *The New Yorker*, May 9, 1983, p. 54.

[3] Charles A. W. Manning, *The Nature of International Society* (New York: John Wiley, 1966), p. 215.

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incinerate hundreds of millions of innocent people? Must every promised escape prove to be an illusion or a mirage?

Here we should remind ourselves of another characteristic of the Star Wars debate that it shares with every other debate over military strategy in the nuclear age: it is logically open-ended. In other words, we will never know, even after we have built it, if Star Wars works as a technical system until the deterrence it is designed to strengthen breaks down. We will not be able to judge it technically until it fails strategically. All arguments for and against exoatmospheric ballistic missile area defense are in the final analysis guesses—or exercises in deducto-hypothetical logic, if one prefers to dress them up a bit. So humility is in order as the nuclear Janus stands before us, one head pointed toward the enormity of destruction, the other toward the undeniable possibility of military use. We stand in the middle, with no way of knowing for certain when deterrence is strengthened by maximizing the enormity of destruction through countervalue threats or by maximizing the credibility of use through more "rational" counterforce strategies. Spykman thought modern wars had to be fought in an atmosphere of unreality and make-believe, and his views remain pertinent. It is not modern war that would be unreal or make-believe, to be sure, but what is involved in planning to prevent or to fight it fits the description quite well. The average citizen can hardly be blamed for failing to see too much difference between the intellectual activity of strategic planners on the one hand and that of directors of intergalactic movies on the other.

The point is that decisions on major weapons systems, even those with profound implications for military doctrine and strategy, are primarily political and not technical decisions. At some point in the decision process, the abiding orthodoxies and loyalties in the dominant bureaucracies and political parties put their stamp on the consequences. What DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) employees think and know is probably a good deal less important than the mélange of images, opinions, and literary metaphors that appears in everything from gossip magazines and local movie houses to the columns of *The New Yorker* and the halls of Congress.[4] One might call this the politics of the critical masses. It is a realm where too much humility or too many details would be inappropriate. Quite irrespective of lofty expert arguments over BMD, the Star Wars debate has captured the attention of the

[4] This is not to say that technical judgments are not important or that they do not have political implications. Technical decisions define the menu of policy options in the first place and, once a general direction has been set, technical decisions can have profound political implications, as the history of MIRVs and experimentation with cobalt explosions clearly demonstrate. Nevertheless, strategic analysts are so adept at ignoring the political contours of military/strategic issues that it is only fair to issue a strong corrective.

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media and the imagination of the American public. (Ironically, interest in things nuclear and strategic has been promoted by the nuclear freeze movement, yet another example of strategic discourse where fiery emotion often displaces cold logic.) For this reason alone, the effort to displace the epithet "Star Wars" with "Strategic Defense Initiative," or "SDI"—one more episode in the saga of bureaucratic acronymphomania—was bound to fail. The scholar, the analyst, and the policymaker have every right to prefer cool clarity over warm confusion, but this does not sell popcorn.

In the popular mind—and perhaps elsewhere, too—there is more than a coincidental connection between President Reagan's famous (or infamous) Star Wars initiative on the one hand and his indictment of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" on the other. Both phrases bring to mind George Lucas' *Star Wars* trilogy and its depiction of an epic struggle between the forces of good and evil. Star Wars, both as cinematic fantasy and as strategic proposition, is engrossing not only because of the simplicity of its basic "us against them" plot, but also because it holds out the possibility of once again living life on a heroic scale. Part of the allure of a project like the High Frontier is that it leaps beyond the mundane operation of deterrence as usual, which, after some thirty-five years, has lost its distinctiveness and novelty. It suggests an image of strategic planners and military brass not as an amorphous collection of faceless technocrats, but as a legion of heroes (or villains). There is, after all, considerable debate over whether Darth Vader represents the Soviet Union or the Pentagon, and whether Luke Skywalker and Han Solo defend our skies or shoot down Korean airliners.

Images on the Fringes

Avowedly leftist and even some liberal critics of the current administration have made no secret of their belief that the president and his closest counsellors live in a world of infantile illusion that finds its expression in dangerous foreign and military policies reminiscent of the most extreme Manichaean alarums of the Cold War. Critics predict that, as before, a new grasp of reality will have to be purchased with American blood. Behind every door, under every bed, and hidden in every closet the President sees Communist agitators and KGB agents. How else to explain his matter-of-fact redbaiting of the nuclear freeze movement, the failure to recognize the domestic sources of discontent and revolt in Central America, and the inclination to avoid arms control negotiations in anticipation of Soviet perfidy, manipulation, and violation?

Not far below the surface, and sometimes above it, is the glib conviction that it is only natural for an actor-become-president to use

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cinematic jargon. After President Reagan's "evil empire" speech and his Star Wars announcement of March 23, 1983, the underground leftist comic-book industry was quick to respond with depictions of "Ronald Ray-Gun" with "Flashcap Weinberger" and "Buck Rogers Clark" close at his side. In the background a manic, malign scientist, Dr. Zarkov Teller, is seen cackling boisterously while hatching ever more improbable gadgets. On page two, unaware of all this, sits the Evil Emperor Muscovy Ming in his complacency, counting his conquests, intoning prayers to Das Oracle, and seeking aid from the ruby-slippered Wicked Witch of the East.

At the other extreme of the political spectrum, those on the far Right have chosen more often than not to ignore the conditional nature of the president's initiative and the Pentagon's plea for patience and balance in the undertaking, preferring instead to see the end of U.S. vulnerability to Soviet bombs as close at hand. Particularly for the religiously oriented far Right, the prospect of an impenetrable defense, after living for so long with the fear of nuclear Armageddon, has taken on the aura of the miraculous. Star Wars is indeed a panacea in this corner of the political world, a technological fix to work a revolutionary transformation of our risk, the better to pursue in relative safety the epochal struggle with the Soviet Union. It is not only to the Manhattan Project that the aspirations of the High Frontier are compared, but to the parting of the Red Sea and the destruction of Pharaoh's pursuing hosts in the rushing waters.

At first blush, the attitudes of far Left and far Right to the Star Wars initiative seem to have little in common except a tendency toward exaggeration and an avoidance of analysis. But they share more than that: both have generated strategic "theories" that reject the desirability and stability of deterrence as it is commonly understood.

The Marxist and proto-Marxist Left evidently believes that capitalist economies are inherently war-prone and doomed by their internal economic structures to a kind of political thanatos regardless of the special dangers of the nuclear age. The original cause of the arms race and the main reason it continues is the need of the military-industrial complex—the central pillar of corporate capitalism—to generate profits. Moreover, the real motive behind U.S. strategic superiority is not to deter the Soviets but to advance American imperial interests throughout the world.[5] That is why the Reagan administration cannot be serious about arms control and why arms control as it has been practiced can never succeed. Only disarmament can prevent nuclear holocaust, but it follows

[5] See, for example, Richard J. Barnet, *The Lean Years: Politics in an Age of Scarcity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980), p. 226; and Andrew Kopkind, "Living with the Bomb at Harvard," *The Nation*, June 15, 1983, p. 695.

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that in order to get disarmament, the power structure of the United States must first be destroyed.

The far Left's portrayal of a generation of U.S. administrations as seeking nuclear superiority to advance imperial interests is of course ludicrous. But there clearly are some in the body politic who do desire nuclear superiority and believe it to be unambiguously attainable—though not for the purpose of plundering global resources. Many on the far Right tend to take a "fortress America" attitude on national defense: political isolationism buttressed by unassailable military might. The far Right rejects the notion that parity between the United States and the Soviet Union is a satisfactory condition in favor of other attitudes. One is that nuclear superiority, though neither perfect nor eternal, is by far the best solution this side of the millenium. Another attitude holds that since defense is impossible, war inevitable, and surrender or appeasement unthinkable, the nation can be saved only by protecting and training as large a percentage of the "patriotic" population as possible in survival skills.[6] The revolutionary appeal of the High Frontier is that it denies the impossibility of defense, and has made it possible to combine the desire for superiority, the supposed pragmatism of civil defense and survival training, and BMD into a sort of "grand strategy."

Just as the attitudes of the far Left rest on a certain view of the United States, so the attitudes of the far Right rest on a particular view of the Soviet Union. This view holds that no stable modus vivendi with the Soviet Union is possible and any policy that assumes otherwise (read détente) plays into the Kremlin's hands. If the Soviet Union were a power concerned only with its own security sphere, then it could be dealt with and arms control agreements with such a power could be to lasting mutual benefit. But the Soviet imperial appetite knows no limits; it engages in arms control negotiations only to lull the free world to sleep and split apart U.S. alliances with other free nations. Thus, it is not necessary that there be Communists in the State Department or KGB agents working for the *Washington Post*. It is enough that a host of Neville Chamberlain's well-placed clones insist on misconstruing the real nature of our adversary.

Finally, far Left and far Right have in common their need for each other. If there were no one insisting on disarmament and revolution, it would be harder to justify the need for nuclear superiority and a hermetic BMD shield. If there were no one given over to demonizing the Soviet Union and demanding unending military expansion, it would be harder

[6] See, for example, Robert C. Smith, *How to Survive a Nuclear Disaster* (New York: Zebra Books, 1982).

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to peddle military-industrial conspiracies and predestined war-prone systems.

Criticism in the Center

Assuming that neither Marx nor Jesus will save us from our peril,[7] let us look at what more conventional and consequential voices have to say about Star Wars. Most of the informed opposition to strategic defense of any kind, whether point defense or area defense, comes not from the far Left but from what may be called the Liberal Establishment, those whose dominant strategic theory has been described as minimal or finite deterrence. At the risk of restating what is already widely known, I would summarize this school of thought as follows: Total nuclear disarmament would be nice but it is unattainable. Since nuclear weapons have rendered traditional ideas about the relationship between military force and national defense obsolete and dangerous, a way must be found to prevent their use and to quarantine their influence. Non-use can only be ensured through a rough equality of risk known as deterrence. Deterrence requires a balance of power between nuclear weapons states up to, but not beyond, a certain level of survivable second-strike countervalue forces capable of inflicting unacceptable damage upon an adversary's society. Beyond this level of sufficiency, which incidentally is a direct function not of the relative size and power of all opposing forces but only of the survivability of one's own retaliatory force, all increments of strategic power are both pointless and provocative. They are pointless because clear superiority is unattainable. They are provocative because they sow the seeds of suspicion, poison political relations, and stimulate dangerous and wasteful arms races.

Most harmful to the stability of deterrence in this view are those assaults on parity that undermine the confidence of both sides in their capability for assured destruction. This includes counterforce targeting and counterforce-oriented declaratory policies because the threat to attack military forces raises the danger of pre-emptive first strikes, aggravates crisis instability, and encourages accident-prone launch-on-warning postures. It also includes measures for active and passive defense and the pursuit of advantage through technological breakthroughs and the militarization of new environments, like outer space. This is because by denying opposing forces a "free ride," an adversary might be led to believe that preparations are being made to absorb a retaliatory strike short of unacceptable damage. Even point defenses are bad because they

[7] Apologies here to Jean-François Revel!

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can be expanded into area defenses, and besides, there should be no need to defend weapons because neither side should aim at them.

This basic logic informs a serious, if arguable, strategic theory. It was the basis for Robert S. McNamara's elaboration of the mutual assured destruction (MAD) paradigm in the early 1960s and remains its ideal expression. It was also the basis for U.S. strategic programs for nearly two decades. And it is from this basis that the organizations of the Liberal Establishment have assailed virtually every aspect of the Reagan administration's defense policies, for they have emphasized counterforce and defense, and have pointed both to the militarization of outer space—through ASAT (antisatellite) and Star Wars programs—and to the development of esoteric technologies (like high-energy lasers) whose implications are unknown.

Most prominent in anti-BMD advocacy have been organizations like the Arms Control Association, the Center for Defense Information, and especially the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS). While these organizations bring to bear far more serious arguments than the proto-Marxists of the far Left, they too have been star struck by the public spotlight, prone to flowery language and occasional logical lapses. In a mass-mail solicitation, for example, the UCS complained in a threnodic outburst that through the Star Wars plan, the Reagan administration was "dragging Heaven into Hell." In its lengthier "report" condemning Star Wars,[8] we find a prominent example of a cognitive distortion that has been called irrational cognitive consistency or cognitive overkill.[9] The UCS report holds that Star Wars is technically infeasible, unaffordable, and would in any case be strategically destabilizing. This may or may not be true, but it is suspicious that these three logically separate concerns—technical, financial, and military—should all point unambiguously to the same policy conclusion.[10]

Another school of thought that has criticized the Star Wars initiative—represented more or less by the Center of the Democratic party—is what may be called the Pragmatic Center. The Pragmatic Center's strategic theory is perhaps best defined by the principles set down in Presidential Directive (PD) 59 during the Carter administration. Its most capable expositors have been former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, the members of the Harvard Study Group who wrote *Living With Nuclear*

[8] See "Reagan's Star Wars," *New York Review of Books*, April 26, 1984, pp. 47-52.

[9] See Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 131-34; and John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 122-23.

[10] Jervis also makes this point in reference to the 1969 ABM debate. See *Perception and Misperception*, p. 134.

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Weapons, and the strategic centrists of *The New Republic.*[11] This school may be fairly said to represent what has happened to Secretary McNamara's original formulation of assured destruction as it evolved through the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations in response to the Soviet build-up, new technological developments (especially MIRVs [multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles] and counterforce ballistic accuracies), and the doctrinal adjustments (the Schlesinger innovations of 1974-75, in particular) that flowed from them. The result is that the Pragmatic Center accepts some, but not all, of the basic axioms of minimal deterrence, but those that are not shared make an important practical difference.

First, the view that incremental strategic advantage short of decisive military superiority is meaningless is rejected less for military than for political reasons. The actual use of nuclear weapons may be quarantined from international politics but not their political shadow. Perceptions of imbalance are deleterious to the solidity of U.S. alliance relations, especially with NATO, upon which U.S. foreign policy depends. Second, the rapid pace of technological innovation, combined with the long lead times needed for developing and deploying replacement systems, is such that constant vigilance is required to maintain assured destruction capabilities. Thus, there are no natural technological plateaus in the arms competition, as the Liberal Establishment claimed. Sufficiency is a constantly moving target requiring prudent hedging and planning. This is why most members of the Pragmatic Center do not support a nuclear freeze, while virtually all members of the Liberal Establishment do. Still, they both agree on opposition to Star Wars.

Third, the Pragmatic Center disputes the view that arms competitions are inevitably destabilizing and lead to war, distinguishing among different weapons developments. Those weapons that put in jeopardy the survival of the other side's retaliatory forces are destabilizing, but other developments can enhance survivability, reduce payloads, or enhance command and control so as to reduce the risks of accidental war or war by inadvertant provocation. Advocates of minimal deterrence worry little about incremental differences in static indices of nuclear power beyond the threshold of sufficiency; the Pragmatic Center sees that such imbalances can pressure the disadvantaged side into assuming launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack postures in order to compensate for weakness. Numbers alone may mean little, but such hair-trigger (and hair-raising) postures may mean quite a lot.

[11] *Living with Nuclear Weapons* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983). For a summary, see "The Realities of Arms Control," *Atlantic Monthly,* June 1983, pp. 39-46. See, also, Charles Krauthammer, "The Illusion of Star Wars," *The New Republic,* May 14, 1984, pp. 13-17.

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Fourth and most important, the Pragmatic Center recognizes that mutual societal vulnerability only works as a deterrent if both sides share similar views of the nuclear predicament. Not only has this predicament itself changed with the introduction of counterforce capabilities on both sides, but Soviet building programs and statements cast doubt on the extent to which they have ever shared U.S. conceptions of deterrence, stability, and arms control. Doubts about the compatibility of U.S. and Soviet strategic cultures grew rapidly in the mid to late 1970s.[12] Controversy reached a peak with the SALT II debate in the summer of 1979, and it was this burgeoning doctrinal schism more than anything else that gave the debate its character and in the end defeated the treaty. Had SALT II been put before the Senate in 1976 or even 1977, it would have passed easily. Some Liberal Establishment critics continue to insist that Soviet ICBMs are not intended as counterforce weapons and that the ABM Treaty still stands as evidence that the Soviets share most major precepts of the assured destruction paradigm.[13] Members of the Pragmatic Center are not persuaded.

The upshot of these adjustments to the theory of assured destruction was a preference for a mixed countervalue-counterforce posture, carrying with it some prospect for quickly re-establishing intrawar deterrence should nuclear exchanges ever commence. What began in 1974 under the tenure of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger reached maturity with PD-59. As Harold Brown explained the new doctrine, assured destruction is not

> sufficient in itself as a strategic doctrine. Massive retaliation may not be appropriate, nor will its prospect always be sufficiently credible, to deter the full range of actions we seek to prevent. . . .
>
> For fully effective deterrence, we need to be able to respond at the level appropriate to the type and scale of a Soviet attack. Fully effective deterrence requires forces of sufficient size and flexibility to attack selectively a range of military and other targets and to enable us to hold back a significant reserve.
>
> The ability to provide measured retaliation in response to less-than-total attacks—and thus to prevent the Soviets from imagining that they can gain meaningful advantage at some level of nuclear conflict—is essential to credible deterrence. Moreover, whatever doubts one may have about whether a nuclear war could be kept limited, . . . it would be the height of folly to put the United States in a position where uncontrolled escalation would be the only course we could follow.[14]

[12] For a discussion of this topic, see Robert Legvold, "Strategic 'Doctrine' and SALT: Soviet and American Views," *Survival,* January-February 1979, pp. 8-13.

[13] See, for example, Arthur Macy Cox, "End the War Game," *New York Times,* November 8, 1983.

[14] Harold Brown, *SALT II and the National Defense,* Department of State Publication 8979, General Foreign Policy Series 313, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, April 5, 1979, p. 5.

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The implications of this strategic theory for ballistic missile defense is clear. Point defense may be permissible if clearly designed to ensure the survivability of one's vulnerable second-strike counterforce systems. But area defenses of all kinds—including Star Wars—are provocative and not necessary to achieve deterrrence. Secretary Brown and the Harvard Study Group have demurred from supporting Star Wars mainly on the ground that denying the other side's countervalue forces a free ride would lead to an endless offensive-defensive arms race spiral.

Politically speaking, it is accurate to say that almost all Democrats oppose the Star Wars initiative, some because of the strategic analysis of the Liberal Establishment, some because of the quite different analysis of the Pragmatic Center. In a presidential election year, it is fortunate for the Democrats that they can unite to oppose the Reagan administration on this issue even though, in truth, the party is deeply divided over basic strategic principles.

Justifying Star Wars

The Reagan administration at times sounds like an administration of the far Right, but its policies, in the military-strategic sphere at least, represent a school of thought that we can call the Conservative Mainstream. The strategic theory of the Conservative Mainstream, unlike that of the far Right, *is* a theory of deterrence. In nearly every respect, the Conservative Mainstream accepts the criticism of assured destruction launched by members of the Pragmatic Center, but assails them for not taking their critique to its logical conclusion. The deterrence of the Liberal Establishment is deterrence based on societal punishment through unacceptable levels of countervalue retaliation. The deterrence of the Pragmatic Center is deterrence based on a mix of societal punishment and military denial achieved through a mix of countervalue and counterforce targeting. The deterrence of the Conservative Mainstream emphasizes victory-denial above all else and emphasizes overwhelmingly a counterforce targeting posture. The threat of enormous societal damage remains, of course, but it is not the threat to punish that is held to deter in those tense circumstances most likely to lead to war. Indeed, since a victory-denial strategy (mixed or pure) is sensitive to threats at all levels, its ideal success, should deterrence fail, would be the restoration of deterrence at the earliest possible time at the lowest level of violence. This is the exact opposite of the ideal of a strategy that means to punish.

The differences between the Pragmatic Center and the Conservative Mainstream concern the mix of targeting postures most likely to strengthen deterrence. The Pragmatic Center is reluctant to leave the

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sobering certainty of unacceptable punishment too far behind lest a victory-denial posture look to the other side like a victory-seeking posture. The Conservative Mainstream is less concerned about how the U.S. strategic posture looks to the other side, and more concerned with rationalizing the U.S. deterrent itself. There should be not a single weapon in the U.S. arsenal without a militarily logical function, and threatening to do politically pointless and suicidal things with nuclear weapons (i.e., countervalue targeting) is not logical. The very possession of countervalue forces is more likely to lead to self-deterrence in a crisis than to the deterrence of the enemy. In other words, the Pragmatic Center seems more anxious about what might push an inferior power to attack—hence the concern about perceptions—while the Conservative Mainstream is more anxious about what might tempt a superior power to attack—hence the sensitivity to a strong victory-denying, logical war-fighting capability. The Pragmatic Center looks askance at Star Wars because it threatens the punishment component of its mixed targeting strategy, and because it might appear to be victory-seeking to the adversary. The Conservative Mainstream supports the initiative because it is a militarily logical component of a strategy aimed almost exclusively at victory-denial. As for perceptions, the Conservative Mainstream seems to share the Soviet assumption that if fundamental military tasks are performed well, the psychological requisites of deterrence will follow close behind.

It follows that the views taken by the Pragmatic Center and the Conservative Mainstream toward the ABM Treaty of 1972 differ accordingly. To the Liberal Establishment, the ABM Treaty has become sacrosanct—an example of all that is right and wonderful about arms control. To the Pragmatic Center, the ABM Treaty has served a useful purpose and should not be dismissed either as an encumbrance or as meaningless. Nevertheless, the Pragmatic Center will listen to suggestions to rebuild the one point-defense complex allowed the United States under the treaty and even to arguments that in the future the treaty may require mutual amendment to allow those point defenses deemed stabilizing.[15] To the Conservative Mainstream, the ABM Treaty is a vestige of an age of strategic illusion whose most fundamental assumptions have been undermined by technology and Soviet behavior. As Eugene V. Rostow put it: "I do not regard the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, or its substantial modification as, in any sense, a catastrophe in itself. The ABM Treaty is part of the old MAD doctrine and it suffers from all the weaknesses of

[15] See, for example, the collection of views in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds., *Ballistic Missile Defense* (Washington: Brookings, 1984).

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that doctrine."[16] Others point out, in addition, that the ABM Treaty was predicated on subsequent reductions in offensive systems (which never took place), the belief being that with defenses outlawed and a free ride for offensive forces assured, any rationale for expanding one's ICBM arsenal would be vitiated.[17] Things did not turn out that way, and the Conservative Mainstream argues that if and when the ABM Treaty prevents the United States from pursuing damage limitation as part of broader deterrent strategy, it should be abandoned.

It is worth pointing out some major differences between the Conservative Mainstream's attitude toward Star Wars on the one hand and that of the far Right on the other. The far Right sees Star Wars as a kind of final solution to U.S. vulnerability, a way out of the strategic conundrum altogether. Presumably, those on the far Right might agree with critics who hold that unless an area defense system is altogether leakproof, it is worthless. The difference, of course, is that the Liberal Establishment critic would hold that a leakproof system is impossible, while those on the Right would claim that it is not impossible.

This argument is not really relevant for advocates of area defense in the Conservative Mainstream. The point of defense and damage-limitation measures is not to find an exit from the strategic competition altogether, but to transform the risks involved. Logically, the most effective dissuasive posture is one that combines offensive and defensive systems in order to maximize the chances of defeating an adversary's pre-emptive strategy. Ballistic missile defense, whether point defense or area defense, need not be leakproof to be effective strategically. It need only complicate an adversary's strategy to the point that he is thoroughly deterred. The principal advantage to having an area defense is that, should deterrence break down anyway, defensive systems will minimize calamity, whereas their total absence will maximize it. With a deterrent structure featuring only offensive forces, we cannot afford for deterrence to fail even once. In a world with area defenses, and particularly in a situation where defenses are dominant, we at least give ourselves a second chance should human frailty produce failure, as many people across the political spectrum believe it inevitably must. It is even possible, argue some members of the Conservative Mainstream, that the existence of credible area defenses might dissuade a would-be aggressor from even planning to attack

[16] "Negotiation from Strength: An Interview with Eugene Rostow," *The Fletcher Forum*, Summer 1983, p. 231.

[17] The clearest expression of this view was presented by none other than Henry A. Kissinger. See U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Hearings*, 92nd Cong., 2d sess., 1972, pp. 121, 137.

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population centers, lest he waste so many warheads that he disarms himself.

As with the Democrats, then, the Republican view of the Reagan administration and its military-strategic programs is clearly a divided one. President Reagan has many times risked alienating the New Right constituency that helped carry him into the White House in 1980. In this election year, it is a safe bet that the administration will be reluctant to make too much of distinctions between the far Right and the Conservative Mainstream over Star Wars.

Is There a Star Wars in Our Future?

Where will the Star Wars proposal of this audacious rebel alliance lead us? Two things seem clear. First, the debate over ballistic missile defense this time around—as opposed to the ABM debate of the late 1960s—has occurred at a time of doctrinal transition and maturation, if not also considerable confusion. A national policy retreat to the innocent world of assured destruction—the nuclear freeze movement notwithstanding—is less and less likely. Second, the technical imponderables and financial tradeoffs involved in any Star Wars scheme are mammoth and will take a very long time to resolve. Nothing short of an unprecedented national emergency or an unprecedented absence of common sense will persuade Congress (and the entrenched military bureaucracies, as well) to throw caution to the winds in breakneck pursuit of the elusive seventh of the seven veils. In a time of seemingly permanent fiscal austerity and a surfeit of competing military and nonmilitary claimants to the federal budget, no congressman wants to leap off the high dive before he knows if there is going to be water in the pool. Congress may not be institutionally suited to quickly seizing upon creative ideas, but it is not inclined to be impetuous either. In other words, we are in for a long haul over the Star Wars concept: the doctrinal climate is such that the idea will not go away, and the financial climate is such that the idea will not be implemented quickly. And this would still be the case, incidentally, even if the experts were not everywhere to be seen disagreeing with each other. We are likely to see the intrusion of partisan politics into this realm of military-strategic affairs more than once with the usual measure of Herculean simplification, whimsical logic, and characteristic sloth. We are, it seems, doomed to another demonstration of the science of muddling through.[18]

In this case, such a fate is probably benign. Those who argue for point defenses as a first step toward a mixed offense-defense posture

[18] The reference is to Charles Lindbloom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through,' " *Public Administration Review,* Spring 1959, pp. 79-88.

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for deterrence make the best case. Besides, to save the MX program, it may still be necessary (and it would certainly be wise) to find some better deployment scheme than putting the missiles in unprotected silos. Some combination of limited mobility, deceptive basing, and point defense (within the limits of the ABM Treaty) remains the best solution for MX.[19] The concept of a layered defense system, combining endoatmospheric and exoatmospheric components, still makes the most sense for the future. We know much more about the endoatmospheric aspect at present, and such a program can be justified on its own merits regardless of what, if anything, should come next. This would be a reasonable precedent to follow both technically and politically; each step toward deploying defensive technologies should be built from below and be able to stand on its own. Moreover, this is the only way that any semblance of a coherent program can be sustained from one administration to the next over the many years that a defense transition will take.

Finally, as others have pointed out, should the nation choose to follow the road to strategic equipoise through defense dominance, the principal problems will not be technical, but the political ones of managing the transition from where we are now to where we want to go. This will involve coming to terms not only with the Soviet Union, but also with our allies. Indeed, if the past is any guide, technical advances will far outdistance political adjustments. In other words, we can put to good use the extra time that a more measured pace would provide. That the vicissitudes of domestic politics are more responsible for this than any explicit effort to make good public policy is either a measure of our luck or of the subtle wisdom of our system of decisionmaking.

[19] See my "Dense Pack: A Critique and an Alternative," *Parameters,* December 1982, esp. pp. 20-21.

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THE KGB's SPECIAL DEPARTMENTS IN THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES*

by Amy W. Knight

The question of how civilian authority is maintained over the Soviet armed forces has been the subject of considerable debate among Western scholars. Analysts have offered diverse and often contradictory theories about why the Soviet military has never seriously challenged the party's leadership, despite continued expansion of the military's power and capabilities. Several years ago Roman Kolkowicz advanced the view that the continued acceptance of civilian authority by the Soviet military could be attributed to a system of party controls, known since 1958 as the Main Political Administration (MPA) of the Soviet Army and Navy. The MPA, which operates as a department of the CPSU Central Committee, is a large and complex network of political organs embedded within the armed forces at all levels. According to Kolkowicz, the MPA has been "the Party's crucial instrument of control over the military," without which the party would not be able to rely on the military's obedience.[1]

More recent studies, however, have challenged Kolkowicz's approach and cast serious doubts on his assessment of the MPA's significance. Timothy Colton, for example, argues convincingly that the MPA is not an effective instrument of control, but rather serves as administrative support to the military.[2] After demonstrating the congruence of interest between MPA and armed forces personnel, he concludes: "The fact that the Soviet military has not exercised its potential for disruptive political action cannot be explained in terms of Party mechanisms for penetration and control of the military command."[3] Colton doubts that there is serious conflict between the party and the armed forces and attributes the latter's political quiescence to its basic conservatism and indifference to most

* This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the Conference on Soviet Military Personnel and Organizations organized by the Center for Strategic Technology of Texas A & M University in Arlington, Va., January 10-11, 1984. The author would like to thank Robert Stephan and George B. Bogounoff for their assistance in location of sources and Raymond Rocca for his useful comments. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent those of the Library of Congress.

[1] Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 123.

[2] Timothy J. Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics* (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1979).

[3] Ibid., p. 279.

Amy W. Knight is a Soviet affairs analyst at the Library of Congress. Her publications on Russian history and Soviet politics have appeared in such journals as *The Russian Review, Survey,* and *Soviet Union.*

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aspects of politics that do not affect it directly. In his view, the military is loyal to the party because its interests have been well served by the party's policies.

Another study, by Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande, concurs with Colton's view of the MPA and his thesis that there is no real conflict between the party and the armed forces, but it takes issue with Colton's conclusion that the Soviet army has the potential (albeit unexercised) to seize power from the party.[4] The authors claim that the military is subordinate to party authority by virtue of the party's ideological dominance. The armed forces have been politicized to the extent that even in cases of severe factional conflict they participate "not as the military per se, but as part of the Party, the Party-in-uniform." Thus, according to Perlmutter and LeoGrande, the military functions as a dual elite whose coercive potential will be used only to support one faction or another within the party, never against the party.

What is common to these theories of Soviet civilian-military relations is their exclusive focus on the relationship between the party and the military and their disregard for the role of the security police, which has its own apparatus within the armed forces — the so-called Special Departments (Osobye otdely) of the KGB. Perlmutter and LeoGrande acknowledge that the "ideological foundation of civilian control may well be buttressed by more practical sorts of political arrangements, for example, an internal security force or militia," but they view ideology as the "heart of the civilian control system."[5] Colton, citing the absence of widespread arrests or apparent use of police violence, claims that the Special Departments concentrate on genuine counterintelligence and play little role in monitoring the activities of the armed forces.[6]

The impact of the police on relations between civilian authority and the military should not be dismissed so readily, particularly since there have been no serious scholarly studies of the KGB's Special Departments. Given the military's enormous potential for organized, forceful opposition, can it really be taken for granted that the party leadership relies either on the political integration of the armed forces or on the supremacy of ideology as the principal guarantee against a threat to its predominance? Should analysts ignore the role of the police in controlling

[4] Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, "The Party in Uniform: Towards a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 76, 1982, pp. 778-89. William Odom's approach is similar in that he stresses a broad consensus between the party and the military on most important issues and sees factional conflicts as intraparty rather than party vs. military. But he conceives of the relationship between the party and military as symbiotic rather than coalitional, as Perlmutter and LeoGrande see it. See William Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique," in Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, eds., *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1978), pp. 27-52.

[5] Perlmutter and LeGrande, "The Party in Uniform," p. 786.

[6] Colton, *Commissars*, pp. 226-27.

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the armed forces simply because the police no longer apply force on a large scale? The crucial factor in determining the importance of police constraints on the military is the potential that this apparatus has to use such force and the possibility that overt violence has been replaced by more subtle and even more effective methods.

Although officially designated as a military counterintelligence organization, the KGB's Directorate of Special Departments performs tasks that extend far beyond counterintelligence and encompass extensive political surveillance of the military. The Soviets themselves have begun to publish books and articles on the past and present activities of the Special Departments which strongly suggest that this apparatus plays a much more important role in the armed forces than Western experts have realized. By examining these writings and other materials, this article sets forth the history, functions, and purpose of the KGB Special Departments and assesses their significance for civilian-military relations in the Soviet Union.

Evolution of the Special Departments

The history of the Special Departments in the Soviet armed forces dates back to July 16, 1918, when a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars created — under the security police, the Ve-Cheka — an Extraordinary Commission for the Struggle with Counterrevolution (Cheka) on the Eastern Front.[7] Shortly thereafter, Cheka organs were established at other fronts. Although these organs conducted counterintelligence operations against enemy agents, their main task was to fight counterrevolution, treason, and criminal activity within the Red Army itself. Such close political supervision and extensive control were seen as essential during a period when the Red Army depended heavily on former czarist officers, many of whom were politically unreliable. Although the Red Army eventually became more dependable, the political surveillance functions of the Special Departments were to remain paramount.

From the outset the difficulty of reconciling the authority and prerogatives of the military, the party, and the police presented the regime with problems. Apparently there was considerable conflict over jurisdiction between the army Chekas and the organs of Voenkontrol (Military Control) of the Revolutionary War Council (Revvoensovet), which were also responsible for counterintelligence and counterespionage. In an at-

[7] Among the sources on the Cheka's Special Departments are S. Z. Ostriakov, *Voennye chekisty* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979); Iu. B. Dogopolov, *Voina bez linii fronta* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1981); "Osobye otdely," in *Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 6 (Moscow, 1978), pp. 142-43; I. Ustinov and K. Kapitonov, "Polveka na boevom postu," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 1, 1969, pp. 99-102; and George Leggett, *The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police* (London: Oxford University Press, 1982).

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tempt to resolve the issue, the two organizations were merged, and by January 1, 1919, a single organization for military counterintelligence — the Special Department (Osobyi Otdel, or OO) of the VeCheka — was established. It was headed initially by a top VeCheka official, M. S. Kedrov, but subsequently the head of the VeCheka, Felix Dzerzhinskii, assumed direct control over the OO. Subordinate Special Departments were established in all the provincial Chekas, military fronts, and armies, while OO commissars were assigned to divisions, regiments, and other units. They were empowered to make arrests, conduct searches, carry out investigations of counterrevolutionary crimes, and in areas under martial law, carry out executions. The OOs were important enough to be allocated one-third the total VeCheka budget in 1920.[8]

Initially the OOs were under the dual authority of the central Special Department and the Revvoensovet, both of which could issue orders to them. The situation was further complicated by the July 1918 creation of a hierarchy of military commissars under the Revvoensovet to supervise the political loyalty of military personnel. These commissars shared command with military officers and, like OO commissars, could arrest officers for counterrevolutionary activity. Conflicts over authority and overlapping functions soon arose between political commissars and OO personnel. The problem was brought to Lenin's attention in January 1919, when a dispute occurred between the head of the Political Department and the head of the OO at the Caspian-Caucasian front.

Two recent Soviet books on the Special Departments offer very different interpretations of this incident.[9] Both acknowledge that Lenin, on hearing about the dispute, sent a telegram ordering those involved to settle their differences. One source, S. Z. Ostriakov, attributes the dispute to an "incorrect attitude toward the army Chekists" on the part of the political commissar. According to Ostriakov, a special commission of the Central Committee which was sent to investigate the matter vindicated the OO officer, while both the political commissar and the chairman of the front's military council were removed from their posts. The other source, Iu. B. Dogopolov, attributes blame to the OO officer, who "misunderstood the leading role of local Party organizations in relation to all other organs within their territory." Dogopolov makes no mention of a Central Committee commission or the dismissals. That Soviet histories would attach such significance to this incident, offering strikingly different accounts, suggests that there may be an ongoing dispute today over the relationship between the Special Department, on the one hand, and the MPA and the party, on the other.

[8] Leggett, *The Cheka,* p. 207. The total VeCheka budget for 1920 was 4,588,200,000 rubles.
[9] See Ostriakov, *Voennye chekisty,* p. 41; and Dogopolov, *Voina,* pp. 66-67.

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The problem of the OO's subordination generated considerable discussion at the Eighth Party Congress held in March 1919. At this time it was decided to place the OOs of the fronts and armies directly under the Political Department (later named the Political Administration) of the Revvoensovet, while leaving "general leadership and control" to the VeCheka Special Department at the center. This change was introduced because the party wanted to keep a closer watch on the political loyalty of the army. It was also part of a general move against the so-called army opposition, who wanted more independence for the Red Army command from the party's political commissars.[10]

During the civil war years, "army Chekists" from the Special Departments were occupied with searching out treasonous elements within the Red Army, particularly among former czarist officers. From 1919 to 1921 they uncovered several major conspiracies against the Soviet regime. They also performed a variety of other tasks, including the arrest of deserters, the security of arms and ammunition depots, and general surveillance over Red Army facilities. In November 1921 the OOs took over responsibility for guarding the borders; special sections for border security were set up in the main border regions, with border units and posts subordinate to them. Their function was to protect the borders from foreign intelligence agents, White Guard emissaries, and smugglers.[11] The OOs retained control of the border service after the GPU (State Political Administration) was created to replace the VeCheka in February 1922. (In 1923 the GPU became the Unified State Political Administration, or OGPU.) It was not until 1926 that a separate Border Guards Directorate was established within the security police apparatus.

After the civil war ended and the ranks of the Red Army were reduced, the OOs concentrated on fighting kulaks and various nationalist bands. They also conducted several operations abroad designed to ensnare members of Russian émigré groups and to transmit disinformation to Western intelligence services. By the mid-1920s, when the threat of subversion from abroad had subsided, the OOs devoted increasing effort to internal control of the armed forces. Their purpose was to protect army and navy personnel from "bourgeois influences" and to expose the "slightest manifestation of political corruption" or "unhealthy attitudes" among military units. Their functions thus became increasingly politicized and, like the rest of the OGPU, they were drawn into the various power struggles within the party. (The OOs took an active part in the defeat of the "Trotskyite-Zinovievite Opposition" in 1926-27, for example.)[12]

[10] Leggett, *The Cheka*, pp. 206-7; Dogopolov, *Voina*, pp. 64-65.
[11] Ostriakov, *Voennye chekisty*, pp. 87-123.
[12] Ibid.

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As the police apparatus in general became more powerful, the OOs also gained more authority. In 1931 they were made completely independent of the Revvoensovet and responsible only to the Special Department at the center. These changes strengthened the role of the OOs as political watchdogs against the military command and paved the way for their participation in the massive purges of the armed forces during 1937-38. One OO representative told a high-ranking Soviet officer during the purges, "In every person I see an enemy of the people, and not a single one will escape, slip through, or deceive me."[13] Alleging foreign espionage plots, the OOs helped implement a purge of 20 to 30 per cent of the officer corps.[14] There can be little doubt that this experience had a profound impact on the attitude of the military toward the police and serves as a reminder, even today, of the latter's potential powers if not closely controlled by the party.

The OOs soon suffered a blow in return. In November 1938 a purge of the police apparatus, at this time called the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs), was initiated, and most of the higher OO apparatus was liquidated. To replace the purged elements, new personnel were brought in from the party and the army. Among the new men were several who later rose in the KGB hierarchy during the Brezhnev era, including Vitalii Fedorchuk, briefly chairman of the KGB and currently minister of internal affairs.[15]

The Special Departments in World War II

World War II brought about significant changes in the organization and functions of the Special Departments (see Table I). in February 1941, shortly before the German attack, military counterintelligence was transferred from the state security organs to the People's Commissariat of Defense. At the same time, the state security organs themselves were separated from the NKVD, and the NKGB (People's Commissariat of State Security) was formed. OO officers were subordinated both to higher OO officials and to military commanders. This dual subordination apparently led to considerable friction between the military command and the military counterintelligence apparatus, particularly after the German attack. Ac-

[13] A. Iu. Vedenin, *Gody i liudi* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964), p. 56; (quoted by P. Kruzhin, "Osobye otdely i Brezhnev," *Radio Liberty Research* (in Russian) RFE-RL RS-1371/79, September 20, 1979.

[14] Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 74-76.

[15] *Istoriia velikoi otechestvennoi voiny sovetskogo soiuza 1941-1945,* vol. 6 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), pp. 134-35. Ostriakov, *Voennye chekisty,* p. 132. For more information on Fedorchuk's career in the Special Departments, see Peter Derabin and T. H. Bagley, "Fedorchuk, the KGB, and the Soviet Succession," ORBIS, Fall 1982, pp. 611-35. Another person who joined the OOs at this time was D. P. Nosyrev, currently chief of the KGB for Leningrad City and Oblast.

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TABLE I

ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF THE SPECIAL DEPARTMENTS
(SOVIET MILITARY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE)

July 1918	Extraordinary Commission (Cheka) established to fight counter-revolution on the Eastern Front, followed by the creation of Chekas on other fronts.
January 1919	Special Department (Osobyi Otdel, or OO) of VeCheka created.
February 1922	Special Department (OO) of VeCheka becomes OO of GPU (State Political Administration).
November 1923	OO of GPU becomes OO of OGPU (Unified State Political Administration).
July 1934	OO of OGPU becomes OO of newly created Main Administration of State Security (GUGB) of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD).
February 1941	OO of NKVD transferred to Third Office of People's Commissariat of Defense and Third Office of Navy Commissariat.
July 1941	Military counterintelligence transferred back to NKVD as OO of NKVD.
April 1943	OO of NKVD becomes Main Administration of Counterintelligence (GUKR) of People's Commissariat of Defense, or SMERSH, with a separate SMERSH organization within the navy.
May 1946	SMERSH disbanded. Military counterintelligence reorganized into Special Department (OO) and subordinated to newly created Ministry of State Security (MGB) as the Main Administration of Counterintelligence (GUKR).
March 1953	OO of MGB becomes OO of newly established MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs), which unites functions of former MGB and MVD.
March 1954	United MVD disbanded. Separate MVD and KGB (Committee of State Security) created. Third Directorate, or Directorate of Special Departments (OOs), established within KGB.

cording to one Soviet source, "There were cases where individual commanders tried to use army Chekists for various service tasks, which had little relation to their basic functions."[16] Thus, in July 1941, when the NKGB was reintegrated into the NKVD, military counterintelligence was again placed completely under the NKVD's control.

The beginning of World War II found Soviet military counterintelligence deficient in several respects. The purges of the Special Departments shortly before the war meant that many of its officers and staff were new and inexperienced. Furthermore, before the German attack little attention had been paid to training cadres or planning for wartime

[16] Ostriakov, *Voennye chekisty,* p. 149.

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counterintelligence. Thus the OOs had no alternative but to organize and train for military counterintelligence when they were "already face to face with the enemy."[17] According to recently declassified U.S. intelligence documents from the period, the ineffectiveness of Soviet military counterintelligence permitted the Germans to gain considerable information about the disposition and strength of the Red Army at the beginning of the war and subsequently to penetrate some of the highest levels of the Soviet wartime command.[18] One Soviet history of the OOs even acknowledges: "There were misfortunes, mistakes, defeats. And so that they are not repeated, they should not be forgotten."[19]

April 1943 brought yet another reorganization. The Special Departments of the NKVD were abolished, and military counterintelligence was transferred back to the People's Commissariat of Defense. The new organization, known as the Main Counterintelligence Administration (GUKR of SMERSH), was headed by the former Special Department chief, the notorious V. S. Abakumov.[20] Some Soviet histories, glossing over the deficiencies of Soviet military counterintelligence prior to 1943, attribute the change to various factors, such as the need to "unify the defense leadership in the final stages of the war."[21] But other Soviet sources point out that the reorganization was part of an effort to improve Soviet military counterintelligence.[22] SMERSH did prove to be more effective than its predecessor. Counterintelligence behind German lines became much more vigorous, and many German spy networks were broken up. Nevertheless, Soviet military counterintelligence continued throughout the war to be hampered by several weaknesses, which were enumerated in a U.S. intelligence document:

> First, constant emphasis on repression and coercion breeds resentment and disaffection even in normally loyal persons. Secondly, the very comprehensiveness of espionage regulations and security measures disperses the efforts of the counterintelligence agencies and forces them to depend primarily upon routine and stereotyped methods. Consequently, while inexpert agents are easily detected, skilled foreign agents with authentic credentials can operate with considerable impunity. Thirdly, the tight segregation of information and the frequent use of internal or special codes afford special opportunities for penetration and the use

[17] Ibid., p. 167. Also see D. P. Nosyrev, ed., *V poedinke s abverom: Dokumentalnyi ocherk o chekistakh Leningradskogo fronta 1941-1945* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), p. 28.

[18] See *Survey of Soviet Intelligence and Counterintelligence,* Intelligence Division, GSUSA, Department of the Army, January 9, 1948, declassified NND 770011, pp. 15, 30-31.

[19] Dogopolov, *Voina,* p. 113.

[20] For a defector's account of Abakumov and SMERSH, see A. I. Romanov, *Nights Are Longest There: Smersh from the Inside,* trans. Gerald Brooke (London: Hutchinson, 1972). Military intelligence was conducted by a separate organization, the Main Intelligence Administration (GRU) of the General Staff. It concentrated on collecting technical, economic, and logistical information on foreign nations.

[21] Ostriakov, *Voennye chekistry,* p. 178; Nosyrev, *V poedinke,* p. 106.

[22] Dogopolov, *Voina,* p. 145; N. N. Koshelev and B. D. Lebin, "Boitsy Nezrimogo fronta," in *Slavnaia pobeda pod Leningradom* (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1976), pp. 479-87.

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of clandestine communications. Lastly, overstress on counterintelligence has led to relative neglect of criminal detection, in relation to both the effort and the moral outlook of the operating agencies.[23]

The functions of counterespionage and counterintelligence resided mainly with SMERSH organs at the higher levels, while lower SMERSH organs were concerned with supervising the political loyalty of the troops. The severity and ruthlessness which SMERSH operatives used in dealing with even the slightest malfeasance have been well documented.[24] Often this took the form of periodic, sweeping campaigns of repression aimed at intimidating the soldiers through exemplary punishment. According to one account,

> Most of the accusations made by Smersh were of a standard variety. Thus, while during peacetime the NKVD was always busy combatting "wrecking" which was said to be occurring everywhere, during wartime a similarly all-inclusive accusation was that of "cowardice." Commanders and soldiers defeated by the enemy or forced to leave their equipment behind were tried for "cowardice."[25]

SMERSH personnel saturated the Red Army at all levels. U.S. intelligence documents estimated that 3 to 4 per cent of the Soviet armed forces in World War II were engaged in intelligence or counterintelligence, while roughly 12 per cent of all military personnel were agents or informers of military counterintelligence.[26] Counterintelligence sections existed at all levels of organization down to divisions. According to one source, the administration of counterintelligence for an army averaged about 100 to 110 men, exclusive of guards and representatives among the troops. Departments for counterintelligence of corps and divisions were smaller.[27] A division counterintelligence department consisted of about seven to eleven persons. Below the division level there were no counterintelligence departments or sections, but representatives were placed within the staffs of regiments, battalions, and companies. SMERSH also had agents or residents, who were regular soldiers, in the various subordinate units who in turn recruited informers. Table II, from a SMERSH document dated April 25, 1944,[28] shows the extent of SMERSH penetration of the troops.

As might be expected, regular military officers were resentful of the Chekists in their midst and cooperated with efforts to ensnare "cowards" only when forced to do so. The relationship between SMERSH

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[23] *Survey of Soviet Intelligence,* p. 15.

[24] See Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956,* trans. Thomas P. Whitney (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), esp. pp. 15-23, 78-83; Simon Wolin and Robert Slusser, eds., *The Soviet Secret Police* (New York: Praeger, 1957), pp. 19-20; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed., *Political Controls in the Soviet Army* (New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1954), pp. 17-73, 78-83.

[25] Brzezinski, *Political Controls,* p. 82.

[26] *Survey of Soviet Intelligence,* p. 11.

[27] Ibid., p. 51.

[28] Ibid., p. 52.

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TABLE II
SMERSH, 389th RIFLE DIVISION

Unit (subordinate to the Division Staff)	SMERSH Residents	Unit Strength	Former POWs	Survivors of Pockets	From Occupied Areas	Under Sentence
838th Signal Company	11	143	1	5	11	0
454th Task Destroyer Battalion	7	174	72	18	30	1
667th Engineer Battalion	7	132	6	1	21	5
449th Reconnaissance Company	6	62	17	1	1	1

officers and the political commissars, or *zampolits,* as they were called after 1942, was also characterized by antagonism. Memoir literature offers several examples of *zampolits* siding with military commanders to protect the troops from persecution by SMERSH personnel at the front.[29] It should be pointed out, however, that military counterintelligence organs had been staffed with large numbers of political officers at the beginning of the war, which may have mitigated to a certain extent the tension between the two groups. Also, both *zampolits* and SMERSH personnel were responsible for ensuring the loyalty of the troops, and both were held accountable for defections and desertions. Because they shared a common task they had to meet frequently to exchange information and discuss the political morale of the troops.

The relationship between the *zampolit* and the SMERSH representative in World War II continues to be a matter of discussion in Soviet publications today. Readers are undoubtedly expected to draw inferences about the current relationship between the MPA and the KGB's Special Departments. One incident, recorded in the memoirs of the former chief of the Special Department of the Black Sea Group of Forces, V. Zarelua, has been given particular attention, mainly because it involved Zarelua's meeting with Leonid Brezhnev in 1942. The incident is significant because of the marked discrepancies in the way it has been cited. Some sources portray Brezhnev, who was then deputy chief of the political department at the front, as having a very authoritative role vis-à-vis Zar-

[29] See A. G. Rytov, *Rytsari piatogo okeana* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1970), pp. 145-49; K. F. Telegin, *Ne otdali Moskvy* (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1975), pp. 120-132. See, also, Solzhenitsyn, *Gulag,* pp. 18-19; Vladmir and Evdokia Petrov, *Empire of Fear* (New York: Praeger, 1956), pp. 98-99; and Brzezinski, *Political Controls,* pp. 80-83.

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elua,[30] while other sources quote the memoirs in a different way, so as to emphasize that Brezhnev was there to help Zarelua and not to give orders.[31] Whatever version is closest to the truth, the discrepancies probably reflect disagreements about the respective roles of the MPA and the OOs.

In addition to counterintelligence, counterespionage, and political security of the troops, SMERSH had other important tasks. First, it maintained surveillance over the civilian population in operational zones not covered by the territorial NKVD agencies. After the Red Army took the offensive, SMERSH organs, along with local security police, hunted down, arrested, and often shot on the spot anyone suspected of having collaborated with the Germans. They also suppressed any form of nationalist opposition in territory "liberated" by the Red Army. As Ostriakov put it, SMERSH "helped the people of liberated countries in establishing and strengthening a free domestic form of government."[32] After the German surrender, another function of SMERSH was to screen former Soviet prisoners of war before they were repatriated to the Soviet Union. This task was reportedly carried out ruthlessly and inhumanely, with large numbers of deaths. Ostriakov acknowledges that "there was a tendency to regard Soviet POW's with distrust. Even military counterintelligence made such mistakes."[33] The variety of functions performed by SMERSH in World War II and immediately afterward suggests that in any present-day conflict the role of the Special Departments would be similarly broad and extend beyond the immediate tasks of military counterintelligence. In fact, the Special Departments probably played an active role when the Soviets moved into Czechoslovakia in 1968 and into Afghanistan in 1979.

The KGB's Special Departments: Organization and Personnel

SMERSH was disbanded in 1946, and military counterintelligence was returned to the hands of the state security apparatus as the Main Administration of Counterintelligence (GUKR) of the Ministry of State Security (MGB). The military counterintelligence staff was reduced significantly, and many former SMERSH personnel were transferred to other MGB departments. When at the instigation of Beria the MGB was amalgamated into the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) in 1953, military counterintelligence became part of this organization, which was headed

[30] Dogopolov, *Voina,* pp. 197-98; *Sovetskii voin,* no. 16, 1979, p. 31; and *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil,* no. 7, April 1979, p. 93. Zarelua's memoirs, *Kavkaz vystoial, kavkaz pobedil* (Tbilisi, 1973), are not available.

[31] Ostriakov, *Voennye chekisty,* pp. 229-30.

[32] Ibid., p. 205.

[33] Ibid., p. 256. See, also, Solzhenitsyn, *Gulag,* pp. 82-83, 237-51.

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by Beria himself. These changes were short-lived, however, since Beria's opponents, led by Nikita Khrushchev with the active participation of Marshall Zhukov and other military leaders, managed to have him arrested and his vast police apparatus dismantled.[34] In 1954, separate internal affairs and state security organs were established — the MVD and the KGB — and military counterintelligence was renamed the Directorate of Special Departments, or the Third Directorate of the KGB.

As part of an effort to bring the security police back under the control of the party, several former Beria associates in military counterintelligence were purged and replaced with cadres from the military-political organs. D. S. Leonov, who became chief of the Special Departments in 1954, was typical of the new OO leadership. At the age of fifty-four, Leonov had over thirty years of political work in the Soviet army behind him. He served as chief of the Special Departments until 1959, when he was replaced by G. K. Tsinev, an old Brezhnev ally who had been an army political officer and had joined the Special Departments shortly after Stalin died.[35] It is important to note, however, personnel changes affected mainly the top level of military counterintelligence; most of the lesser officials survived the 1953 shakeup. Moreover, despite Khrushchev's destalinization campaign and the substantial measures taken to curb the powers of the police, the KGB began to regain political status and influence, even before Khrushchev's ouster.[36]

It is not surprising that there is little information available on how the Third Directorate (said by some sources to have the status of a Chief Directorate) is presently organized. During World War II, SMERSH was organized along functional lines, with separate departments for surveillance, investigation, counterespionage, censorship, security, information, personnel, and so on, and a military tribunal for trying and sentencing those arrested by SMERSH operatives.[37] An independent military counterintelligence organization existed within the Soviet navy. Some Western sources claim that the Third Directorate, which is now responsible for all of the armed forces, including the navy, is organized at the top level according to service branches. John Barron lists twelve major

[34] See Roy Medvedev, *Khrushchev,* trans. Brian Pearce (New York: Anchor Press / Doubleday, 1983), pp. 59-71. According to Petrov, *Empire of Fear,* p. 99, the Special Departments had played a role in Marshall Zhukov's temporary fall from favor after World War II. If so, this gave Zhukov added incentive to participate in moves against the police. After 1953, he apparently was urging that the military victims of the purges be rehabilitated — a potential embarrassment to the KGB and the Special Departments. See Michael J. Deane, *Political Control of the Soviet Armed Forces* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), pp. 60-61. Thus the latter in their turn probably supported Khrushchev in his dismissal of Zhukov in 1957.

[35] See Leonov's obituary, *Krasnaia zvezda,* January 14, 1981, p. 4; *Ezhegodnik Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia* (Moscow: Izdat. Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1971), p. 637; and Ostriakov, *Voennye chekisty,* pp. 272-73.

[36] See A. Knight, "The Powers of the Soviet KGB," *Survey,* Summer 1980, pp. 138-55.

[37] *Survey of Soviet Intelligence,* pp. 49-51.

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departments within the Third Directorate, which oversee the Ministry of Defense and General Staff, the Main Intelligence Administration (GRU), conventional ground forces, naval forces, air forces, border troops, militia and internal troops, missile forces, nuclear forces, civil aviation, and the Moscow military district. If such service departments do exist, they are obviously not equal in terms of size and stature. For example, the Ground Forces Department would have much greater responsibility than departments in charge of border troops or civil aviation. Also, the OO's of some force groups, such as the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG), may have the status of main departments, or even subdirectorates.[38] Most functional divisions, such as surveillance and security, are probably duplicated and subordinated to these main departments or subdirectorates, but some, such as counterespionage and personnel, may serve as independent departments of the Third Directorate with branches at various levels. This would mean that the Third Directorate is organized somewhat like the MPA, with both service and functional divisions.

There are no figures available on the manpower of the Third Directorate, but reports from Soviets who have defected to the West permit some broad estimates of the Third Directorate's personnel strength. Today the OO network in the armed forces is undoubtedly much smaller than it was during the war, but KGB Special Departments still exist in all military institutions and installations, all military districts, groups of forces, armies, corps, divisions, and brigades. Regiments and independent battalions do not have Special Departments as such, but they do have two or three operational case officers from the Third Directorate.[39] One former OO officer, Aleksei Myagkov, who served with the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany from 1969 to 1974, offered some figures on the Special Department there. Based on his figures, there appears to have been about one OO officer (excluding agents and informers) for every 600 men — about 0.17 per cent. If this ratio is applied broadly to the total manpower of Soviet armed forces today, we arrive at a figure of about 9,500 Special Department personnel.[40]

The OO network among Soviet forces stationed abroad may be denser than among forces within the Soviet Union, and ground forces in general may also have a higher ratio of OO personnel in their midst

[38] John Barron, *The KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents* (New York: Bantam Books, 1974), pp. 19-20; and Aleksei Myagkov, *Inside the KGB* (Richmond, Surrey, Eng.: Foreign Affairs Publishing House, 1976), pp. 53-54. See, also, Peter Deriabin and Frank Gibney, *The Secret World* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1982), p. 108. This is a reprint, with some revision, of a book originally published in 1959. Deriabin lists four main divisions for the army, navy, air force, and General Staff, but the number of divisions has probably increased.

[39] V. P. Artemiev, "OKR: State Security in the Soviet Armed Forces," *Military Review*, September 1963, p. 22; Brzezinski, *Political Controls*, pp. 55-57.

[40] Myagkov, *Inside the KGB*, p. 26; *The Military Balance, 1983-1984* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), pp. 11-18.

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than, for example, the Soviet navy. Nevertheless, even if the figure of 9,500 is an overestimate, it does not take into account the OO departments or staff officers that exist in all the defense-related industries, missile installations, and Aeroflot and among the MVD internal troops, the border guards, and other special troops. If we add these, plus the staff of the Third Directorate at KGB headquarters in Moscow, an estimate of 10,000 to 12,000 for the total manpower is probably not an exaggeration, particularly since Colton estimates the total MPA strength to be around 40,000.[41]

According to most sources, political reliability is the main criterion for recruitment into the KGB, including its Special Departments, although educational background is also stressed. Third Directorate personnel sections select OO officers, drawing mainly from the military and the MPA, but these selections must be sanctioned by the Administrative Organs Department of the Central Committee. The Third Directorate sends its officer personnel to special training schools, one of which is known to be in Novosibirsk. While specializing in military counterintelligence, the new recruits receive courses on all aspects of KGB operations, which means that they can move to other areas of the KGB without much additional training. Transfers to other types of KGB work, as well as between geographic locations, are not altogether uncommon at higher levels.[42]

OO officials, or "military Chekisty," represent a specialized group within the KGB, and their career patterns and backgrounds are fairly homogeneous. Profiles of eighteen KGB officials who have served in the Third Directorate at some time or other since 1954 offer a picture of the OO career type at the upper echelons (see Table III). All, with the exception of Geidar Aliev, are Slavs by nationality. Higher education appears to be the norm among these officials. Most started their working careers by joining the Special Departments during the war or before, though at least three served in the MPA before joining the Special Departments. About half these officials subsequently moved out of the Third Directorate into other work in the KGB or elsewhere. Judging from their subsequent careers, their service with the Special Departments seems to have placed them in a good position for upward mobility. In particular, Mironov, Aliev, Fedorchuk, Ivashutin, and Tsinev all rose to positions of considerable prominence in the KGB, the party, or government. It is significant that from May to December 1982, both the chairman and one

[41] Colton, *Commissars,* p. 15.

[42] See Myagkov, *Inside the KGB,* pp. 44-48; Deriabin and Gibney, *Secret World,* p. 69; Barron, *The KGB,* p. 99; and *Survey of Soviet Intelligence,* pp. 82, 160-61. The field of foreign espionage, supervised by the First Chief Directorate, may be an exception. There is little evidence of personnel transfers into or out of this directorate.

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of the first deputy chairmen of the KGB (Fedorchuk and Tsinev, respectively) were former military Chekists.

It is not possible to determine exactly who has headed the Third Directorate since Tsinev occupied that position. Fedorchuk may have been chief from about 1967 to 1970, when he became chairman of the KGB in the Ukraine, and according to some sources I. A. Fadeikin was chief in the early 1970s. At present, the evidence suggests that Lieutenant General N. A. Dushin is chief (or at least a high-ranking official) of the Third Directorate. Ostriakov refers to him as occupying a key position in the Special Departments, and he was identified as the head of an unnamed directorate when he attended the Twenty-sixth Party Congress in 1981.[43]

Functions of the Special Departments

According to official Soviet sources, the main function of the KGB's Special Departments is military counterintelligence.[44] Yet the Soviets conceive of counterintelligence in much broader terms than we in the West do, and the functions of the Special Departments extend far beyond the struggle against foreign espionage and the hostile penetration of foreign agents into the armed forces. The Special Departments, for example, are responsible for all security clearances of military personnel and for ensuring that security regulations and procedures are strictly observed in all branches of the armed forces.[45] Thus they have control over, or at least immediate access to, military personnel files and all information relating to the political reliability of members of the armed forces. In cases of violations of security procedure, the OOs investigate the situation and make sure the violators have been held to account. The Special Departments are also charged with protecting all military secrets, including those involving nuclear weapons, which places them in a position of considerable strategic importance. Ostriakov has pointed out: "The reliable defense of Soviet forces from all types of espionage took on special significance when the basic defensive strength of the country came to consist of the most contemporary weapons systems, especially ballistic-nuclear weapons."[46]

The Soviets claim that their armed forces, and the population at large, are continually being threatened by so-called ideological diver-

[43] See CIA, *Directory of Soviet Officials,* vol. 1, *National Organizations,* November 1973, p. 202; Ostriakov, *Voennye chekisty,* p. 152; and *XXVIs'ezd KPSS: Stenograficheskii otchet,* vol. 3 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1981), p. 351.

[44] "Osobye otdely"; Ostriakov, *Voennye chekisty,* p. 275.

[45] Ostriakov, *Voennye chekisty,* pp. 300-1.

[46] Ibid., p. 275.

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TABLE III
PROFILES OF SOME KGB THIRD DIRECTORATE OFFICIALS
(1954-1984)

	Birth Date	*Nationality*	*Education*	*CP Membership*	*Career*
Alekseev, Aleksandr Vasilevich Major General	—	Russian	—	—	party *apparatchik;* s. 1953 MVG / KGB 3rd Dir.; id. June 1977 as Dep. Chief Moscow KGB; died January 1980.
Aliev, Geidar Ali Rza Major General	1923	Azerbaidzhan	higher	s. 1945	SMERSH, OO 1943-64; s. 1964 Dep. Chm., Chm. Azer. KGB; s. 1969 1st Sec. Azer. CP; s. 1982 1st Dep. Chm. USSR C. of M., member CPSU Politburo.
Chugunov, Vasilii Ivanovich Colonel	—	Russian	—	—	s. WW II SMERSH, OO; 1948-52 Chief OO, GSFG; s. 1952 in 3rd Dir., Moscow; retired; died April 1978.
Dushin, Nikolai Alekseevich Lieutenant General	1918	Russian	higher	—	school teacher; s. WW II OO; currently Chief of 3rd Dir.
Evdokimenko, Georgii Stefanovich Lieutenant General	1914	Russian	higher	s. 1940	s. 1939 OO; 1963-75 Chm. KGB Kazakhstan; retired.
Fadeikin, Ivan Anisimovich	—	Russian	—	s. 1939	s. 1949 OO; early 1970s (?) Chief, 3rd Dir.; died 1979.
Fedorchuk, Vasilii Vasilevich Army General	1918	Ukrainian	higher	s. 1940	journalist; s. 1939 OO; Chief, 3rd Dir. 1967-70 (?); 1970-82 Chm. Ukr. KGB; May-December 1982 Chm. USSR KGB; s. December 1982 USSR Min. of Internal Affairs.
Feldsherov, Ivan Alekseevich Major General	1915	Russian	—	—	s. 1946 OO, Moscow; died May 1977.

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Guskov, Anatolii Mikhailovich	—	Russian	middle	—	s. 1941 OO, SMERSH; 1950-54 oblast st. sec. organs; 1954-56 Chm. Azer. KGB; 1956-?? OO, Moscow.
Ivashutin, Petr Ivanovich Army General	1909	Russian	middle	s. 1930	s. 1926 Sov. army; s. WW II OO; 1961-63, 1st Dep. Chm. USSR KGB; s. 1963, Chief GRU.
Leonov, Dmitrii Sergeevich Lieutenant General	1899	Russian	higher	s. 1918	s. 1922 Sov. army, then MPA; 1953-59 MVD/KGB 3rd Dir. (Chief 1954-59); 1959 ret.; died 1981.
Lepikin, Nikolai Nikolaevich	1918	Russian	—	—	s. 1939 OO; became Chief of OO of a naval fleet; died 1964.
Loiko, Nikolai Antonovich Major General	—	Russian	—	—	Komsomol; MPA; s. WW II OO; currently in leading post in 3rd Dir., Moscow.
Matveev, Aleksardr Ivanovich	—	Russian	—	—	Komsomol; s. WW II OO; currently a leading 3rd Dir. official.
Mironov, Nikolai Romanovich Major General	1913	Russian	higher	s. 1940	Komsomol and party work; s. 1951 OO; 1957-59 Chief Leningrad KGB; 1959-64 Chief Admin. Organs Dept., CPSU CC; died October 1964.
Nosyrev, Daniel Pavlovich Lieutenant General	1915	Russian	higher	—	engineer; s. WW II OO; s. 1970 Chief Leningrad KGB.
Shornikov, Sergei Semenovich Lieutenant General	—	Russian	higher	—	army intelligence during WW II; s. 1952, OO; s. 1967 Commandant of Kremlin, 9th Main Guards Dir.
Tsinev, Georgii Karpovich Army General	1907	Russian	higher	s. 1932	party work; 1941-51 MPA; s. 1953 OO; Chief 3rd Dir. 1959-??; s. 1970 Dep. Chm., s. 1982, 1st Dep. Chm., USSR KGB.

Biographical information is from numerous sources, including S. Z. Ostriakov, *Voennye chekisty* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979); *Deputaty verkhovnogo soveta SSSR* (Moscow), for various years; *Ezhegodnik Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia* (Moscow, 1971); and various issues of *Krasnaia zvezda*.

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sion, or attempts by Western governments to subvert individuals by means of bourgeois propaganda aimed at weakening their political and ideological convictions. According to the Soviets, the development of anti-Soviet views or politically unorthodox attitudes makes the military more vulnerable to penetration by foreign espionage. Hence, a key element of OO activities is political surveillance of the armed forces at all levels. Since World War II, this surveillance function has taken precedence over other counterintelligence and counterespionage activities.[47]

The OOs carry out their political surveillance on a formal level and an informal level. Officially, the OOs are empowered by law to conduct investigations into crimes against the state or political crimes committed by members of the military. According to Soviet law, the KGB's Special Departments investigate cases of treason, espionage, terrorism, diversion, anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, divulgence of military secrets, and various other state crimes involving the military. All other crimes committed by members of the armed forces are investigated by special military procurators (or prosecutors) of the USSR Military Procurator's Office, which is a branch of the USSR Supreme Court.[48]

In investigating cases under their purview, OO officers no longer have the vast powers that their predecessors enjoyed. They are supposed to follow set rules of criminal procedure at all stages of the investigation. These regulations govern procedure for arrest and questioning of suspects, time limits on the confinement of those accused before trial, and various other aspects of the investigation.[49] Furthermore, the OOs no longer have the right to conduct trials. Once the investigation has been completed, the case is tried by special military tribunals under the USSR Military Procuracy. It is difficult to say whether the OOs actually operate according to these legal norms. The military procurator's office is formally responsible for ensuring that correct legal procedures are observed by all investigators, including those from the KGB, but it is doubtful that they actually enforce their supervisory powers with the latter. From what we know about KGB cases in the nonmilitary sphere, it seems that political concerns always take precedence over legality and that procurators rarely interfere with KGB investigations.[50] Soviet military law experts stress the necessity of complete cooperation with investigations on the part of the military command and the political organs, in terms of providing information, witnesses, and so on. Yet it appears that OO

[47] See Artemiev, "OKR: State Security in the Soviet Armed Forces," p. 23.

[48] A. G. Gorny, ed., *Osnovy sovetskogo voennogo zakonodatelstva* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966), pp. 311-20, 387-89; A. G. Gorny et al., eds., *Voennoe zakonodatelstvo i pravovoe vospitanie voinov* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1983), pp. 117-23, 200.

[49] Gorny, *Osnovy*, pp. 380-419.

[50] See Gordon Smith, *The Soviet Procuracy and the Supervision of Administration* (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1978), p. 20.

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investigators are not required to cooperate in return. While armed forces personnel cannot be arrested for military crimes without the permission of their commander, such a restriction does not apply to OO investigators of state crimes involving the military.[51]

In addition to criminal investigation, the Special Departments have extensive informal responsibilities for ensuring the political reliability of the armed forces. Soviet sources state explicitly that Special Departments are not only to uncover and investigate political crimes but also to prevent the emergence of such crimes by various "prophylactic methods."[52] Thus, in an effort to combat the ill-effects of bourgeois propaganda, the OOs conduct daily educational work "to increase political vigilance and communist convictions" among the armed forces. The OOs work closely with the MPA, sending their representatives to monthly meetings at MPA headquarters in military districts to discuss the state of discipline among the troops and to consider measures to strengthen law and order. The OO officers are also members of party commissions that exist in all military units for the purpose of reviewing decisions on admission to or expulsion from the party and to consider cases of misconduct within the military.[53]

This educative, indoctrination function, normally associated with the MPA, is apparently something that the KGB's Special Departments have increasingly taken on. G. K. Tsinev, currently a first deputy KGB chairman, noted that "preventative activity" by the OOs has increased significantly in recent years and that a strong effort is under way to detect persons who manifest potential antistate tendencies and to deal with them through persuasion and education rather than arrest.[54] An example of this method was presented in Ostriakov's book on the Special Departments: "News reached the OO that in a small, distant garrison two young soldiers were discussing Soviet foreign policy and taking the wrong position. The OO conducted several talks with these soldiers and their behaviour became the subject of a stern, critical examination by their comrades at a meeting of soldiers."[55] Telephone conversations and correspondence of military personnel are monitored by OO officers, ostensibly to ensure that military personnel are not violating security procedures or revealing state secrets. But it also gives the OOs an op-

[51] See Gorny, *Osnovy,* p. 388, where the requirement of obtaining a commander's permission for arrest is said to apply *only* to military crimes, not to crimes against the state committed by military personnel, which are investigated by OO investigators.

[52] See "Armeiskie chekisty" (an interview with G. K. Tsinev), *Trud,* March 7, 1979, p. 4; and Ostriakov, *Voennye chekisty,* p. 312.

[53] M. P. Maliarov, ed., *Prokurorskii nadzor v SSSR* (Moscow: Izdat. Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1966), p. 300; Sergei Zamascikov, *Political Organizations in the Soviet Armed Forces: The Role of the Party and Komsomol* (Falls Church, Va.: Delphic Association, 1982), pp. 31-36.

[54] "Armeiskie chekisty," p. 4.

[55] Ostriakov, *Voennye chekisty,* p. 312.

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portunity to detect any "incorrect" political attitudes and thereby to set personnel straight by means of "friendly chats."[56]

In order to uncover "political deviants," the OOs require a wide network of surveillance and rely heavily on informers. According to Aleksei Myagkov, recruiting informers is one of the most important tasks of an OO officer. Myagkov claims that on reporting for duty in East Germany he was told to enlist ten agents within two months. Once the potential informer was selected, Myagkov had little difficulty recruiting him: "In practice one rarely comes across a Soviet citizen who refuses to cooperate with the KGB. Everyone thinks about the consequences for his own future."[57] Informers are recruited from every category of the military, including high-ranking officers and civilians under military employment. They are not paid for their work, but do it either voluntarily or because of provocation or blackmail.

Estimates of the number of OO informers among military personnel vary. The proportion has undoubtedly declined considerably since the estimated World War II level of 12 per cent and probably depends on the service branch, functions, and location of a given military unit. One source claimed that about 3 per cent of the strength of a rifle company are informers, while the percentage is higher among tank, technical, rocket, air defense, and air assault troops, particularly in the air forces. In the navy the proportion of informers is only 1 to 2 per cent because of the compact living conditions on ships and the limited opportunities for communicating with outsiders.[58]

Among other assignments, informers are to report on cases of drunkenness, insubordination, security violations, and anti-Soviet attitudes. Informers engage in political discussions to gauge the views of their colleagues and sometimes conduct deliberately provocative activities, such as planting secret documents to test the "vigilance" of military personnel. If a particular soldier or officer is considered suspect, several informers will likely be assigned to watch him closely for any unusual actions or statements.[59]

Like other employees of the Soviet state, OO officers must produce results — some tangible evidence that they are being productive. Thus, according to one source, if real spies are not detected, anti-Soviets and enemies of the regime are occasionally "created" by the OO officer in order to make himself appear efficient and productive.[60] The *zampolits,* who bear the main responsibility for political indoctrination of the troops,

[56] Ibid., p. 299; Artemiev in *Military Review,* p. 30.
[57] Myagkov, *Inside the KGB,* p. 65. See also Zamascikov, *Political Organizations,* p. 71.
[58] *Survey of Soviet Intelligence,* p. 52; Artemiev in *Military Review,* pp. 28-29.
[59] Brzezinski, *Political Controls,* p. 67.
[60] Myagkov, *Inside the KGB,* pp. 74-75.

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no doubt resent this, since it reflects poorly on their own performance, but they have little recourse, given the OO's awesome investigatory and punitive powers.

In general, the Special Departments are in a position of much greater authority than the MPA. First, the OOs themselves have officials within the MPA who monitor the activities of its personnel. Second, the OOs operate with more autonomy vis-à-vis the central party apparatus than does the MPA, which functions under the supervision of the Central Committee with the status of a Central Committee department. (As a State Committee of the USSR, the KGB, according to the 1977 USSR Constitution, is technically subordinate to the Council of Ministers, but in reality operates independently.) While the party has ultimate authority over the KGB, the only formal party body within the Central Committee for supervising the KGB — and its Special Departments — is the Administrative Organs Department. This department, particularly since the death in 1964 of a former, very influential chief, N. R. Mironov, seems to have a limited role. Given its broad purview (it oversees, in addition to the KGB, the courts, procuracy, the MVD, civil defense, civil aviation, and the armed forces) and the reportedly small size of its staff, the Administrative Organs Department probably does not make key policy decisions. More likely, it reviews and confirms appointments.[61] Thus, the actual direction of the KGB and its Special Departments is implemented at the highest level, the Politburo. From 1973 until 1982 the KGB chairman, Yuri Andropov, was a full member of that body, while the current KGB chairman, Viktor Chebrikov, enjoys the status of a candidate member. MPA chief Aleksei Yepishev, on the other hand, is only a member of the Central Committee.

A somewhat analogous situation exists between the Special Departments and the GRU, which bears responsibility for military intelligence. Both the current head of the GRU, Petr Ivashutin, and his predecessor, Ivan Serov, were former SMERSH officials. Serov was actually chairman of the KGB before he headed the GRU from 1958 to 1963. Though the GRU is part of the General Staff and administratively independent of the KGB, some Western sources claim that the GRU is dominated by the KGB. According to John Barron, Ivashutin brought with him five senior KGB officers to join the GRU, and the latter is now controlled by professional KGB officers rather than military men.[62] Although Barron's portrayal of the relationship may be somewhat exaggerated, other sources

[61] On the Administrative Organs Department, see Colton, *Commissars,* p. 29; Peter H. Solomon, *Soviet Criminologists and Criminal Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 204. Very little is known about this department in the West, and more scholarly research on its role and functions is clearly needed.

[62] Barron, *The KGB,* pp. 19, 464-65. On the relationship between the GRU and the KGB, see, also, Oleg Penkovskiy, *The Penkovskiy Papers,* trans. Peter Deriabin (New York: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 53-65.

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do confirm that the GRU is heavily permeated with KGB officers from the Special Departments and that in the event of any jurisdictional dispute the KGB prevails. The Special Departments' exposure as spies of GRU Lieutenant Colonel Petr Popov in 1958 and Oleg Penkovsky in 1962 undoubtedly contributed to the dilution of the GRU's authority.

Recent Trends

In recent years the Soviet press has devoted increasing attention to the KGB's military counterintelligence and political security functions. Numerous books and articles praising the activities of "military Chekists" and their historic achievements create the impression that the authority and prestige of the Special Departments are on the rise.[63] One aspect of the Special Departments' work which is designed to enhance their image and which receives considerable publicity in the press is the part they play in hunting down and investigating alleged Nazi war criminals living in Soviet territory.[64] Judging from Soviet accounts, these war criminals are inevitably of non-Russian nationality (Byelorussians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians), and usually their criminal activity during the war is linked to some sort of nationalist, anti-Soviet activity today. The publicity surrounding these investigations serves two important propaganda purposes. First, the association of war crimes with non-Russian nationalist groups smears the activities and aims of these groups. Second, the portrayal of KGB investigators from the Special Departments as dedicated heroic workers, fighting to see justice done to the perpetrators of crimes against humanity, helps to legitimize the KGB in the eyes of the Soviet public.

Calls for stronger "vigilance" in the armed forces have become more frequent in the past year, with the implication that the Special Departments are particularly important at this time. As the Soviets portray it, the deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States has created an atmosphere where the threat of Western espionage

[63] Among the Soviet books on the OOs are Dogopolov, *Voina;* Ostriakov, *Voennye chekisty;* Nosyrev, *V poedinke;* M. A. Belousov, *Ob etom ne soobshchalis: Zapiski armeiskogo chekista* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1978); Iu. I. Semenov, *Komissar gosbezopasnosti* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979); and G. K. Tsinev, ed., *Voennye kontrarazvedchiki* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979), reviewed in an article by A. Marchenko, "Geroi nevidimykh srazhenii," *Sovetskii voin,* August 1979, pp. 30-31. For articles on the OOs, see Korovin, "Uchasite organov gosbezopasnosti," in *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo,* no. 5, 1975, pp. 53-60; G. K. Tsinev, "Na strazhe interesov vooruzhennykh sil SSSR," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil,* December 1978, pp. 26-31; Tsinev in *Trud,* March 7, 1979; Iu. Stvolinskii, "Ofitser Kontrrazvedki," *Leningradskaia pravda,* December 22, 1981, p. 3; and V. Seregin, "Proval eshche odnoi aktsii TsRU," *Pravda,* September 13, 1983, p. 4.

[64] See L. Korneshov, "Vyshei meroi spravedlivosti," *Izvestiia,* February 25, 1983, p. 3, and February 26, 1983, p. 3; "Death Sentence for War Crimes in Belorussia," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,* SU/7409, August 11, 1983; Ostriakov, *Voennye chekisty,* pp. 259-63; and A. Rekunkov, "War Criminals Must Be Brought to Book," Moscow, *APN Daily Review,* March 3, 1983, pp. 1-6.

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and subversion is heightened. Hence the KGB's "protection" of the military must be stepped up and security measures must be intensified. According to a recent article in *Krasnaia zvezda,*

> To be vigilant means . . . to be capable of discerning the treacherous intrigues and any tricks by bourgeois propaganda, rebuffing views and morals which are alien to us and actively countering the class enemy's subversive activity . . . to place a firm obstacle in the way of all attempts by enemies to ferret out our secrets, piously keep military and state secrets, and reliably ensure the protection of military installations. . . . Military service is unthinkable without vigilance.[65]

As this article points out, "vigilance" is not restricted to enforcing security regulations and military norms, but encompasses the struggle against all forms of deviant behavior in the military, including "egotism, careerism, mercenariness, carelessness, drunkenness, and immorality." In their subversive activities, the article notes, "our enemies count on people with these vices, since they are more easily led astray."

Linking such forms of misbehavior to the dangers of enemy subversion provides a justification for KGB involvement in many facets of military life, including the struggle against corruption and bribery. Andropov's anticorruption campaign did not leave the armed forces untouched. Numerous exposés of improper and illegal activity on the part of Soviet officers began to appear in the press after Andropov came to power, and criticism of the military for not enforcing law and order was intensified.[66] It is possible that the KGB has been participating in the anticorruption effort within the military, just as it has taken an active role in such efforts among the state and party bureaucracy.[67]

How these trends have affected the relationship between the military, the party, and the KGB, and whether they will continue under Konstantin Chernenko, is difficult to determine. The military undoubtedly looks unfavorably on any public exposé of corruption in its ranks. But thus far only a limited number of Soviet officers have been implicated in wrongdoing. It would probably take a major scandal, involving corruption or treason at a high level in the armed forces, before there would be any real political impact. Moreover, as several Western observers have observed, the military establishment seems to be enjoying considerable influence and authority at present, with senior military leaders increasingly visible in public.

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[65] V. Builov, "Leninym zaveshchannaia bditelnost," *Krasnaia zvezda,* September 29, 1983, pp. 2-3. See, also, B. A. Viktorov, "Bditelnost vsegda," *Sovetskii voin,* May 1981, pp. 34-35; and V. Seregin in *Pravda,* September 13, 1983.

[66] See, e.g., *Krasnaia zvezda,* June 1, 1983, p. 2; June 14, 1983, p. 2; August 17, 1983, p. 2; August 19, 1983, p. 2; and August 25, 1983, p. 2. See, also, Konstantin Simis, "An Officer and a Crook: Ripping Off the Red Army," *Washington Post,* January 8, 1984.

[67] On the KGB and the anticorruption campaign, see A. Knight, "Soviet Politics and the KGB-MVD relationship," *Soviet Union* (forthcoming).

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Even if we accept the claims that the military backed Andropov's accession to power and assume that a modus vivendi has existed between military leaders and the KGB, this alliance might not survive under Chernenko, especially if factional conflicts develop among party leaders. Soviet history has shown that the police and the military have more than once been drawn into power struggles by opposing sides within the leadership. The presence of the Special Departments in the armed forces is not only a source of possible friction between the military and the police (as it has been in the past) but also a potential weapon against the military by the party, or factions thereof. Calls for increased vigilance in the armed forces and stepped-up criticism of the military for lack of discipline and corruption serve as a reminder of the KGB's potential to damage the latter's reputation and perhaps to curb its powers. The fact that former Special Department officials, such as Fedorchuk and Aliev (both outspoken campaigners against corruption) occupy top leadership posts reinforces this impression.

Because the KGB's Special Departments have broad powers of surveillance and criminal investigation within the armed forces, they perform crucial functions of political control over the military, in addition to ordinary counterintelligence. This dual role might be attributed to the Soviet tendency, particularly during periods of political instability and international tensions, to blur the distinction between external and internal enemies. The MPA may act as a restraint on the armed forces, but its authority is limited in that its purview does not extend beyond domestic military concerns and it does not have the punitive powers or the access to information enjoyed by the KGB's Special Departments. The KGB, not the MPA, is seen as the ultimate defense against efforts to subvert the military both from abroad *and* from within. Although it acts on the party's behalf and follows party directives, the KGB's Directorate of Special Departments is an important and powerful institution whose significance for relations between civilian authority and the military in the Soviet Union should be more widely recognized.

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CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND CRISIS RESOLUTION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES*

by Kevin N. Lewis and Mark A. Lorell

Although the official agenda of the fall 1983 review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) vanished in an explosion of Free World outrage over the wanton Soviet destruction of an off-course civilian airliner, a number of ongoing CSCE matters were nonetheless addressed that could have important implications for the future of the East-West military relationship. Chief among these was an agreement to convene, in Stockholm in January 1984, the thirty-five-nation Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) to negotiate a wide range of issues relating to so-called confidence-building measures (CBMs).[1]

The potential role of CMBs — to help defuse nascent crises, to reduce the escalatory risks inherent in crisis situations, and to lessen international tensions in general — has recently become the subject of considerable study and debate. The primary stimulus behind the resurgence of interest in CBMs is, of course, the agreement to meet in Stockholm.[2] Moreover, given apparent deadlocks in the START and INF arms limitation talks (among others), some analysts see the CDE as the most viable international arms control forum. Consequently, the confidence-building question has become a subject of great interest not only in various international communities but also in Western official circles.[3]

Along with the new prominence of CBMs has come optimism in some quarters that confidence- and security-building arrangements can

* The views expressed in this paper are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of Rand or its sponsors.

[1] The CDE will examine initiatives intended both to improve East-West relations and to enhance Western security. Consequently, the phrase "confidence- and security-building measures" is now often used, as opposed to the older "confidence-building measures." We focus here, though, on the earlier and more clearly defined concept of CBMs as delineated in the Helsinki Final Act.

[2] Discussions relating to CBM issues have been stalemated for three years; thus, the new talks do break a significant logjam.

[3] For two prominent examples of recent academic treatments, see Hans Brauch and Duncan Clarke, eds., *Decisionmaking for Arms Limitation: Assessments and Prospects* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1983); and J. Holst, "Confidence-Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework," *Survival*, January-February 1983, pp. 2-15. As far as U.S. official interest goes, in 1982 the Senate Working Group on Nuclear Risk Reduction was established to support the development of confidence-building measures. Similarly, the Reagan administration has announced plans for new CBM-related undertakings, such as expanded and modernized hot-line communications links between heads of state.

Kevin N. Lewis and **Mark A. Lorell** are analysts for The Rand Corporation.

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play a very considerable role in improving relations between the superpowers and their respective blocs. According to some of the more enthusiastic advocates of formal CBMs, the negotiation of mutually acceptable confidence-building regimes could have quite positive consequences for the Atlantic security scene, not to mention the long-term U.S.-Soviet competition. Systematic analysis has yet, however, to confirm persuasively the assertion that CBMs can play the promising role that is frequently attributed to them in both academic forums and in the larger public policy debate.

It would seem, based on a reading of both the current official and public scenes, that CBM are conceivably applicable in two scenarios:[4] (1) "routine" situations where the problem is to provide the communications and protocols to help prevent or sort out unexpected developments, unintended actions, accidents, and so forth — which one might characterize as acts of God; and (2) crisis situations where it is necessary to resolve the issues giving rise to serious confrontations between nations. There is no doubt that improving a nation's ability to communicate is desirable (crisis or no). The key question for review, accordingly, is how far one could or should go to expand the scope of confidence-building options to include plans and other preparations for sorting out crises resulting from deliberate, "premeditated" choice — as well as acts of God. So far, however, widespread interest in CBMs has outstripped analytic efforts to evaluate in detail particular CBM options or to devise some kind of broad theory of confidence-building. Perhaps in the future certain exploratory techniques, for instance the analytic gaming of CBM situations, can shed more light on the subject. But pending any such discoveries, the CBM debate seems destined to revolve around a few "typical" measures — hotline upgrades, prior notification of maneuvers, exchanges of data, and the like — which have, given the lack of more thorough evaluation, come by default to constitute the "universe" of CBM opportunities.

In our opinion, the historical record has much to teach when it comes to the nature of confidence-building techniques, the circumstances of CBM use, and the probability that a given CBM will produce some result. For one thing, it is clear that what have in the past been used to build confidence in fact represent a very broad range of options compared to the usual list of measures one frequently hears discussed today. In other words, the "menu" of interesting CBM options may be far broader than much recent discussion would indicate. Second, based

[4] In addition, many CBM advocates cite the advantages of a confidence-building forum in improving day-to-day interalliance relations by exchanges of data on force strength and disposition and the like; however, the use of CBMs in situations occasioned by deliberate acts or accidental events is the primary concern.

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on a survey of historical cases in which confidence-building strategies have been undertaken, it is apparent that detailed operational preplanning in anticipation of certain types of crisis situations is, by and large, a fruitless task: in particular, the most promising options tend to emerge only as the specific features of a scenario come into sharp focus. Third, in the gravest crises, CBMs have tended to accomplish little or nothing. Since there is, in serious emergencies, an understandable tendency to trust much to apparent ways out — including CBMs — any such overreliance can, moreover, blind policymakers to grim reality, with negative results.

It may well be that new CBM schemes and doctrine can be concocted that afford us dramatic new CBM possibilities compared, at any rate, with historical experience. But until such possibilities can be demonstrated, it is prudent to keep in mind the lessons of history (especially as they relate to the pitfalls of CBMs and similar measures in profound crises). To illuminate the lessons cited above we will, accordingly, dissect historical cases using the following framework for analysis.

A Historical Framework for the Evaluation of CBMs

To set the stage for a more productive assessment of the CBM problem, we will examine a range of historical episodes in which CBMs have been employed, successfully or otherwise. The cases examined are chosen to illustrate: (1) the great breadth of the possible roster of CBM options, and (2) the relationship between the interests at stake and the probability that CBMs can help attain meaningful results. The cases highlight some important characteristics of two types of confrontational situations — one in which CBMs may be useful, and one in which CBMs may not only be useless, but perhaps even counterproductive. Subsequently, we suggest some points for consideration as we approach, conceptually and politically, the CBM design problem in the months and years ahead.

But before proceeding with this review, it is useful to consider briefly the problem posed by acts of God. Most recent CBM analytic effort has been focused on this problem, an understandable emphasis given the widespread fear of accidents involving nuclear weapons. History suggests, however, that relying on CBMs in such situations may be ill-advised. Certainly, because acts of God may involve long-standing rivals and because prestige and/or injury may be at issue, the risk of war may seem to increase in the wake of an act of God. But they do not represent an attempt by a responsible leadership to gain some *key* advantage at its opponent's expense. In the absence of any evidence of willful premedi-

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tation on either side, then — and subject to the other side's recognition of this fact — reconciliation is usually relatively easy to accomplish.

For a representative example, in 1905 a Russian naval squadron en route from the Baltic Sea to fight Imperial Japan fired upon an English fishing fleet (mistakenly thought to be an ambushing force of Japanese torpedo boats) in the so-called Dogger Bank incident. The outrageous nature of this episode was compounded when the disorganized Russian fleet failed to rescue survivors.[5] Though relations between Britain and Russia were then by no means cordial, even this event was no *casus belli*. In this case, CBMs played a useful role: one Russian CBM tactic was, for instance, a speedy promise of restitution and punishment of those responsible for the error.

Thus, with acts of God, the crucial problem is to demonstrate that an unintended development is just that. In attempting to anticipate such situations in the nuclear or any other age, CBM planning boils down to ensuring that the necessary means are available to inform and persuade. CBM design therefore seems to pose predominantly technical and procedural problems, such as how much data must be transmitted, what degree of redundancy should be built into communications links, and what kinds of prior notification should accompany which potentially menacing activities.

Though the resolution of accidental crises garners much of the attention of CBM analysts,[6] from a crisis manager's point of view the most important developments are not bolts from the blue but deliberate choices made in the context of ongoing international rivalries. Here, two types of situations must be distinguished when it comes to the design and assessment of the utility of CBM techniques. The first consists of situations in which friction develops between rivals under ordinary circumstances in such a way that some risk of escalation to a more serious crisis exists. The second class of crises are those which arise over interests that the opposing sides both consider to be fundamental. We wish to stress that the two types of crisis are different in kind — not in degree.[7]

Crises That Occur During the Course of Business as Usual

Friction between nations can be the result of ongoing competition over trade interests, prestige, local military advantage, and so

[5] In the undisciplined melee, the Russians scored several hits on their own ships, redoubling fears that potent enemy forces were lurking nearby.

[6] In addition to the emotionally charged character of the problem of nuclear accidents, determining appropriate CBMs for acts of God can be accomplished by relatively technical and legal means, and these situations are therefore more interesting to many than the far more murky and ambiguous types of crisis situations discussed below.

[7] Interestingly, exactly this distinction is embodied in the charter of the International Court of the Hague, which restricts court jurisdiction to disputes involving "neither honor nor vital interests."

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forth. From time to time, local standoffs result. But in this kind of crisis, none of those involved seriously contemplates risking general commitment since the interests that are at stake are not truly vital to the survival or elemental aims of the confrontational states. Under nearly all circumstances in such crises, actions are shunned that are expected to expand a crisis in such a way that the essential interests of the antagonists would come to be jeopardized. These facts are clear at the time to all the sides involved — though the desire to save face, prevail in a narrow contest, or prevent the establishment of intolerable precedents or potential sources of future turbulence often may give rise to apparently ominous symbolic or declaratory policy adjustments in the context of the local action itself.[8]

Predictably, the desire to prevail in less than all-out confrontations historically has led to many situations involving escalation far out of proportion to the basic interests of either side. Indeed, serious war scares occasionally evolve from relatively petty disputes. To help head off unnecessary calamities, a surprisingly broad range of CBMs have been effectively used to relieve and localize the tensions that result from such escalation. Historically, successful CBMs for controlling an emerging crisis have included the dismissal of pro-war factions in governments, face-saving gambits, side-trades of relatively minor interests, solicitation of third-party mediation, and so forth. Here, in short, the purpose of CBMs is to assure that exacerbated routine tensions between antagonistic camps or localized conflicts over peripheral issues do not lead to serious hostilities that threaten fundamental interests.

To illustrate the nature and value of CBMs in this type of scenario, we will refer to the vigorous Anglo-French competition for political and economic power in the colonial world after the Congress of Vienna. This contest was not a zero-sum game, but it was fierce. Indeed, between 1815 and 1904, a number of localized confrontations occurred. Yet while there was occasionally talk of war on both sides (usually loudest, naturally, among hotheads and opposition party factions), the stakes were never so vital that general conflict threatened. To help both sides disengage from a crisis in politically acceptable ways, diplomatic and military techniques to enhance confidence and security at many levels played a vital role. Of perhaps the greatest interest to present-day planners was the tremendous variety of CBMs used by the British and French and the fact that the nature of the appropriate measure frequently depended almost entirely on the specific situation in question.

[8] The only exception to this rule occurs when one side enjoys overwhelming military superiority over an adversary that has no hope whatsoever of obtaining significant outside support (political, economic, or military) — a condition not very likely to obtain in today's political environment. The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan may be a partial, but, if so, rare modern exception to this rule. Before World War II, though, one finds many more examples of such situations.

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Crises in Which Fundamental National Interests are at Stake

Our second class of situations in which CBMs might be considered involves episodes and crises in which vital national and bloc interests have come to be inextricably opposed. This is the situation that holds the gravest risks for national well-being and the kind of situation in which successful CBMs could be or, as many advocates assert, are of extraordinary value. Yet we will suggest below that in what are generally recognized as the truly most threatening crises — those where supreme interests of the parties to the dispute are perceived to be at stake — CBMs and related measures are unlikely to be effective and may even be dangerous.

The reasons for this grim fact are self-evident. If sincerely and effectively employed,[9] CBMs at best facilitate better communication. They cannot change what is communicated — that is, the substance of the dispute. In circumstances where vital interests which affect — or which are perceived to affect — the very survival of the competing nations or regimes come into direct conflict, improved communication may serve only to clarify the extent to which the situation has become hopelessly irreconcilable. In our view, there are only three possible outcomes to this type of crisis: war, return to a status quo ante, or appeasement.

This characterization of potential outcomes may seem cynical. Surely, one would think, with both sides aware of the consequences of the failure to resolve a crisis short of what probably would seem to both to be a mutually unacceptable outcome, they would readily subscribe to the notion that the judicious use of appropriate CBMs and related approaches would help them steer clear of catastrophe and effect a satisfactory compromise. When adversary nations have at their disposal powerful military establishments, the consequences of resorting to arms to settle the issue are inevitably catastrophic. But by threatening to precipitate a disastrous war, albeit a mutually devastating one, one side could conceivably hope to bluff the other into surrender — or, as the popular term has it, prevail in a game of "brinksmanship." Considering the large costs involved, discretion may indeed be the better part of valor under many circumstances. But to surrender each and every time in major disputes too is unacceptable. With the options of war or ultimate extinction by piecemeal surrender, war usually is the result, even if the odds of military victory do not appear promising to sober onlookers.

In crises of this type, leaders exploit every possible eleventh-hour technique for averting disaster. CBMs have figured prominently

[9] That is, if the CBM is not used as a deliberate aid to a strategic deception plot. See the caveat below.

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among the crisis-control options exercised in past showdowns. But once constellations of vital interests come into opposition and military crisis momentum has developed, the situation is lost (unless interests are redefined by either party as less than essential). In such cases, CBMs have tended not only to be ineffectual but may also have been downright dangerous. This is because in the heat of crisis self-delusion may be engendered by belief that good faith can save the day. Since CBMs may come to be seen as a panacea at this point, they may actually serve to make a crisis situation worse.

To illustrate this type of crisis we will draw from the cases of the German and Allied camps' drift toward the two world wars of this century. When confronted with irreconcilable differences, a string of crises, and a highly charged situation, some of the major powers exercised enormous restraint (in essence, surrendered) during a series of European confrontations between 1911 and 1914. But the fundamental sources of dispute that had led to this string of disputes in the first place had not disappeared, and the next time around — August 1914 — general war began, to the great regret of all concerned. Similarly, the Western Allies elected a CBM policy based on appeasement through the late 1930s, but eventually had to abandon that position in 1939 to make good their threat to fight Germany.

Two Caveats

Before turning to the historical cases, two caveats are in order. First, this paper discusses only *peacetime* CBM situations. In war — even in the middle of all-out wars — different kinds of CBMs may be very important. This is especially true in an age of weapons of mass destruction when relatively formal escalatory thresholds exist, as the following example suggests. Neither side used gas in Europe in World War II — though stockpiles were available and often on hand even in combat areas. At Anzio in 1943, a forward U.S. ammunition dump — in which some gas shells had been stored — was successfully attacked by enemy artillery, releasing gas that drifted toward Axis lines. The U.S. commander was, nonetheless, able to contact his counterpart and convincingly explain the situation. This CBM — undertaken during intense fighting in the middle of a total war — was, amazingly, successful. One can imagine modern parallels of such wartime restraint — for example, avoidance of direct attacks on national command-and-control facilities.[10]

[10] See Paul Bracken, *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces* (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1983).

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Moreover, we do not address the problem of the deliberate abuse of CBMs for the purpose of strategic deception, which may argue against the use of CBMs in the worst crisis situations. For example, while the Allies used CBMs to try to prevent war with Germany in the late 1930s, the Germans used them to *improve their standing* in a future conflict. Thus, on one occasion, the Germans revealed accurate (and lower than the British feared) air order of battle data to RAF Intelligence. This was done in the hope that demands would decrease in Britain for accelerated air rearmament. Similarly, the Austrians exploited German CBMs in the July 1914 crisis, using the time bought by German efforts to develop a compromise solution to complete military preparations against Serbia. But such "confidence-building" steps were, on balance, hardly employed sincerely to build up collective security. With these constraints in mind, let us turn now to our review of historical cases.

Competition During "Business as Usual" and Confidence-Building Measures

When the national interests in a dispute are not absolutely critical, opportunities abound for resolving a crisis and sorting out the consequences of inopportune action. But when both sides' perceived interests seem to be more significant, then compromise on routine points becomes much more difficult, if not absolutely impossible to reach because of major stumbling blocks that are raised in diplomatic and military forums and domestic political debates. In this section, we shall review the relevance of possible CBMs to incidents that arise during the course of the former type of competitive context. We have selected two related case studies to illustrate the issues involved in these less than absolute rivalries.

Such historical cases are representative of ones in which CBMs may be very usefully employed. However, both cases also reveal how hard it is to predict precisely what operational plans and other arrangements might be designed to facilitate the relief of future crises. Though CBMs obviously can play a vital role in defusing less than critical standoffs, effective CBMs tend to be so specific to the context of the crisis that detailed, advanced preparation is likely to be a fruitless endeavor.

The Anglo-French Rivalry of the Nineteenth Century

The most protracted and bitter global rivalry since the seventeenth century existed not between Germany and France or the Soviet Union and the United States, but between Britain and France. Centuries

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of strife between these two nations climaxed early in the nineteenth century with the successful global struggle led by Britain against the initiatives of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. Following the ultimate military defeat of France in 1815, Britain emerged as the undisputed premier colonial and naval power and the fulcrum of European balance-of-power politics. After two centuries of costly failures, France never again attempted to impose her dominion on the rest of Europe through force of arms. Consequently, the most fundamental of the issues in dispute between the two countries began to fade, particularly during the latter part of the nineteenth century with the Prussian defeat of France and the rise of the German Empire.

Yet Britain and France continued a lively and often intense competition, particularly in the colonial sphere, throughout the nineteenth century. With essential national interests no longer at stake, the issues remaining in dispute were basically of a secondary nature. None justified the risk of war in the minds of the leaders of either country. Nonetheless, the ongoing competition, taken in the context of the long history of rivalry and suspicion, made any dispute over subordinate issues potentially dangerous. This was particularly true in an era of slow and unreliable communications. Indeed, misunderstandings and unauthorized actions led the two countries to the brink of war more than once during this period. What follows are brief accounts of two such incidents that were de-escalated in part by the use of ad hoc CBMs.

The Don Pacifico Affair, 1850

In 1821 the Greeks rebelled against Ottoman rule.[11] Russia, Britain, and France, though concerned about the outcome of the rebellion and the future status of the Turkish Empire, desired to avoid war. Eventually, all three intervened militarily on the side of the Greeks, forcing Turkey to relinquish sovereignty. Yet the three powers remained suspicious and jealous of the others' positions in Athens. Finally, in 1830, they agreed at an international conference to establish a completely independent Greece under a constitutional monarchy ruled by a king from a neutral country. Prince Otto of Bavaria was selected as the compromise candidate.

This resolution of the Greek problem proved unsatisfactory, especially for the British. Besides being corrupt and despotic, Otto's court

[11] This section is based on British Foreign Office correspondence. No authoritative accounts of this incident have been published. For further information, see British Sessional Papers, vol. 56, nos. 401-401c, "Correspondence Respecting the Demands Made Upon the Greek Government and Respecting the Islands of Cervi and Sapienza, October 1842-31 May 1850," London, 1850; and Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, third series (London: Cornelius Buck, 1850), vols. 107-112.

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became a hotbed of intrigue for French, Russian, and British "parties," all jockeying for influence. By the 1840s, the French party, supported by the Russians, had gained the upper hand, to the chagrin of Britain's activist foreign minister, Lord Palmerston. Furthermore, the Greek government badly managed its finances, and was unable to keep up its interest payments on English loans.

Several long-outstanding claims against the Greek government by British citizens — the most famous of whom was Don David Pacifico — finally were employed as a pretext for the use of force to settle the Greek problem. In November 1849, Palmerston diverted the British Mediterranean fleet to Athens in the expectation that its presence would force the Greek government to acknowledge Pacifico's claim and other British demands. More important, this action also would make clear to the other countries which nation wielded the most power in the region.

Unfortunately, the Greek government refused to cooperate. In January 1850, it rejected the British ultimatum and appealed directly to the French and Russian governments to intervene as the other co-guarantors of Greek independence. Incensed at the Greek response, Palmerston rejected French and Russian offers to mediate. The Royal Navy imposed a total blockade of Greek ports and began seizing Greek ships as security against outstanding claims.

The stridency of French protests in the wake of Palmerston's forceful actions surprised and disturbed the British. In the interest of keeping the situation under control, Palmerston agreed to accept a formal French offer of mediation in return for lifting the blockade. But Britain refused to release the scores of Greek vessels the Royal Navy had seized and declined to alter its original demands. Friction between the major powers worsened.

A break in the impasse seemed to come in March. With domestic political opposition to Palmerston's hard-line policy increasing, the French mediator in Athens discovered evidence casting doubt on the veracity of Pacifico's major claim. Palmerston wavered, and the French successfully pressed for a London conference of French, Russian, and British representatives to settle the dispute while negotiations continued on a lower level in Athens. By April, all parties in London had agreed on a settlement that conceded all British claims except the central Pacifico claim. This was referred to an international commission of arbitration. In return, the British in effect renounced the unilateral use of force against Greece in favor of international arbitration conducted by a conference of the three original co-equal guarantors of Greek independence.

With the London Convention signed, the way seemed open for a return to more normal Anglo-French relations. But within days, a

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communications failure combined with unfortunate timing to transform the improving situation into a serious crisis between Britain and France bordering on open hostilities. The problem arose when the British and French dispatched messages informing their negotiating teams in Athens of the terms of the London Convention. The French message was sent by fast steamer and arrived nine days before the British message, sent via a slower, overland route. Before either message had arrived, the Athens negotiations had completely broken down. As the British ambassador to Greece was preparing to reimpose sanctions, the French ambassador received news of the London Convention and conveyed it to his counterpart. The British ambassador responded that without new orders from London he had to proceed with his original instructions of re-establishing a blockade. This was done. Two days later, the Greek government capitulated unconditionally to all of Britain's demands. Some days later the British ambassador received news of the London Convention from his foreign office, but the damage had already been done.

Louis Napoleon and the French foreign minister were outraged by what they considered a blatant breach of faith on the part of the British. The French government lodged a formal protest accusing Palmerston of deceit by deliberately withholding news of the London Convention from the British ambassador in Athens. The protest threatened serious repercussions if the British did not repudiate the Athens agreement in favor of the London accord. Palmerston refused, noting that some of the terms of the former were less harsh than those of the latter.

Palmerston's inflexibility brought the crisis in Anglo-French relations to a head. On May 14, the French recalled their ambassador to Great Britain for the first time in nearly four decades. Indignation over British conduct of the previous six months fed a growing war fever in the French capital. The Russian ambassador hinted that he, too, was about to be recalled from London.

Since the inception of the Greek venture, Palmerston had attempted to conceal the true deteriorating state of relations with France from the rest of the cabinet and Parliament. Consequently, the recall of the French ambassador stunned responsible leadership in the court and parliament. With war with France suddenly looming "out of the blue," major factions in Parliament rapidly joined forces with the queen to restrain Palmerston. They sent an immediate conciliatory signal to the French to prevent the situation from further worsening.

Queen Victoria and Prince Albert placed enormous pressure on Lord Russell, the prime minister, to dismiss Palmerston. Russell agreed that such a course of action would be useful to rapidly defuse the crisis with France, but he also noted it would lead to the downfall of the current

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government. This was unacceptable to the court. Subsequently, efforts to remove Palmerston were concentrated in the House of Lords. On May 28, a motion of censure against Palmerston contended that the foreign minister's handling of the Pacifico affair had endangered "the continuance of our friendly relations with other Powers."

This censure motion sent a loud signal to both Palmerston and the French. The foreign minister reopened negotiations and offered numerous concessions to the French that amounted to a virtual renunciation of the Athens agreement. While rejecting the new offers, the French, no more wanting to be drawn into war than the British over subsidiary issues, felt vindicated and agreed to new negotiations. Palmerston had been chastised in the most humiliating manner by both his queen and Parliament. Negotiations continued. Some weeks later, a new settlement was initialed by both powers. In all essential aspects, it was identical to the original London Convention.

Palmerston's cavalier handling of the Pacifico Affair combined with poor communications and bad timing to precipitate a crisis with France. The subsidiary issue nonetheless could have gotten out of control and resulted in an unnecessary war. The effective use of CBMs, in this case the censure of the government official most closely associated with the onerous policy, clearly contributed to the easing of tensions and the resumption of peaceful and productive negotiations.

The Fashoda Crisis, 1898

Anglo-French relations continued on their roller-coaster course until 1904. Yet the two decades preceding the signing of the Entente Cordiale witnessed some of the worst Anglo-French tensions of the nineteenth century. In 1898, these culminated in a serious war scare over the Egyptian question.[12] Only an adroit use of CBMs prevented this dispute over peripheral issues from leading to open hostilities and a major setback to both countries' primary interests in Europe.

In 1882, to protect lines of communications to India and secure interests in the eastern Mediterranean, the British intervened militarily in Egypt to put down an anti-European rebellion. With Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire growing, the British decided that Egypt had to be permanently occupied. The prerequisites of this policy were: (1) securing the Upper Nile — Egyptian Sudan — to protect Egypt and the Suez Canal,

[12] See William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902* (New York: Knopf, 1960), for a classic account of the Fashoda crisis. The French and British perspectives are discussed in Roger Brown, *Fashoda Reconsidered: The Impact of Domestic Politics on French Policy in Africa, 1893-1898* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); and C. J. Lowe, *The Reluctant Imperialists: British Foreign Policy, 1878-1902* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967).

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and (2) gaining acquiescence of the other Great Powers, particularly France, for permanent occupation.

British occupation of Egypt infuriated the French and set off a new scramble for colonies in Africa. Moreover, the French claimed a special role in Egypt because of the Napoleonic era precedent and French involvement in the construction of the canal. Therefore France demanded either withdrawal of British forces or territorial compensation. The British refused. Anglo-French relations began a typical downward spiral.

The European balance of power had shifted dramatically, however, since the Don Pacifico Affair. In 1871, the German Empire had emerged as potentially the most dominant power on the continent after decisively defeating France. The major adversary to France thus was no longer Britain, but Germany. Under these circumstances, war with Britain could only serve to aid France's chief opponent.

Thus, France greatly desired to reach a general settlement with Britain for the sake of the French position in Europe. But such a settlement seemed impossible without British concessions over Egypt. Since Britain would not budge, France adopted a strategy of territorial expansion into equatorial Africa as a means of increasing its leverage and improving its bargaining position with Britain. The problem was that Britain promptly countered every French move *and* raised the ante, backing France steadily into a corner. With each new escalatory step, the odds seemed greater that a serious crisis would develop from which neither side, with national prestige heavily committed, could back down.

The immediate origins of the ensuing crisis may be traced to the Italian defeat in March 1896 by Ethiopian natives and their allies, the Dervishes, at Adowa. This defeat gave pro-French Ethiopians undisputed power and opened for France a route to the upper Nile from the east and the west. After years of fruitless negotiation, both sides now saw the opportunity to settle the Sudan problem. The French planned new expeditions to the upper Nile; the British were determined to conquer and occupy all Sudan.

Nearly two years elapsed as rival expeditions were organized and worked slowly toward their objectives. A British force of about 1,500 men under General Horatio Kitchener set out up the Nile from Egypt, methodically building up a major logistic network as it advanced. Meanwhile, in the spring of 1897, a small French expeditionary force, primarily manned by Senegalese troops, set out from the Congo to seize the fort at Fashoda in the gap between British Uganda and Khartoum. In 1898, the French dispatched a second expedition of Ethiopians, commanded by Major Jean Marchand, from the east to link with the original expedition. Marchand's year-and-a-half trek through unspeakably hostile terrain,

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which included dragging a dismantled steamboat through long stretches of jungle, finally ended at Fashoda in July 1898.

On September 2, Kitchener's forces defeated the Dervishes at Omdurman and occupied Khartoum. Several days later, the British set out for Fashoda. They arrived on September 19, and a tense standoff ensued. Kitchener's forces were clearly superior to Marchand's, but any outbreak of fighting would have made war between France and Britain inevitable, particularly because of inflamed national passions of the populaces, who were closely following this high drama of imperialism. Communications between field commands and national leaderships were slow. Any error could mean a war no one wanted. Hence, local commanders and, later, the respective governments resorted to a series of CBMs to defuse the crisis.

The first critical CBM was implemented by the field commanders. Both sides refused to back down, so the captains agreed to ease tensions by flying three separate flags over the fort at Fashoda — French, British, and Egyptian. Secondly, it was agreed that no action would be taken by either side until instructions were received from home.

Delcasse, the French foreign minister, realized that the Fashoda strategy had backfired. Instead of coercing the British into negotiations, the British had raised the stakes, backed the French into a hopeless military situation, and constructed the infrastructure needed to deal with a better-organized French challenge in the future. Yet, in large measure because of the jingoistic hysteria that gripped the French populace, Delcasse could not retreat gracefully without British help.

The British were adamant on the substance of their demands, but also did not want to force the French to fight. Though they could have won easily in the Sudan, the British realized a larger war with France would not serve their national interests. Consequently, they communicated many CBMs to the French to defuse the crisis atmosphere, chiefly a willingness to discuss French face-saving proposals. For example, a proposal to withdraw Marchand's forces a short distance to a string of lesser forts was discussed, although the British had no intention of accepting it. Negotiators also came up with a formula to rule Sudan officially as an Anglo-French condominium, although in reality the French were to be given no power. Behind the smokescreen of these negotiations, the French withdrew their expeditionary force. In March 1899, negotiators signed a final agreement that gave the appearance of compromise between equals. In fact, the agreement amounted to a complete French capitulation. In essence, the French renounced all claims to the Sudan and fully recognized the British position in Egypt.

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The Fashoda crisis of course had a much deeper significance for the future of the two countries. It demonstrated how conflicting subsidiary interests, if not handled very carefully, could lead two nations to war at the expense of primary interests — some of which were shared. In this instance, both Britain and France were beginning to perceive Germany as the primary threat to European stability. As a direct consequence of the sobering experience of the Fashoda crisis, France and Britain worked diligently toward establishing closer relations. In 1904, they openly joined in an alliance of friendship directed implicitly against Germany.

In short, both sides in these representative crises recognized the existence of important shared interests, even in the heat of crisis. Under the circumstances, a variety of diplomatic techniques — including what today would be known as CBMs — helped to ease dangerous tensions. To the extent that vital and subordinate interests can be kept distinct, CBMs, particularly of an ad hoc variety, have proven of great utility.

Confidence-Building Measures and Conflicting Vital Interests

We are suggesting that the specific context of a crisis determines the likely effectiveness of CBMs. Under certain circumstances, localized conflicts involving secondary interests may be contained with the help of CBMs. However, in the gravest crises, where supreme interests of the parties apparently are at stake, CBMs tend to be ineffectual, and may even be counterproductive. This, as noted before, results from the fact that CBMs only amplify and do not change that which is communicated. Taking all factors into account, we find only three possible outcomes to this type of crisis:

(1) *War,* often resulting in unfavorable results for all if the military balance is roughly equal at the outset, or if the military means for inflicting profound damage are in hand.
(2) *Return to a status quo ante,* generally entailing only a superficial compromise on peripheral or even meaningless issues rather than resolution of the profound causes of the crisis. This compromise will result in only a postponement of the ultimate confrontation.
(3) *Appeasement,* leading to a genuine resolution of the conflict if one side essentially surrenders by voluntarily accepting a radical alteration in the status quo. This may profoundly alter or, more likely, diminish its global position.

The three outcomes may appear overly stark and pessimistic. With so much at stake, one supposes that every effort would be made

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to negotiate compromises in an emergency. Yet, in this respect, the historical record paints a grim picture. Perhaps the best example of such a competition (and the inability of diplomacy to prevent its awful result) would encompass the last decade preceding the outbreak of the First World War, when the vital interests of the Triple Entente (Great Britain, France, and Russia) came into increasingly direct conflict with those of the Triple Alliance.[13]

This episode is especially relevant because of numerous parallels with current situations. First, the competition between the two pre-World War I blocs was global in scope and included most areas of state activity. Second, though willing to take risks to gain advantages at the expense of competitors, none of the statesmen of the period desired a general European war.[14] Finally, the statesmen of the early years of this century were very much aware of techniques that today would be called CBMs. They used them on numerous occasions during a long series of crises from 1895 to 1914. In every instance save one, crises were resolved peacefully. The July 1914 crisis, however, led to the general war so dreaded by Europe's leaders. Interestingly, the July crisis was remarkably similar with respect to geographical location, issues at stake, and nations involved to several earlier Balkan crises. It is most instructive, therefore, to ask why some crises were resolved peacefully while one ended in global conflict.

We believe that the crucial lesson here is that to avoid having to chose between war or appeasement, modern statesmen simply must not allow crises of this type to arise. False hopes placed in the supposed efficacy of CBMs may only undermine the vigilance necessary to avoid dangerous situations. Once a crisis is mounting, furthermore, reliance on CBMs, in lieu of recognition of the realities of an evolving critical situation, may tempt an enemy to pre-empt or accelerate the tempo of a crisis. We will expand on these observations in a brief examination and comparison of the various Balkan crises of 1912-14 and the fatal July crisis of 1914.

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[13] Originally, the Triple Alliance was composed of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy; later, under the rubric of the Central Powers, Turkey replaced Italy, which defected to the Entente.

[14] Indeed, nearly all of the national leaders and military analysts of this period believed that a general war among the Great Powers would result in catastrophe for the Western world. The specter of nuclear holocaust did not overshadow events as it does in the modern age. Nonetheless, conventional wisdom before the war did suggest that the vast industrial resources, mass armies, and new technologies (such as the airplane, poison gas, and the machine gun) would result in a war of unprecedented violence and destruction from which full recovery would be difficult if not impossible. In this sense, the policy-makers of the earlier period shared a similarly strong incentive with modern leaders to avoid all-out conflict.

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The Balkan Crises, 1912-14

The basic causes of the First World War derived from long-term trends that slowly but profoundly were altering the power relationships among the major European states for at least a half-century preceding the war's outbreak.[15] The most important trends involved the emergence of a united Germany and the enormous expansion of its economic and military power after 1871; the relative decline in power of France and Great Britain; the accelerating deterioration of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, and the continued expansionist ambitions of the Russian Empire. These trends produced two potentially explosive problem areas involving (1) the determination of Germany's ultimate status and power position in the European state system vis-à-vis the other Great Powers, and (2) the status of and distribution of influence over the Balkans.

The first problem pitted two declining powers — France and Britain — determined to maintain the status quo, against a dynamic revisionist state — Germany — determined to gain recognition and influence commensurate with its growing economic and military power. On the surface, the second problem was more regional and narrow in scope: who would benefit most — or be hurt least — by the disintegration of Ottoman sovereignty over its holdings in southeast Europe, and the rise of south Slav nationalism. On a more profound level, however, the resolution of this problem ultimately would determine the continued viability of Austria-Hungary as a state and the future status of Russia in the European power system.

The system of alliances that grouped the Great Powers into two opposed blocs after 1900 gave this regional problem global dimensions. Austria-Hungary was Germany's only major reliable ally in Europe. For domestic, political, and foreign-policy reasons, Russia allied with those forces in the Balkans that most threatened Austria-Hungary. In a parallel fashion, Russia was France's principal ally on the continent. Thus any crisis in the Balkans had immediate implications for the Russian and French position vis-à-vis Germany and vice versa. This situation inevitably involved Britain, because any radical change in the status of France and the Low Countries would pose an intolerable threat.

Nearly all these factors came into play in both the Balkan crises of 1912-14 and the July 1914 crisis. Many CBMs were used in

[15] Contrasting surveys of the Balkan wars and their aftermath can be found in A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); and René Albrecht-Carrie, *A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna* (New York: Harper & Row, 1958). The best detailed diplomatic history remains E. C. Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938).

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both, particularly the July crisis. Yet in the Balkan crises, the leading states did not allow themselves to be backed into a corner by permitting regional issues to become hopelessly entangled with supreme national interests. This did happen in July 1914. Rather than any role played by CBMs, this is the primary explanation of why some crises ended peacefully and one led to general war.

Briefly summarized, the Balkan crises involved a series of wars conducted by fifth-rate regional powers who indulged in treachery and comic-opera shifts of alliances in an effort to absorb the Balkan territories of the moribund Ottoman Empire. In brief, the Balkan wars began after a 1911 Italian attack on the Ottoman territory of Tripoli revealed the full extent of Turkish impotence. In 1912, Bulgaria and Serbia, spurred by Russia, attacked the Ottoman province of Macedonia with the help of Greece and Montenegro. Turkish forces rapidly were defeated, but a subsequent international conference produced a compromise settlement that established the new state of Albania. Dissatisfied with the settlement, Bulgaria attacked Serbia and Greece. In response, Turkey and Romania, still legally at war with Serbia and Greece, invaded and defeated Bulgaria by August 1913.

These petty regional quarrels had much wider implications because of the involvement of Russia and the fears of Austria-Hungary that such turmoil would destabilize its own shaky empire. Russia encouraged Slav nationalism, particularly as advanced by Serbia, against Ottoman rule in the hope of building strong client states in the Balkans. Yet the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which included many restless Slav nationalities within its borders, viewed the growth of Serbian power, its expansionist appetite, and close relationship with Russia as a mortal threat to its existence.

These were the same critical issues that led to war in July 1914. Why didn't war break out in 1912 or 1913? At first glance, CBMs appear to have played a major role in defusing the Balkan crises. A classic CBM, employed in the early stages of the crisis, was the symbolic dismissal of a senior Austrian official known to be an advocate of aggressive, hard-line policies. The Austro-Hungarian government was extremely disturbed by the unprovoked Italian attack on Tripoli. Government officials realized that Italian successes would encourage Serbia to act against Ottoman interests in the Balkans, further stoking Slav insurgencies. The war party in Vienna was determined to stop Italy and aid the Turks. France and Britain, though greatly annoyed by Italy's aggression, were equally determined to avoid a military confrontation with Italy. Germany similarly pressured the Austrians to avoid war with Italy.

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Without German support, the Austrians had to defuse the crisis. In a well-publicized move, the emperor summarily dismissed Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Austrian chief of staff, and the most prominent advocate of war against Italy. This action sent a clear message to Rome that helped control the crisis situation. Later, the London Conference, which involved the CBM of face-to-face negotiations among the principals, created the new state of Albania out of Ottoman territories conquered by Serbia. The creation of Albania blocked Serbia's access to the sea, and removed the possibility of a return of Ottoman rule or annexation by Austria.

Thus, the Great Powers prevented an explosive situation from blowing up into general war, in part by means of CBMs. However, the compromise solution produced at the London Conference proved to be based on little more than self-delusion. It served to lull the major powers into a false sense of security. In fact, the parties most directly affected by the settlement were extremely unhappy. Serbia was incensed at having been robbed of the fruits of military victory, and was determined more than ever to undermine Austria's empire. Indeed, Serbia and the other members of the Balkan League broke the armistice twice in 1913 and conducted major military campaigns to force the hands of the major powers.

Serbia also condemned Russia for not backing its cause with sufficient vigor. Twice in five years — during the Bosnia-Herzegovina annexation crisis of 1908 and during the Balkan wars — Russia had intervened to restrain and undercut its prime Balkan ally in the interests of heading off general war. Russia now felt it had appeased once too often. In the next Balkan crisis, Russia would have to back Serbia to the hilt; anything short of the most steadfast support would risk an open breach with its ally and a collapse of the Russian position in southeast Europe.

Austria felt it had temporarily stopped Serbia through tough measures, and not by the negotiated settlement at the London Conference. Vienna realized that the Balkan League, led by Serbia, had now emerged as a major and immediate military threat to the survival of the Empire. The defeat of Turkey only convinced Austria that Serbia ultimately would have to be confronted. Like Serbia, Austria bitterly resented attempts to restrain it. (Germany had played a decisive role in arranging the London Conference that had prevented an Austrian declaration of war.) With Italy drifting into the Triple Entente camp, Germany now felt more isolated than ever. So Germany too concluded that Austria, as Berlin's only ally, would have to be supported fully in its aims.

In a transparent attempt to pass blame, Russia said its "sellout" of Serbia was due to French unwillingness to back Russia during the crisis. But France had concluded some time earlier that genuine security against

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Germany demanded full military support of Russia. France had offered such support during the Balkan crises. But Russia's public complaints (designed to mollify Serbia) made France even more determined to demonstrate complete support the next time. Finally, while Britain hoped to avoid being drawn into the Balkan mess, its fate was tied to that of France and the Low Countries.

By the end of 1913, the supreme interests of all the Great Powers had come to be in direct opposition because of the Balkan situation. The London Conference and the use of various CBMs had apparently helped prevent war. The more basic reason why peace had been preserved, however, was that both Russia and Austria had been willing to compromise temporarily in a manner that *undermined* their supreme national interests. In their own eyes, both countries had been forced into a posture of appeasement for peace. Both concluded that further appeasement was intolerable. In turn, the other major powers felt that unquestioning support of their major allies had become critical for their own positions. Despite a brilliant series of CBMs, the next Balkan crisis collapsed this tenuous balancing act.

The July Crisis

On June 28, 1914, the July crisis was precipitated by the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria and his wife by a Serbian fanatic in Sarajevo, the capital of the Austrian province of Bosnia.[16] Suspicion of Serbian government involvement provided Vienna with the pretext for confronting the Serbian problem. Backed by a blank check of support from the German government, Austria formulated a purposely unacceptable ultimatum for the Serbian government. Austria was determined to crush Serbia militarily, and Germany felt obligated to support Austria. Russia saw no alternative to protecting Serbia, and demanded and received French support.

Diplomats and government leaders quickly recognized the explosiveness of the situation. They worked feverishly throughout July to prevent war or at least confine it to the Balkans. On the diplomatic plane, proposed CBMs included third-party mediation, bilateral negotiations between Austria and Russia, and a Europe-wide conference. The telegraph served as a sort of "hot-line" between Berlin and St. Petersburg. Kaiser William and Czar Nicholas exchanged personal messages (the famous "Willie-Nicky" telegrams) in an attempt to forestall war. CBMs were also

[16] The best general reference works on the outbreak of World War I are still Sidney B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War* (New York: Macmillan, 1930); Bernadotte E. Schmitt, *The Coming of the War, 1914* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1930); and Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952-57).

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employed with military preparations to avoid any direct provocation. For example, at the height of the crisis, the French pulled their forces back ten kilometers from the German border; the British considered dispersing the fleet; the Russians initially ordered partial rather than full mobilization, and the Germans promoted a "pledge plan" to guarantee the localization of any Austro-Serbian war.

These efforts came to nothing. Europe became embroiled in a war most observers considered suicidal, a war that destroyed the governments of Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and eventually Italy, and left France and England profoundly weakened. CBMs failed to avert war primarily because vital national interests had come into direct conflict at a time when no nation was willing to appease its adversaries or return to an unsatisfactory status quo ante. Germany's future standing in Europe depended on supporting Austria's basic objectives. Therefore, Germany promised to guarantee Serbia's territorial integrity. Likewise, Russia's standing in Europe would decline catastrophically — in the view of its leaders — unless it guaranteed Serbian sovereignty. To Russia, Germany's position meant that Serbia would become essentially a vassal state of Austria. With fresh memories of the earlier Balkan crises, neither side would appease the other. With no apparent grounds for compromise, the exigencies of military planning and technology took priority.

Epilogue: Munich and Danzig, 1938-39

The lessons of the utility of CBMs in the crises preceding the First World War largely are confirmed by the European crises of the late 1930s.[17] Once again, with vital interests of the adversaries in direct conflict, the only real options were reduced to war or appeasement. One of the players, Nazi Germany, refused to appease its adversaries and was more than willing to resort to *localized war,* even at the risk of general war, to achieve its aims.[18]

Under these circumstances, Germany's opponents had to appease or fight. The Western powers, led by Great Britain, chose appeasement through September 1939.[19] CBMs, including the famous flight of Prime Minister Chamberlain to Germany for face-to-face talks with Hitler during the height of the Munich crisis, clearly helped to ease tensions. As late as 1937, German and British air force officers still routinely were

[17] Competent overviews may be found in Christopher Thorne, *The Approach of War, 1938-39* (New York: St. Martins, 1968); E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939* (London: Macmillan, 1946); and Telford Taylor, *Munich, The Price of Peace* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1979).

[18] Austria-Hungary and Germany had adopted a similar stance in July 1914.

[19] For the rationale behind the policy of appeasement see Keith Middlemas, *The Strategy of Appeasement* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970); and Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment* (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1972).

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exchanging information and visiting each others' facilities as a means of controlling tensions during a massive rearmament period.[20] Ultimately, however, the Western powers preserved peace in 1938 only be practicing appeasement — sacrificing national interests and tolerating a diminution of their international positions to prevent a catastrophic global conflict.

Continued appeasement — equivalent to surrender — inevitably became unacceptable for Britain and France, as it had for Russia and Austria before World War I. The Danzig crisis of the summer of 1939 *could* have been resolved peacefully by another Great Power conference, but Britain and France were not willing to appease again. As in August 1914, general war ensued.

The psychotic, racial obsessions and brutality of the Nazi regime are unique in the annals of modern West European history, but Hitler's diplomatic objectives in the 1930s actually did not differ radically from those of the central powers during World War I.[21] Late in 1937, Hitler decided to initiate a more aggressive foreign policy in central Europe. Like Austria-Hungary in July 1914, Germany, in March and September of the next year, confronted the democratic powers with the choice of acceding to its demands or going to war. On both occasions — the Austrian Anschluss crisis and the Czech Sudetenland crisis — the democratic powers, led by Great Britain, elected to appease. Contrary to popular misconceptions, Britain's decision was founded on three apparently reasonable premises: (1) Germany's territorial ambitions were limited and negotiable; (2) German control of Austria and the Sudetenland did not constitute a fundamental threat to vital British interests; and (3) a general European war did.

In March 1939, German forces occupied Czechoslovakia. Following the "rape of Prague," the Nazis almost immediately turned on Poland and began demanding the cession of Danzig and the Corridor. These actions discredited the first premise of British policy formulated during the 1938 Czech crisis. Doubt thus was cast on the validity of the second premise. Hitler's appetite now appeared insatiable. Under these circumstances, the preservation of vital British interests meant Hitler had to be checked. Appeasement would no longer do. Thus in the spring, Britain and France opened negotiations with the Soviet Union and signed a mutual defense pack with Poland, assuring the latter state's national integrity against German aggression.

The pact with Poland virtually guaranteed that the Danzig crisis of the summer of 1939 would lead to general European war. Britain and

[20] See H. M. Hyde, *British Air Policy Between the Wars* (London: William Heinamann, 1976).

[21] See Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: Norton, 1967); and A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1963).

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France now clearly had committed their international prestige to Polish territorial integrity. Hitler was determined to settle the Danzig-Corridor question by force. He did not believe that Britain and France would go to war over this issue, but he was willing to fight them if necessary. A European conference organized to arrange for the orderly transfer of Danzig and the Corridor to German sovereignty in the summer of 1939 might possibly have prevented war, as the Munich conference had in the summer of 1938. But, as in July 1914, none of the principal states was willing to back down again or accept an unsatisfactory status quo. All perceived their vital interests to be in conflict with those of their opponents.[22]

In such circumstances, CBMs — which facilitate communication and help guard against misunderstanding — cannot defuse the crisis. As the July 1914 and August 1939 crises show, when truly vital interests are permitted to collide, the only real options left are appeasement or general war. CBMs then will only prove useful to the nation selecting appeasement.

CBM Policy Options

We believe that there can be no standardized definition of a confidence-building measure. Nor is it likely that any unifying conceptual rules for a confidence-building policy will be devised. It is difficult to assess the exact effects of a CBM even after it has been employed. To predict the effectiveness of a prospective measure is equally difficult. But a strict definition or detailed conceptual taxonomy of CBMs is not needed to proceed with analysis. Evaluation of policy options can proceed once three classes of CBM situations are distinguished.

First are acts of God, incidents without intent by any responsible leadership to gain advantage at an opponent's expense. Although incidents involving major rivals may appear to make war more likely, a reconciliation usually can be effected. The emphasis of CBM planners in this area thus is placed rightfully upon the technical means and procedural rules for facilitating communication and evading possible pitfalls.

We have not dealt with acts of God nor technologies and techniques for dealing with them. These acts pose particular problems in the nuclear age. Specialized insurance is needed. But concentration on technical means for communicating can blind us to the fact that acts of

[22] Hitler seems to have been mystified by Britain's hard-line response to the Polish crisis. He appears sincerely to have believed Germany's continental ambitions did not directly threaten Britain's "real" (Imperial) interests.

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God comprise, relatively speaking, a very small part of the list of troubles encountered in the international arena.

Nations just do not go to war because of an accident or the odd unfortunate development. The fundamental drift of nations toward conflict is most critical, not the particular events that serve as benchmarks along the path the drift follows. Acts of God may often provide an excuse for action, but the true explanation for a decision to act can be traced to steady and often quite predictable patterns developing over an extended period of time. Thus, the Dogger Bank incident, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the destruction of a Korean airliner did not result in war because no side had fundamental national interests at stake. On the other hand, the destruction of the U.S.S. *Maine,* the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, the mysterious explosion on a Japanese rail line in Manchuria in 1931, and the revelation of the Zimmerman telegram all apparently did help lead to war. But in each case, the cause of conflict can be found in a trend toward conflict that can be traced back many years.

Nuclear weapons have tended to make the consequences of isolated acts of God more serious. However, nuclear weapons have not changed the underlying dynamics of international competitions. Critical competitive factors will determine whether any particular event — be it an accident, an ambiguous provocation, a blatant challenge, a limited act of aggression, or something else — leads to a crisis situation or conflict.

Nonetheless, consideration of acts of God has thus far dominated the CBM agenda. CBM enthusiasts assert that techniques for smoothing over acts of God can play a larger role in crisis resolution. Our review of historical crises indicates that efforts to extrapolate a larger role from this chiefly technical and procedural CBM planning often may prove unsuccessful. The prognosis for *prepared* CBMs intended to de-escalate conflict situations caused by deliberate action by both sides is particularly bleak. Though much attention is focused on improving communications should a crisis begin, there often is little paid to a far more important determinant of confrontation: the national interests over which the protagonists have collided. By ignoring the issues at stake, some of the more inspired CBM proponents in effect are allowing the contingency (or technical) tail to wag the strategic dog.

We thus have concentrated on two types of crisis situations where *deliberate* steps are taken in the context of an ongoing international rivalry.The key distinction concerns the relative importance of the national interests at stake.

In the first type, situations require the management of crisis events that have occurred between rivals during the pursuit of "business as usual." Nonetheless, the risk of escalation is present. None of those

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involved want to risk major conflict because the issues at stake are not important enough. The parties involved usually are able to see that enough key interests are *shared.* Peaceful resolution is unquestionably in the interest of both.

In order to resolve such crises, nations resort to a number of diplomatic and other techniques. Many can be considered confidence-building measures. One nation seeks to signal to others that escalation need not occur and that military options are on a tight political leash. In a review of historical CBMs one finds that various good-will measures have proved useful in assuring that routine or peripheral tensions between major antagonists have not accreted into a casus belli that ultimately would have cost both sides quite dearly in more critical national objectives.

In sum, there is a role, often major, for CBMs in these crisis scenarios. But if the historical record holds true in the nuclear age, we should assume that the nature of appropriate CBMs ordinarily would depend on the specifics of the situation. Extensive operational preplanning of crisis CBM options is probably not a useful pursuit.

Sometimes the fundamental interests of nations clearly cannot coexist or be kept in an acceptable balance over the long term. When this situation is reached, the only long-term solutions are conflict or for one side to give in. Adversary nations have large military complexes, and the consequences of fighting are inevitably catastrophic. But for a variety of reasons, piecemeal surrender too many times is equally unacceptable. In the end, it too can spell national extinction. With the options of extinction by war or extinction by surrender, war is the unfortunate but usual result.

In such crises, CBMs are unlikely to be effective, and may be counterproductive. During long-term national competitions, when vital interests that affect survival — or are perceived to affect survival — come into direct conflict, improved communication may serve only to clarify the extent to which the situation is beyond salvage. Predictably, CBMs in this type of crisis are probably useless. And if reliance on CBMs gives rise to or abets self-delusion, CBMs may be downright dangerous. If reliance on a CBM-intensive policy emerges as a last-ditch panacea, the ultimate effect might be to encourage enemy pre-emption (should part of the CBM strategy call for restraining one's willingness to take necessary and timely deterrent steps).

The Stockholm talks on confidence- and security-building measures will address a number of very important topics. Some of the measures likely to be proposed in these talks — for instance, routine transfers of information on orders of battle, maintenance of adequate

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communications channels, and prior notification of field exercises — should be carefully considered. They are valuable regardless of the role attributed to CBMs. It is not clear, however, how far beyond such technical and procedural matters we should allow the CBM agenda to range. Nor is it clear how much emphasis should be placed on CBMs, as opposed to other diplomatic and security initiatives. More study certainly is needed to help bound the domain of useful, future CBM options and to resolve pressing CBM design issues. Until such research has been done, we should heed the cautionary signals conveyed by the historical cases recounted here. We should not restrict our definitions of CBMs to a narrow list of options. We should avoid putting too much emphasis on CBMs that require a relatively high degree of preplanning, especially at operational levels. Probably most important, if we learn no other lesson from the historical record, we should keep in mind that, pending the availability of convincing, contrary evidence, the potential role of CBMs in very grave situations should be very carefully scrutinized. The corollary of this statement is that peripheral and vital interests should be kept absolutely distinct by the great powers.

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THE FRENCH STRATEGIC DILEMMA

by Robbin F. Laird

French leaders identify the political purpose of nuclear weapons as the defense of French territory or, at best, of France's "vital interests." But external pressures are making it necessary for France to provide a more explicit definition of the role of French nuclear weapons in the West European security system. This is a basic strategic dilemma for France. The central tension in French doctrine revolves around the emphasis on protecting the national "sanctuary" with nuclear weapons and the growing recognition of the need to include West Germany in the French security concept.

I will begin with an examination of the basic elements of French doctrine, limited to identifying the response to a central question: What political purposes are served by French nuclear forces? Next I look at the external pressures that are challenging the credibility of the French deterrent and creating a need for change in French doctrine. Then the resulting French strategic dilemma is identified and discussed, followed by an analysis of the basic French defense options in the 1980s as reflected in the discussions of defense policy in France. An assessment of the alternative scenarios for the evolution of French defense policy in the 1980s and 1990s is included.

French Strategic Doctrine

The central element of the French approach to nuclear weapons is to see them as fundamentally different from conventional weapons in that they pose the gravest questions of life and death. The radical nature of these weapons in terms of the level of destruction they can inflict make them usable only when the survival of a nation is at stake. Because it would be difficult for a nation, even the United States, to risk its ultimate survival for the sake of its allies, France felt a need to develop an independent nuclear force in order to defend itself in the nuclear era.[1]

[1] For an interesting recent discussion of the impact of nuclear weapons on alliance politics, see Charles Zorgbide, *Les Alliances dans le Système Mondial* (Paris: PUF, 1983), chap. 9.

Robbin F. Laird is a Senior Researcher, Political-Military Affairs, with the Center for Naval Analyses.

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The French have developed a number of ideas associated with their perceived need for an independent national deterrent.[2] First, they believe that possession of nuclear weapons turns French territory into a "sanctuary." If France has the capability to attack Soviet territory directly with nuclear weapons, then France is less likely to be subject to Soviet nuclear strikes. French territory is thereby "sanctuarized" by its possession of nuclear weapons.

Among the Europeans, the French have most vigorously cast doubt on U.S. willingness to use its nuclear weapons to implement an extended deterrence strategy. When the French nuclear forces were established in the mid 1960s, Charles de Gaulle coined the phrase that the Americans would not be willing to trade New York for Hamburg in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. The French have strongly criticized the U.S. concept of flexible response from its inception.[3] They have perceived this concept as simply reflecting U.S. unwillingness to strike Soviet territory with nuclear weapons in light of Soviet assured destruction capability against U.S. territory.

In the case of the superpowers, the French tend to focus on the centrality of political will to deterrence rather than solely on the presence of a strategic weapons balance. Even though the United States continues to have strategic parity with the Soviets, Americans might not have the will to use those weapons in a European war limited to the European theater. To the Soviets, France, with its national survival at stake in a European war, would appear more likely to have the political will to use nuclear weapons. The Soviets are thereby deterred, in part, by having a nuclear decisionmaking center in the West which is an alternative to the United States. The French cite NATO's Ottawa Declaration of 1974 as providing explicit U.S. recognition of the legitimacy of their position that alternative decisionmaking centers heighten the credibility of the Western deterrent.

The classic French position equates the use of nuclear weapons with the defense solely of French territory. For example, General Lucien Poirier, prominent French strategic thinker, has conceptualized the French security situation as consisting of three circles. Nuclear weapons protect the "national sanctuary," i.e., the first circle. The second circle encompasses the defense of France's immediate periphery. The third is the defense of France's interests in Africa and the Third World. In Poirier's schema, nuclear weapons are inextricably intertwined with the defense

[2] For a discussion of the development of French doctrine, see "La Défense," in *L'Etat et les Citoyens* (Paris: Commission du Bilan la France, 1982), vol. 5, pp. 46-55. See, also, Jean Klein, "La Stratégie Nucléaire de la France et les Hypothèses de Guerre en France," *Défense et Sécurité*, vol. 5, 1982, pp. 233-62.

[3] See Lucien Poirier, *Des Stratégies Nucléaires* (Paris: Hachette, 1977), chap. 15.

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of the first circle but related only ambiguously to the defense of the second circle.[4]

The French can border on the caustic in describing the virtues of their independent nuclear deterrent. In spite of the independence of French nuclear forces, however, their credibility as a deterrent rests largely on their ability to operate "behind" U.S. nuclear forces. The preoccupation the Soviets must have with U.S. forces provides a significant "force multiplier" to the French forces. The language of "independence" can obscure the significance of the U.S. deterrent to the credibility of the French deterrent.

A close examination of the substance of three key expressions of French doctrine reveals the significance of the U.S. deterrent to the credibility of the French deterrent. First, the French speak of their nuclear forces as the weak deterring the strong. This approach to deterrence is rooted in the clear recognition of the limits within which French strategic power must operate. They can never hope to match the Soviets in the size or diversity of nuclear forces, and the Soviets have significant advantages in geographic expanse as well, which would allow them to conduct "limited" nuclear strikes against France. France cannot hope to have an equivalent capability against the Soviet Union. In reality, however, the French are really operating vis-à-vis the Soviets in a position of the strong deterred by the strong augmented by the weak. The Soviets are deterred in part by recognizing that the damage inflicted by the French might be significant enough to allow the United States to dominate the war termination process. This Soviet concern significantly augments the deterrent effect of French forces.

Second, the French speak of "proportional deterrence." Their strategy is rooted in a capability to inflict damage greater than the value to the Soviets of destroying France. The credibility of "proportional deterrence" rests on the capability of France having survivable nuclear forces that can execute a highly destructive second strike. Underwriting the "proportional deterrence" strategy as well is the U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear standoff. One might be able to conceive of the willingness of the Soviets to risk part of their population and industrial assets in order to destroy France in an effort to win a war limited to the European theater. Proportional deterrence would fail as a strictly dyadic Soviet-French exchange. It is more difficult to imagine the Soviets engaging in a strategic nuclear exchange with France which would leave Soviet military-economic capabilities severely eroded in the face of a U.S. adversary that would have greatly enhanced prospects of dominating a war termination process.

[4] See Lucien Poirer, *Essais de Stratégie Theorétique* (Paris: Stratégique, 1982), pp. 287-311.

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Third, the French speak of implementing "proportional deterrence" through a countervalue as opposed to counterforce strategy. It is a strategy aimed not at war-fighting — antiforce — but at destruction of Soviet industrial and demographic targets. In part this reflects the capabilities of French forces — they are limited in numbers and accuracy of warheads. And in part this reflects French preference to pursue a deterrence strategy that does not threaten Soviet strategic forces and thereby leads to a Soviet desire to pre-empt French forces in the event of crisis. The French want to have credible second-strike forces, not first-strike forces, to deter the Soviets from military adventurism in Europe. The nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) has evolved as the most significant weapons system in this role.[5]

The language of French strategic doctrine is that of *dissuasion* (deterrence). The thrust of *dissuasion* for domestic purposes is to emphasize the primacy of nuclear weapons for the defense of French territory. Extensive public debate about the use of French nuclear weapons for any other purpose (e.g., the forward defense of West Germany) would intensify conflict over the political purposes to which French nuclear forces would be put and erode public support for French nuclear weapons policy.[6]

Since the mid 1970s, French leaders have backed away from the more extreme public positions taken earlier regarding the independence of their defense policy. In part, this has entailed the restoration of some of the language of alliance solidarity in French defense discourse. For former President Giscard d'Estaing, France was identified as a key player in the alliance, in which French nuclear weapons served alliance interests indirectly by serving French interests directly. Giscard d'Estaing also publicly questioned the salience of the all-or-nothing character of the use of French nuclear weapons in a European war. He favored the development of a broader array of military options for France. The development of more flexibility inevitably entails greater intermeshing of French security interests with alliance interests.[7]

The Mitterrand administration has continued to search for more flexibility in meeting France's security interests in Europe by means of greater public and private involvement within the alliance. Mitterrand's decision to host the NATO ministerial meetings in Paris in June 1983 was of symbolic importance in this regard.[8] According to Pascal Krop of *Le*

[5] See Pierre Lacoste, *Stratégie Navale* (Paris: Fernand Nathan, 1981), p. 294.

[6] See Dominique Moisi, "Les Limites du Consensus," in *Pacifisme et Dissuasion,* ed. Pierre Lellouche (Paris: Economica, 1983), pp. 253-66.

[7] See the various policy declarations of the Giscard d'Estaing administration contained in *Une Politique de Défense pour la France* (Paris: government print, 1981).

[8] See *Washington Post,* June 10, 1983; and *New York Times,* June 9, 1983.

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Matin, the socialist government has pursued a double objective in reasserting France's commitment to the alliance, namely, "to reassure the allies by assuring them of French support in case of conflict and, on the other hand, to develop a true European defense in case the Americans ultimately disengage themselves from Europe."[9]

In part, the language of alliance solidarity is being restored to French defense discourse because of the perceived decline in alliance cohesion. In theoretical terms, the French position is like that of the operation of an interest group in Mancur Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action.*[10] France could act with benign neglect when the United States, as the force shaping the alliance, could *by itself* provide for the "public good" of collective defense. With a decline in the ability of the United States to do so, the "public good" of Western defense has eroded. The French are left in the position of remaining aloof and watching further deterioration in collective capabilities or contributing directly to the enhancement of the "collective or public good" of Western defense capability.[11] The French are increasingly finding themselves in the position of having to link their "independence" more directly and publicly with the efficacy of overall Western defense capabilities in order to deter the Soviets.

France's relationship with West Germany is at the heart of French doctrinal problems.[12] The development of closer Franco-German relations in the 1970s and 1980s has led to greater French sensitivity to the impact of the French nuclear issue on the Franco-German core to the European component of the alliance.

The Giscard d'Estaing administration expanded the scope of potential interests served by French military power — including by implication the nuclear forces — by introducing a concept of an "enlarged sanctuary." The French have traditionally tied the use of nuclear weapons to the concept of the French territorial sanctuary. When the French chief of staff spoke publicly in 1976 of France contemplating the defense of its European interests, specifically West Germany, as an "enlarged sanctuary," the implication was clear. The French government eased away from the use of this term when public criticism was leveled that France was thereby slipping away from its traditional position of defending a

[9] Pascal Krop, *Les Socialistes et l'Armée* (Paris: PUF, 1983), p. 148.

[10] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).

[11] This idea was suggested to me by Robert Gelbard of the U.S. Department of State and is acknowledged with his permission.

[12] On Franco-German military cooperation, see Walter Schutze, "La Coopération Franco-Allemande dans le Domaine Militaire," in *Allemagnes d'Aujourd'hui,* no. 84 (forthcoming).

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national "sanctuary," not an extended one.[13] The Mitterrand administration has clearly identified the defense of West Germany as a "vital interest" for France.[14] The public commitment by West Germany and France to animate the security provisions of their 1963 comprehensive bilateral agreements entails a provision for frequent bilateral meetings between the French and German ministries of defense.[15]

A central tension in French doctrine clearly revolves around emphasis on the primacy of independence, defined as protecting the national "sanctuary" with nuclear weapons, and the growing salience of the need to involve France in West German security issues.[16] In the context of justifying their exclusion from the U.S.-Soviet intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) talks, the French have insisted that their nuclear weapons cannot be used to defend West Germany directly. But further development of any European alternative to U.S. dominance of the alliance — something that some French analysts favor — requires France to identify clearly its nuclear weapons with the defense of an "enlarged sanctuary."

However, the French are in the throes of identifying their conventional forces with the forward defense of West Germany.[17] Traditionally, they have identified their conventional forces in West Germany, supported by tactical nuclear weapons, as having the function of "testing the enemy's intentions," or operating primarily as a tripwire for French strategic forces. With the formation of the rapid action force (FAR), the Mitterrand administration has underscored the importance of the forward defense of West Germany by conventional means. The decision by France and West Germany to co-produce a helicopter gunship may in fact be linked to the virtual commitment of the FAR to the forward-defense concept.

In addition, when the Hades is deployed, probably in part with neutron warheads, it will be used to support actions of the FAR and the First Army stationed in West Germany. As a result, French nuclear weapons will de facto become more closely linked to the forward defense of West Germany. But the French will stop short of making explicit public judgments about when or how their tactical nuclear weapons might or would be used in the defense of West Germany. France considers dec-

[13] See Michael M. Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 193-204.

[14] J. Lacaze, "Politique de Défense et Stratégie Militaire de la France," *Défense Nationale,* June 1983, p. 16.

[15] Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Western Europe), October 22, 1982, p. J2.

[16] See Joseph Rovan, "Bonn," *Politique Internationale,* Spring 1982, pp. 43-66.

[17] *Le Monde,* June 1 and June 18, 1983.

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laratory ambiguity on this question to be a key part of its deterrent posture.[18]

If NATO would not be able to mount a credible forward conventional defense, French doctrinal ambiguity is almost irrelevant to the militarily effective use of tactical nuclear weapons. It is questionable whether the Soviets would consider French use of tactical weapons as a realistic signal of the intention by France to use strategic weapons, unless their tactical nuclear weapons were used in a militarily efficacious manner.

The French treatment of the tactical nuclear issue most clearly reveals the operation of several of the elements of French strategic thinking identified so far. When the French first deployed tactical nuclear weapons in the early 1970s, they indicated that these weapons were an inextricable part of the strategic deterrent. They were to function as the "last warning shot" to indicate French resolve to use strategic nuclear forces.[19] For the French, their tactical nuclear weapons are to be clearly distinguished from those of the United States. The French weapons are used as part of *dissuasion,* that is, to dissuade the Soviets from direct attacks against French territory. According to the French, their tactical nuclear weapons are not to be considered as battlefield weapons, whereas U.S. weapons are positioned to fight a limited nuclear war that might well engulf France. To maintain their limited role as a "last warning shot" to indicate French resolve, only a limited number of French weapons need to be deployed.

The basic French position on tactical nuclear weapons fits well with their "national sanctuary" doctrine, but adaptations to the Franco-German rapprochement have complicated the picture. First, Giscard d'Estaing publicly questioned the credibility of the all-or-nothing strategy. He suggested the need for a more flexible strategy, which implied a battlefield role for French tactical nuclear weapons.[20]

Second, the decision in the mid 1970s to foster a research and development program to develop a neutron warhead fit in with a strategy for battlefield use of tactical nuclear weapons. The neutron warhead can be deployed in the mid 1980s, but it will not precede the deployment of the Hades missile.[21] The neutron warhead can be used effectively primarily against Warsaw Pact armor and is designed to precede follow-on attacks by conventional forces.[22] The deployment of the neutron warhead might then imply a willingness by France to engage in

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[18] On the importance of declaratory ambiguity to dissuasion, see Dominique David, "L'Alliance: Nôtre Arche et son Déluge," *Stratégique,* no. 16, 1982, p. 83.

[19] *Livre Blanc sur la Défense Nationale* (Paris: government print, 1972).

[20] This has been most clearly stated by Giscard d'Estaing's political party, the Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF) in *Une Doctrine de Défense pour la France* (Paris: UDF, May 1980).

[21] FBIS, *Daily Report* (Western Europe), June 28, 1983, p. K1.

[22] See Maurice Leman, "Les Neutrons: l'Arme Anti-Invasion pour une Défense Européenne," *Politique Étrangère,* vol. 2, 1981, pp. 409-26.

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the forward defense of West Germany with a mix of conventional and tactical nuclear forces in a battlefield situation.[23]

Third, some French analysts have expressed concern that the quality of the "last warning shot" to be delivered against Soviet forces needs to be enhanced. There is a need to provide a real pause to Soviet military actions on the European battlefield to provide time for a favorable war termination process.[24] A forward defense of West Germany bolstered by tactical nuclear weapons could provide such a pause to the Soviets.

Tactical nuclear weapons are "antiforce" in character and despite declaratory intentions contribute to Soviet success or failure on the battlefield. In all likelihood, the Soviets are likely to perceive French tactical nuclear weapons, especially the new generation weapons, as significant factors affecting the success of their operations on the European battlefield. The tactical nuclear problem reflects a central tension in French doctrine between the public commitment to independence and the public commitment to West Germany and the alliance. The French are having difficulty having it both ways. They would like to insist that their tactical nuclear weapons are only a fuse that would light the strategic arsenal, but the Soviets might well perceive them as battlefield weapons. In addition, the West Germans might well insist that the new generation of French tactical nuclear weapons ought to contribute to collective defense, not just to the defense of French territory.[25]

External Challenges

The French face a number of challenges to the credibility of their nuclear deterrent in the 1980s and 1990s which in turn underscore a basic dilemma in their doctrine. The most significant challenges are provided by the growth of Soviet military capability and doctrine. Many French military analysts believe that the Soviets have adopted the conventional war option as their basic option for fighting a war in Europe.[26] Some of these analysts also believe that the threat to use nuclear weapons against Soviet territory is necessary in order to dissuade or deter the Soviets from attempting to implement their conventional option. Others believe, as does the recently resigned General Etiénne Copel, that nuclear weapons deter only nuclear weapons and that therefore, the Soviet conventional threat cannot be dealt with solely by nuclear means.[27]

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[23] Pascal Krop, *Le Matin,* March 13, 1982.
[24] *Le Point,* November 30, 1981, pp. 58-65.
[25] *Der Spiegel,* October 18, 1982, pp. 31-32.
[26] See *Défense Nationale,* March 1982, p. 58. See also the report (Nov. 21, 1983) by Senator M. Jacques Chaumont entitled *Défense: Forces Terrestres* (Paris: Senat, November 21, 1983).
[27] Etiénne Copel, *Vaincre la Guerre* (Paris: Éditions Lieu Commun, 1984).

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French military analysts tend to believe that the Soviets have a number of advantages that would allow them to prevail in a protracted war fought only with conventional forces. Most significant in this regard are Soviet geographical proximity to the European theater, Soviet mobilizational capabilities, and the size and scope of Soviet military reserves in terms of both manpower and material. Although a conventional war would in all likelihood overwhelm Western Europe, the alliance can legitimately aspire to deterring the Soviets from the belief that they could win a short conventional war in Europe. For example, the deployment of the FAR has been justified in part by the need to deal with Soviet development of operational maneuver groups (OMG).[28] OMGs are part of a shock attack strategy by the Soviets designed to overwhelm West Europe defenses.

Other French analysts emphasize that the Soviets would plan to conduct nuclear strikes from the onset of a war in Europe. According to one such analyst, "The most reasonable hypothesis (for the beginning of a war) would be that of a nuclear attack conducted with highly accurate ballistic missiles capable of destroying from a distance the adversary's means of combat, especially catching them by surprise."[29] This judgment is bolstered by the assertion that Soviet doctrine is based on nuclear warfighting as the basic military option for a European conflict.[30]

Some French analysts are also concerned with the growing capability of the Soviets to implement a "flanking option" against Western Europe.[31] Soviet power projection forces could be used to threaten vital lines of supply in a crisis situation, and nuclear forces would not necessarily be useful in deterring Soviet actions in this regard. Conventional forces coupled with good military and diplomatic relations with Third World supplying states (especially with the Arab Middle East) are critical to deterring the Soviets from attempting military flanking actions. But when French doctrine talks of deterrence, it is concerned primarily with the use of nuclear weapons in a massive strike against Soviet territory to deter Soviet military actions against France proper. The exercise of a flanking option by the Soviets against France by means of conventional forces outside Europe is not covered. Also, the threat of massive strikes against the Soviet homeland might be undermined, as the Soviets have developed more flexibility of conventional military means in Europe.

A number of technological developments by the Soviet military threaten the viability of French nuclear forces and are of great concern to the French. First, the greater precision of Soviet nuclear warheads with

[28] *Libération*, June 18-19, 1983.
[29] Charles Zorgbide, *Le Risque de Guerre* (Paris: PUF, 1981), p. 91.
[30] See Henri Paris, *Stratégies Soviétique et Américaine* (Paris: Stratégique, 1980), p. 69.
[31] See Jean-Paul Pigasse, *Le Bouclier d'Europe* (Paris: Seghers, 1982), p. 57.

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lower yields (reducing collateral damage) provides the Soviets with an increasingly credible posture for conducting limited nuclear strikes against nuclear forces based in France.[32] The Soviets would then have reduced France to its sea-based deterrent, which might well enhance Soviet capability to dominate a war termination process with France.

Second, the growth in the capabilities of the Soviet air force — both in munitions and aircraft — provides them with the possibility of destroying all but the IRBMs (intermediate-range ballistic missiles) with conventional ordnance.[33] What would be a credible French response to such a Soviet conventional strike against French land-based nuclear forces?

Third, Soviet advances in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) might well undermine the credibility of the French sea-based deterrent. The heavy reliance by the French on the SSBN makes them especially concerned with the growth of the Soviet ASW threat. However, the French appear confident that the SSBN will remain a viable second-strike deterrent for some time to come.[34]

Fourth, significant Soviet breakthroughs in ballistic missile defense (BMD) would call into question the ability of French ballistic missile warheads to penetrate Soviet defenses. Soviet BMD breakthroughs, coupled with Soviet advantages in passive defense and geographic expanse (as compared with France's very limited civil defense capability and limited geographical expanse) could erode the political will of France to use nuclear weapons.[35] Why should France commit national suicide if it is able to deliver only a slap in the face rather than a fatal blow to the Soviets?

Fifth, the density and increasing quality of Soviet air defenses make it difficult for France to replace the ballistic missile warhead easily with air-delivered weapons as the main strategic weapon. The French could develop increasingly longer-range stand-off missiles, but the more sophisticated guidance systems associated with U.S. ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles) might well be beyond the technological grasp of France.[36]

The variety of technological possibilities for Soviet military developments threatens the core of French strategic doctrine — independence, proportional deterrence, and countervalue. Independence could be threatened by the growing need to cooperate with the United

[32] See Pierre Gallois, "L'Option Zéro est Inacceptable pour L'Europe," *Géopolitique,* April 1983, pp. 104-12. Gallois has elaborated his argument in "Precision, the Fourth Age of Strategy," unpublished paper, November 1983. Also see Gallois and John Train, "When a Nuclear Strike Is Thinkable," *Wall Street Journal,* March 22, 1984.

[33] On the problem of the threat posed to France by the Soviet air force, see the report by M. Albert Voilquin entitled *Les Moyens de la Défense Aérienne* (Paris: Senat, April 20, 1983).

[34] See Hubert Moineville, *La Guerre Navale* (Paris: PUF, 1982), pp. 54-55.

[35] Jean Ducret in *Armée Nouvelle,* vol. 9, 1983 pp. 10-11.

[36] See Lawrence Freedman, "The European Nuclear Powers: Britain and France," in *Cruise Missiles,* ed. Richard K. Betts (Washington: Brookings, 1981), pp. 464-76.

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States or the United Kingdom in developing various aspects of strategic weapons technology (cruise missiles, submarines, etc.). Proportional deterrence could be undercut by dramatic improvements in Soviet strategic defense capabilities (against French systems prior to and after launch). The countervalue of strategy especially could be undermined by a significant expansion of Soviet BMD capabilities.

In addition to a military challenge, the Soviets pose an arms control challenge to the French. The Soviet Union has insisted that French nuclear systems be explicitly recognized in the Intermediate Nuclear Force negotiations as a component part of the Western deterrent. The Soviets insist that French and British systems should be included in their calculations of the strategic balance. The French resist the Soviet claim for many reasons. First, the overall Soviet military threat is not captured in a negotiation limited to intermediate nuclear forces. Second, the French reject the claim of the Soviet Union to nuclear superiority, which is implied by the assertion that Soviet nuclear capability should be equal to the sum of American, British, and French nuclear capability. Third, the French do not wish to recognize a broader role for their nuclear weapons than simply the defense of their "vital interests." In effect, the Soviets are actually pushing the French in the direction of playing a broader European role, although their intention is simply to undermine the French defense consensus.

The French position is challenged to a lesser extent by its allies, especially the United States and West Germany. The Americans challenge the French position in two major ways. First, in developing its own military (especially strategic) technology, the United States stimulates Soviet deployments, which in turn are threatening to French systems.[37] If the Americans deploy BMD systems to protect their ICBMs, similar Soviet deployments would significantly undercut the credibility of the French deterrent. The development of U.S. cruise missile technology has encouraged the Soviets to enhance the capabilities of their air defenses to such an extent that the air-delivered alternative for France is not an easy one by any means, especially when coupled with enhanced Soviet conventional attack capabilities against the French air force.

Second, the development by the United States of new conventional weapons technologies could foster change in NATO doctrine.[38] Such changes might imply the transformation of the "forward defense of

[37] See articles by Jean-Paul Pigasse, *Défense et Sécurité,* April 20, April 28, and May 1, 1983.

[38] The tension between changing U.S. doctrine and the traditional French position on defense is evident in *Defense and Arms Control Policies in the 1980s* (New York: Trilateral Commission, 1983), Triangle Paper no. 26, pp. 66-67, 90, 103-4. On changing U.S. doctrine and its possible impact on France, see *La Nouvelle Doctrine de Guerre Américaine et la Sécurité de l'Europe,* Cahiers d'Études Stratégiques no. 1 (Paris: Centre Interdisciplinaire de Recherches sur la Paix et d'Études Stratégiques, 1983).

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West Germany" into a campaign to conduct conventional interdiction missions into Eastern Europe. That kind of a change in doctrine would seriously complicate French independence, especially with regard to defining the role of French tactical nuclear weapons as a warning shot.

The United States clearly would like France to play a greater role in the conventional defense of Europe. Although recognizing the significance of French nuclear weapons as an additional deterrent to the Soviet Union, Americans hope that France will augment its conventional military capability and link that capability more directly with the defense of Europe. American and French interests coincide to the extent that France strengthens its ties to European defense (e.g., the FAR). To the extent that nuclear forces (in budgetary and force structure terms) drain conventional forces, those interests diverge.

The West Germans challenge the French position in several ways. First, some politicians in West Germany have indicated that France should in some way include its strategic forces in the INF arms control process. The Social Democratic party has officially adopted such a position at its party conferences in 1982 and 1983. Some members of the ruling coalition are also sympathetic to this position. For example, Juergen Todenhoeger, arms policy spokesman for the ruling alliance of Christian Democrats and the Christian Social Union, called for a merger of U.S., French, and British nuclear forces in European arms control talks.[39]

Second, West German officials want France to contribute more fully and publicly to the forward defense of Germany with French conventional forces.[40] These officials have been concerned that the current French economic downturn and commitment to nuclear modernization will lead to a reduction in French conventional capabilities in Europe. Consequently, West Germany might well use the formation of the FAR as an opportunity to deepen French commitment to long-term conventional modernization.

Third, West Germany will continue to pressure France to clarify its intentions with regard to the role of France's tactical nuclear weapons. West Germany has always been understandably uneasy with the notion that French tactical nuclear weapons are to be used simply as a "last warning shot" to indicate French resolve to use strategic nuclear weapons. West Germany is concerned lest this French "last warning shot" be translated into a Soviet nuclear reprisal against NATO forces solely on German territory.

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[39] *Washington Post*, April 18, 1984.

[40] See Konrad Seitz, "La Cooperation Franco-Allemande dans le Domaine de la Politique de Sécurité," *Politique Étrangère*, vol. 4, 1982, pp. 979-87.

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The German and French governments have established a new institutional mechanism for conducting discussions of joint security issues.[41] In October 1982 the German and French defense ministries agreed to form a joint Defense Committee. There are three working groups, one each for political and strategic questions, military cooperation, and armaments cooperation. These working groups meet two to three times a year. In addition, there are regular German-French General Staff talks.

The focus of the current dialogue between France and Germany has been primarily on the need to expand joint arms procurement decisions.[42] Most recently, the discussion has focused on the development of a joint antitank helicopter. The two governments have agreed to build four hundred of these helicopters, as well as to plan joint development of a fighter plane for the 1990s. Discussions have also focused on the relationship between French and German conventional forces. For example, there has been extensive consultation with the Germans over the development of the French FAR and how it could be deployed in West Germany in times of crisis. There has also been talk about the tactical nuclear problem, but reports about the exact nature of this discussion are contradictory. The French have apparently provided more detailed information regarding the development and possible use of their tactical nuclear force, particularly about their current thinking about the new-generation tactical nuclear weapons. But to date France has not indicated any willingness to allow the Germans a participatory role in the use of these weapons. According to a high-ranking German official, "We want some sort of nuclear guarantee whereby France regards German territory, East and West, as its [Bonn's] own security area."[43]

Nonetheless, there is a central tension at the heart of the Franco-German dialogue. For the Germans, only U.S. nuclear forces provide the ultimate deterrent of Soviet forces in Europe. The French can play only a subordinate role, although France and Germany could play a more significant supplemental role in the alliance (especially in terms of cooperation in conventional military forces). In contrast, for the French, the dialogue with the Germans is at the heart of any Europeanization of the alliance.[44] France seeks a European role within the alliance, not a revitalization of U.S. leadership over Europe by means of the alliance. It is difficult to resolve the basic tension between German (to strengthen

[41] Wolfgang Flume, "Weapons Development with France," *Wehrtechnik,* February 1984, p. 25.

[42] On the general significance of European armaments production to the Mitterrand administration, see the speech by Defense Minister Hernu delivered to the West European Assembly on December 1, 1983; unpublished draft text obtainable from the French Ministry of Defense.

[43] *Washington Post,* April 20, 1984.

[44] See Bernard Adrien (pseudonym), "La France et les Interrogations Allemandes," *Politique Étrangère,* vol. 4, 1982, pp. 967-77.

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French ties to the U.S.-led alliance) and French objectives (to strengthen the power of the European component of the alliance).

The Dilemma and Its Resolution

The basic political purpose of French nuclear forces is to ensure French independence. The difficulty is that the growth in Soviet global military capabilities, the decline in alliance cohesion, and the increased importance of West Germany to French security all question the meaning of independence if it is limited solely to the defense of French territory or of a narrowly construed definition of France's "vital interests."

The growth in Soviet military capabilities undercuts the credibility of a French all-or-nothing strategy by allowing the Soviets the possibility of destroying French nuclear forces through conventional means. The Soviets also have the capability of selective destruction of French nuclear forces—the prosecution of SSBNs at sea, air strikes against the French air force, and commando raids against the IRBMs. What would be the appropriate French response to selective and gradual disintegration of their nuclear forces in the face of Soviet conventional degradation of the deterrent?

The decline in alliance cohesion increases the salience of the French role in the alliance. If France fails to commit its nuclear assets to any Euorpean role, it can play that role only with its conventional forces. But if France starves conventional forces to feed nuclear forces, France will exacerbate intra-alliance relations, rather than strengthen them.

Nonetheless, the implementation of an "enlarged sanctuary" doctrine might erode the French defense consensus.[45] Although there is broad support for French nuclear weapons policy, this support does not extend to the notion of an "enlarged sanctuary." As a result, French policymakers are unable to confront directly the broader European concerns generated by the modernization of French nuclear forces. Hence, a central dilemma for French policymakers is between the need to expand the concept of independence induced by external pressures and the need to maintain the myth that French territory is "sanctuarized" by the possession of nuclear weapons—this myth being central to the French defense consensus.

How might France best resolve the dilemma or tension between "independence" and "European security"? The French defense debate of the early 1980s has provided three major alternative responses

[45] On the fragility of the French defense consensus, see Pierre Lellouche, "France and the Euromissiles," *Foreign Affairs,* Winter 1983-84, pp. 318-34.

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to this difficult problem.[46] First, France could "resolve" this tension by ignoring it. France would continue to emphasize the centrality of her nuclear forces to the defense of France proper. To the extent that France made a contribution to European security, it would be by indirectly supplementing the U.S. nuclear "guarantee" in terms of the presence of an alternative decisionmaking center for nuclear reprisals against any Soviet nuclear attack directed toward France. To the extent that the Soviets could not conceive of fighting a war in the European theater without invading France, the "sanctuarization" of France by nuclear weapons contributes to deterrence.

There is a maximalist and minimalist version of this position. The maximalist version, espoused by some Gaullists, advocates a significant increase in the French strategic arsenal. The Gaullist party, the Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR), proposed an alternative military program law for the 1984-88 period in which nine SSBNs would be operational by 1994.[47] It is difficult to see how such an augmentation could occur without a significant drawdown of French conventional forces. The maximalist position frequently carries with it a judgment concerning the nonutility of conventional forces in deterring the Soviets. The adversary is painted as planning a nuclear campaign against Europe, from which France could protect itself only with the possession of a secure second-strike strategic force.

The notion that strategic nuclear weapons "sanctuarize" France implies that West Germany must fend for itself. Some Gaullists have stated to the author that they would prefer to see West Germany occupied than to fire a single nuclear weapon in the defense of West Germany. As one Gaullist posed the question to the author, Why should France commit national suicide to defend West Germany? Another Gaullist pointed out to the author that West Germany "fending for herself" could not include the acquisition by that nation of nuclear weapons. This person would rather see Germany "Finlandized" than acquire an independent nuclear deterrent.

The minimalist position is the one espoused by the Parti Communist Français (PCF). As a member of the governing coalition, the PCF nominally agrees with the Parti Socialist Français (PSF) on the "essentials" of French security policy. But as the recent annual summit (December 1983) between the PSF and PCF made clear, the agreement on "essentials" does not carry over to the "details" of concrete policy. The PCF

[46] This section is based in part on extensive interviews conducted by the author in Paris in May and December 1983. The author would like to thank the Institut Français des Relations Internationales for its help. I would especially wish to thank Marie Claude de Saint Hilaire and Marie Helene Chanier for their logistical support

[47] *Contre-Projet de Loi de Progammation Militaire, 1984-1988* (Paris: RPR, 1983).

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supports a limited nuclear modernization as the absolute priority of French defense policy.[48] By starving conventional forces, the nuclear program reduces the power of the uniformed military, most notably the ground forces. Past struggles between the Left and the army have not been forgotten by many members of the PCF. Paradoxically, the PCF supports the nuclear policy as a way of reducing "militarism" in French society, rather than augmenting it.[49]

A further strand of the minimalist version of "independence" has been espoused by some members of the left wing of the PSF, notably the CERES (Centre d'Études, de Recherches, et d'Éducation Socialiste) group. The advantage of an independent nuclear deterrent for France is to allow France to avoid "entangling" alliances with the unreliable and erratic United States. Also, by having an independent deterrent, France does not have to "overcommit" resources to the military sector.

Both the maximalist and minimalist versions of "independence" have in common no change in French doctrine. The political purpose of French nuclear forces would be identified as solely the protection of French territory. The strength of this position is the preservation of the "historical" consensus that has emerged in France regarding nuclear weapons. The weakness of this position is the absence of any response to the erosion of the "public good" of Western defense. Although rational from the standpoint of French domestic considerations, such a position of "independence" would appear irresponsible to other members of the Western alliance in the challenging European security environment of the 1980s and 1990s.

Second, France could "resolve" the tension by not changing doctrine but augmenting the capabilities of France to participate in the forward defense of Germany by conventional means. Nuclear weapons would be used to protect French territory primarily and French "vital interests" secondarily. Ambiguity would surround exactly what is covered by the concept of "vital interests."

The current positions of the Mitterrand administration embody this alternative.[50] French doctrine has clearly not changed under Mitterrand. The administration has ritualistically asserted that French doctrine has not been modified to allow changes in French military capability to unfold without a debilitating doctrinal debate, that is, a debate about the political implications of changing French military policy. The administra-

[48] On the PCF's nuclear policy, see Nicole Gnesotto, "Le PCF et les Euromissiles," *Politique Étrangère,* vol. 3, 1983, pp. 701-11.

[49] On the relationship between the PCF and the military, see Yves Roucaute, *Le PCF et l'Armée* (Paris: PUF, 1983).

[50] For an interesting statement of the administration's position by an informal participant, see Jacques Huntzinger, "Défense de la France, Sécurité de l'Europe," *Politique Étrangère,* vol. 2, 1983, pp. 395-402.

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tion has used the concept of "vital interests" to provide for a sense of ambiguity surrounding the political uses of French nuclear forces, especially tactical nuclear weapons.

The major alteration that the Mitterrand administration has introduced in French forces is the rapid action force. It is clear that the creation of this force has been motivated by political objectives. The most significant one has been to enhance Franco-German security cooperation.[51] Defense Minister Charles Hernu, as well as the newly appointed commander of the FAR, has gone so far as to identify the role of this force as that of having the capability of participating in the forward defense of Germany. This role would require close peacetime as well as wartime cooperation with NATO.[52]

Within France the government's new FAR has been the subject of vigorous discussion and criticism. The government has been severely criticized for the changes in French doctrine which the deployment of the FAR seems to imply. During the all-night debate of December 2, 1983, in the French senate on the French defense budget witnessed by the author, several members of the opposition prominently displayed the newspaper article by the FAR commander suggesting a NATO role for this force. The mere appearance of such a role carries with it the air of illegitimacy to many French citizens.

The government has responded vigorously to the charge that the deployment of the FAR changes French doctrine. The government claims that it is only creating more flexible deterrent options.[53] Part of the force will be deployed in the south of France and would have to be moved northward to play its role. One government spokesman claims that such movement would provide an important "signal" to the Soviets of French intentions in a prewar setting, adding to the range of French deterrent options.[54]

The strength of this second option—"independence" plus "participation in the forward conventional defense" of West Germany—is the practical emphasis placed on altering capabilities rather than on theological clarity. The Mitterrand administration may well have set the objective of accelerating a process of security cooperation with West Germany which will then have a political logic of its own in ten to fifteen years.

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[51] See the column by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Mitterrand Looks to Germany," *Washington Post,* December 16, 1983.

[52] See Olivier Wormser, "Quelle Politique de Défense?" *L'Express,* December 9-15, 1983, p. 25.

[53] See the arguments by Hernu in *Le Monde,* October, 25, 1983.

[54] François Cailleteau, "La Force d'Action Rapide," *Études Polémolgiques,* bulletin no. 3, 1983, p. 5.

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In other words, rather than debating the difficult problem of whether French nuclear weapons will ever be able to play an extended deterrence role for West Germany, why not focus on the practical dimensions of expanding Franco-German cooperation? The weakness of this position is that without doctrinal change at some point it will not be clear either to the French public or to France's allies that France is serious about a European role for its military forces. If France continues to value its nuclear forces much more than its conventional forces, the absence of some form of commitment of those nuclear forces to West Germany calls into question the seriousness with which France desires to play a European role.

Nonetheless, the Mitterrand administration is clearly modifying the French concept of independence in defense policy. As a high-ranking French official noted in 1983, "It is often said that 'The policy of France is independent.' It would be better to say: 'The policy of France is as independent as possible.' Absolute independence does not exist any more in the realm of security than it does in the realm of economics."[55]

There is a political force in France which would go further and make explicit the doctrinal changes necessary to identify clearly French conventional forces with the forward defense of Germany and with other alliance military missions. The political coalition of former President Giscard d'Estaing, the Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF), has clearly asserted the need for France to express its solidarity with the alliance.[56] The UDF has criticized the Mitterrand administration for overinvesting in nuclear forces. "The decision to give increased priority to nuclear arms, according to the government's own statements, in a reduced budget package is likely to produce a purely illusory 'sanctuarization' of defense whose inevitable result is neutralism in Euorpe and impotence in the world."[57] The secretary-general of the UDF even went so far as to speak of the French nuclear force as "a new Maginot line." Michel Pinton meant that nuclear forces are also self-deterring and that France needs strong conventional forces augmented by cooperation with the forces of the alliance to protect French security interests.[58] Needless to say, there was a vigorous negative public reaction to Pinton's turn of phrase, which led in part to his resignation.

A well-known advocate of greater cooperation in conventional forces with the alliance, François de Rose, has articulated the problem of independence:

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[55] As quoted in Dominique de Montvalon, "France-Otan: La Fin des Soupçons," *L'Express,* June 10-16, 1983, p. 94.

[56] *Une Doctrine de Défense pour la France: La Loi de Programmation Militaire Nécessaire à la France en 1983* (Paris: UDF, April 1983); *Défendre l'Europe* (Paris: UDF, March 1984).

[57] *Le Monde,* April 20, 1983.

[58] *Ibid.,* June 16, 1983.

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It has often been said that France has a policy of independent defense. It would be more appropriate to say that France has an independent defense policy. The confusion is revealing, for an independent defense policy does not absolutely bar us from cooperating with our allies for common defense whereas an independent defense links it to neutrality.[59]

Such a shift in the public characterization of the French defense effort is required for a process of deepened conventional cooperation with the alliance.

Third, France could assign her "independent" nuclear force a more ambitious role than simply deterring Soviet attacks against French territory, that is, a role greater than simply turning French national territory into a "sanctuary." Several augmentations of the role of French nuclear weapons have been suggested in recent years—the deployment of a large nuclear force armed with neutron warheads for battlefield use, the extension of some form of nuclear guarantee to West Germany, and the indirect or direct creation of some form of "European" nuclear force stimulated by French example and/or effort.

Some analysts have suggested that France should give her ground forces a significant upgrading of usable nuclear firepower. The most frequently discussed candidate for this role has been the neutron warhead.[60] If French forces were armed with an arsenal of neutron weapons, they would become a much more formidable barrier to any Soviet armored assault into Europe. By being prepared to take the nuclear battle to Soviet forces in the European theater, France would significantly enhance deterrence of Soviet "limited" war options. The mere existence of an anticities French nuclear capability is not enough to deter "limited" Soviet war aims.

Diverse voices in France have suggested the possibility of extending some form of nuclear guarantee to West Germany. At the heart of such a guarantee is the question of the use of French tactical nuclear weapons.[61] Almost always the guarantee in question would be designed to supplement, not supplant, the U.S. nuclear guarantee. For example, Michel Tatu of *Le Monde* has argued that when the new Hades missile is ready for deployment it could be placed on German soil under a dual-key arrangement.[62] Also, in a speech delivered in Bonn, Jacques Chirac, mayor of Paris and leader of the Gaullist party, argued that French nuclear

[59] François de Rose, "La Défense de la France at de l'Europe," *Défense Nationale,* December 1982, p. 73. See also de Rose's new book, *Contre la Stratégie des Curiaces* (Paris: Julliard, 1983).

[60] The best-known proponent of this idea is Marc Geneste. See Samuel T. Cohn and Marc Geneste, *Échec à la Guerre: La Bombe à Neutrons*) Paris: Éditions Copernic, 1980); Marc Geneste, "Why the Allies Need the Neutron Bomb," *Wall Street Journal,* August 17, 1983.

[61] See Pierre Eylau-Wagram (pseudonym), "Propositions pour une Stratégie Française de 1980 à 1990," *Politique Étrangère,* vol. 1, 1981, pp. 121-36.

[62] *Le Monde,* December 4-5, 1983.

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forces should be involved in some form of a "European" guarantee to West German security.[63]

Several variants of a "European" nuclear force idea have been aired recently by French analysts.[64] One emphasizes the importance of the simultaneous modernization of the French and British forces for European defense. The very fact that both forces will be augmented in the 1980s and 1990s enhances the nuclear protection for Europe.[65] A second variant would go further and encourage direct British-French nuclear cooperation, in joint development of either their strategic forces or a tactical nuclear force for Germany. One French analyst suggested to the author that a joint French-British cruise missile force could be developed for use in providing a "tactical nuclear cover" for French and British forces in West Germany. A third variant is much more ambitious and would seek to proliferate nuclear warheads among the major West European states, including West Germany.[66] This variant rests on the assumption that deterrence would be enhanced if the Soviets faced a multitude of nuclear decisionmaking centers. This variant would require, among other things, the abrogation of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and dealing with the politically explosive issue of the possession of nuclear weapons by the West Germans.

In light of the various options to "resolve" the problem of defining the role of French nuclear weapons for West European defense (see Table I), what are the most likely scenarios for the evolution of French defense policy and doctrine in the 1980s and 1990s? The most likely scenario is the continued highest priority accorded nuclear weapons with no doctrinal change affording a direct European defense role for French nuclear weapons. Precisely because of serious disagreement over doctrinal change, it is unlikely that doctrinal change will occur, but the absence of change in doctrine does not foreclose changes in capability. For example, the accretion of French strategic power may foreshadow the modification of French countervalue doctrine to encompass some counterforce option.[67]

Two debates over the development of the French nuclear force structure have a reasonable probability of occurring. The first debate would involve questioning the wisdom of France's placing too much emphasis on ballistic missiles. In light of perceived impending BMD de-

[63] Ibid., October 28, 1983.

[64] For an overview of this problem, see Jean Klein, "Myths et Réalités de la Défense de l'Europe," *Politique Étrangère,* vol. 2, 1983, pp. 315-336. See also *Le Nouvel Observateur,* December 2, 1983.

[65] See the interview of General Gallois in *Libération,* October 19, 1983.

[66] See Michel Manel, *L'Europe sans Défense* (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1982). This book was reissued in 1983 under a new title, *L'Europe Face aux SS-20.*

[67] On the changing French force structure, see Robbin F. Laird, "French Nuclear Forces in the 1980s and 1990s," *Comparative Strategy* (forthcoming).

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TABLE I
FRENCH DEFENSE OPTIONS

Basic Option	*Variants*	*Military or Security Locus*
Assert primacy of "independent" nuclear deterrent	Maximalist	SSBN force augmented
	Minimalist	Modest nuclear *force modernization*
"Independent" nuclear deterrent plus forward defense of FRG by conventional forces	Franco-German cooperation	Nuclear modernization plus deployment of FAR
	Enhanced direct and public involvement by French Conventional forces in NATO missions	Greater emphasis on enhancing NATO's conventional deterrence
"Independent" nuclear deterrent, plus	Enhanced tactical nuclear "battlefield" capability	*Neutron weapon*
	Supplemental nuclear guarantee for FRG	Double-key system Enlarged sanctuary Indirect supplement Active
	"European" nuclear force	Franco-British cooperation Nuclear proliferation within Western Europe

ployments by the superpowers, no prudent French strategic planner can afford not to develop a serious nonballistic missile alternative, most notably, the development of a cruise missile alternative. Especially significant might be the development of a sea-launched cruise missile program. The second debate would revolve around the tactical nuclear weapons issue. Some might wish to reduce the tactical component of the nuclear arsenal in order to augment the strategic component. Others might wish to "nuclearize" either the FAR or the First Army by giving it a neutron warhead battlefield system. Others might wish to change the mix of tactical-nuclear systems in favor of the Hades or the ASMP (short-range attack missile) program.[68]

[68] The ASMP is to be deployed on fifteen Mirage IVs for use as a strategic system as well. See ibid.

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The second most likely scenario is for a process of Franco-German military cooperation in conventional forces to unfold in the 1980s which would allow modifications in French doctrine to include Germany directly in the French security concept. The most likely area where France would provide a "supplemental" nuclear guarantee for Germany would involve the tactical nuclear force. This could be done either by stationing some nuclear systems directly on German soil or by indicating the willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons based on French soil in the forward defense of Germany.

The least likely scenario is for France to re-emphasize conventional forces at the expense of nuclear forces. There would be increased cooperation in the conventional area to some extent for political purposes, the most important one being to anchor West Germany in the Western security system. The major military purpose will be to enhance the deterrent capability of French conventional forces by increased cooperation within the alliance. Nonetheless, augmented cooperation will stop short of France's rejoining the integrated NATO command, such an action being outside the pale of legitimacy in French politics.

In short, modernization of its nuclear forces will remain the central priority for France. These weapons will most likely remain identified with the defense of French territory, but there is increasing external pressure to define a broader role for these forces. The internal debate regarding the legitimacy of providing a broader role for French nuclear weapons might just succeed in creating a "moving consensus" in favor of incorporating West Germany in the French security concept. But strong domestic pressures impede the evolution of such a consensus, so it is difficult for France to resolve its basic strategic dilemma.

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THE PAST AS PROLOGUE: PROSPECTS FOR A NEW BRETTON WOODS

by Joanne Gowa

Debates about the status of the world economy during the last year or so have been punctuated by calls for an international monetary conference resembling that held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, forty years ago. For example, at the spring 1983 meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, French President François Mitterrand appealed for a "new Bretton Woods conference" to restore stability to the international monetary system. In response to such evident dissatisfaction with the functioning of the present system, the "Group of Ten" industrial nations have been assessing the prospects for a fundamental reform of the international monetary regime.[1]

In light of the problems besetting contemporary international economic relations, not only between North and South but also within the North itself, an appeal for a fundamental reform of the contemporary monetary system comparable to that accomplished four decades ago is no surprise. Given the difficult decade that followed the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 (or 1973), it is understandable that certain policymakers might seek either to resurrect a system like that of Bretton Woods itself or, less ambitiously, to organize a conference modeled on the one held in New Hampshire in 1944.

Attempts to resurrect Bretton Woods, whether in letter or in spirit, however, have little prospect of succeeding. The international monetary conference held in 1944 among forty-four nations, which produced the Articles of Agreement of the Bretton Woods system, rested on a constellation of international power that has long since vanished. Moreover, the Bretton Woods regime itself, although laboriously negotiated and enshrined in the Articles of Agreement, proved to be much more mythical than real. The ability of the postwar monetary system to function as successfully as it did, although that success has been overstated, de-

[1] *New York Times,* November 18, 1983.

Joanne Gowa is an Assistant Professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania. She is the author of *Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods* (Cornell University Press, 1983), and co-author, with Nils H. Wessell, of *Ground Rules: Soviet and American Involvement in Regional Conflicts* (Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1982).

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pended much less on the provisions of the Bretton Woods agreement than it did on the willingness of many industrial nations to tie their macroeconomic policy fortunes to those of the United States.

Clearly, there is a need for cooperation to ensure the stability of international monetary relations, but for the reasons reviewed below that cooperation cannot assume the form characteristic of the immediate or later postwar period. Instead, it must conform more closely to the realities of the current distribution of international political and economic power, as well as to the realities of domestic political patterns and practices in the advanced industrialized nations. The present system of largely ad hoc cooperation and consultation among the major industrialized states may well be preferable to any attempt to achieve a comprehensive reform of the present system, whether based on the model of the postwar Bretton Woods regime or not.

The Bretton Woods Conference

The original Bretton Woods conference was held under the auspices of the United and Associated Nations in July 1944. Attended by delegates from forty-four nations, including representatives of the Soviet Union, the conference resulted in agreement on two documents: the Artices of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank).[2] Those two documents were intended to establish the framework for postwar international monetary relations and for the reconstruction of war-torn economies.

Under the IMF articles, signatory states were committed in principle to the setting and maintenance of fixed exchange rates for their currencies. Reacting to the then dominant interpretation of the interwar years that floating exchange rates (exchange rates that fluctuated in accord with market forces) were a potent source of international economic instability, the Bretton Woods delegates instead agreed to a system in which governments would either intervene in foreign exchange markets to stabilize their currencies within a range of 1 per cent above or below the par value established for each currency, or agree to exchange their currency for gold at a fixed price.[3] However, in the case of "fundamental" balance-of-payments disequilibrium, a term left undefined in the articles,

[2] For a comprehensive history of the conference and the negotiations that preceded it, see Richard N. Gardner, *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: The Origins and Prospects of Our International Economic Order,* rev. ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969).

[3] A discussion of the postwar interpretation of floating rates is in Thomas D. Willett, *Floating Exchange Rates and International Monetary Reform* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1977), pp. 2-7.

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nations could adjust their exchange rates after consultation with IMF authorities. Short-term balance-of-payments disequilibriums were to be financed through access to the reserves of the IMF. IMF reserves were supplied by quotas of gold and national currencies subscribed to the fund by member nations in rough proportion to their shares of world output and world trade. Exchange controls, another bête noire of the interwar period, were prohibited, other than for a transitional period and with respect to short-term capital flows.[4]

The accomplishments of the Bretton Woods conference appear impressive. The nations in attendance agreed to an international monetary system designed to eliminate both the rigidities of the pre-World War I gold standard and the chaos of the interwar period. The IMF was to be the instrument that would serve not only to insulate national economies from fluctuations in the international economy but also to ensure that individual national responses to the world economy would not be unduly restrictive of international trade and financial flows. What would become known as the Bretton Woods system was therefore a carefully negotiated compromise between the laissez-faire internationalism of the gold standard era and the competitive nationalism of the interwar period.[5]

At first glance, therefore, an international monetary conference similar to that held in 1944 might appear to be an attractive means of resolving the present conflict between tendencies to protect industries endangered by free trade and desires to preserve a generally liberal trade and monetary regime. But the parallel is misleading. The success of the convocation at Bretton Woods depended much less on the conference itself than it did on either the long and difficult Anglo-American negotiations that preceded it or the power realities of the mid 1940s that significantly influenced both the bilateral negotiations and the endorsement in New Hampshire of the Articles of Agreement.

The key to understanding the constitution of the Bretton Woods system lies in the negotiations between the U.S. Department of the Treasury, represented by Harry Dexter White, and the British Treasury, represented by John Maynard Keynes. Planning for the postwar monetary system began in the U.S. Treasury as early as 1941, and negotiations between the two treasuries began in 1943 and extended to the eve of the Bretton Woods conference. It was in these arduous Anglo-American negotiations that the framework for postwar monetary relations was es-

[4] For a detailed description of the system as agreed to in 1944, see J. Keith Horsefield, *The International Monetary Fund, 1945-1965: Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation,* vol. 1, *Chronicle* (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1969), esp. chap. 5.

[5] An incisive analysis of this compromise is in John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," *International Organization,* Spring 1982, pp. 329-416.

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tablished; there are only marginal differences between the Joint Statement by Experts on the Establishment of an International Monetary Fund, issued by the United States and Britain in April 1944, and the Articles of Agreement of the IMF agreed to in New Hampshire three months later.[6] In short, the Bretton Woods conference itself did not in any meaningful sense produce Bretton Woods. At the most elementary level, then, the realities of the Bretton Woods conference suggest that contemporary appeals for an international monetary conference are at best premature. The more sophisticated proposals for a comprehensive reform of the extant monetary system, including those under consideration within the Group of Ten, do recognize, however, that an extended period of pre-conference negotiations would be necessary to the successful outcome of any high-level conference to alter the present payments regime.[7]

More important, calls for a new Bretton Woods seem to rest on a fundamental misapprehension, or at least a serious underestimate, of the importance of the changes that have occurred in the constellation of international political and economic power since 1944. While hegemony is an imprecise and slippery concept, it remains useful to illustrate the dominant position occupied by the United States as World War II came to a close. In 1945 the United States produced more than half the world output, accounted for more than half the world trade, and held 60 per cent of global gold reserves. Under these conditions, the close correspondence among U.S. preferences, the Articles of Agreement, and the outcome of the Bretton Woods conference is not surprising.

In part because of the recovery of Western Europe and Japan, U.S. power resources have undergone a relatively large decline since 1945.[8] The U.S. share of total world output is now approximately 25 per cent, and its share of world trade stands at 13 per cent.[9] While the relative decline in U.S. economic power resources should neither be overstated nor be considered an unambiguously negative development, it does suggest that U.S. ability to orchestrate an international monetary conference on the order of Bretton Woods has diminished significantly.

The importance of the changed distribution of interstate power is enhanced in that preferences among the industrialized nations have also diverged considerably since 1945. While the negotiations between

[6] To compare the two documents, see *International Monetary Fund, 1945-1965,* vol. 3, *Documents,* pp. 128-35, 185-214.

[7] See, e.g., the discussion in Robert D. Muldoon, "Rethinking the Ground Rules for an Open World Economy," *Foreign Affairs,* Summer 1983, pp. 1078-98.

[8] For a discussion of the decline of U.S. power, see Stephen D. Krasner, "American Policy and Global Economic Stability," in *America in a Changing World Political Economy,* ed. David P. Rapkin and William P. Avery (New York: Longman, 1982).

[9] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Multinational Corporation in the 1980s," in *The Multinational Corporation in the 1980s,* ed. Charles P. Kindleberger and David B. Audretsch (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983), p. 3.

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Britain and the United States during 1943 and 1944 were difficult and frequently acerbic, they did proceed on the basis of a consensus on the essential nature of the postwar monetary system. Much less consensus characterizes the preferences of the major nations today; the fixed-rate system of the European Community and the explicit U.S. preference for a floating dollar provide only one indicator of present disagreement. The gap among the major parties to any monetary accord has widened, even as the power resources available to the United States to attempt to close that gap have declined. No longer does the United States have the surplus power resources that made it willing and able to support the reconstruction of the world trade and payments system even at some cost to its own competitive position in the world economy. This does not bode well for the outcome of another Bretton Woods conference.

Nor does the change in the overall international security environment since 1945 augur well for any attempt to revive Bretton Woods. In the mid 1940s and through much of the 1950s, the United States was concerned that economic chaos in Western Europe and Japan could lead those nations into the Soviet orbit. As the West European nations and Japan emerged as strong and stable democracies that seemed unlikely to slide into the Soviet camp, their potential as economic competitors with the U.S. for domestic and third-party markets has assumed an increasingly high profile. This change in the relative balance of security and economic concerns also casts doubt on the prospects for successful conclusion of a monetary conference convened in the spirit of Bretton Woods.

Bretton Woods in Practice: The Myth and the Reality

While it is by no means clear that those issuing the appeal for an international monetary conference mean to resurrect not only the spirit but also the letter of Bretton Woods, it should be clear that the outcome of the Bretton Woods conference and the actual operation of the postwar monetary system bore little resemblance to one another. The latter depended much less on the principles and practices agreed to in writing in 1944 than on the role played by the United States and the acquiescence of the rest of the industrialized world to that role in the postwar period. The willingness of the rest of the world to follow and the willingness of the United States to lead have dissipated since the mid 1960s, and therefore prospects for a return to either the myth or the reality of the postwar monetary system are dim.

Because they reflected a serious underestimate of the difficulties inherent in reconstructing the world economy in 1945, the provisions embodied in the Bretton Woods agreement were placed in

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suspension within two years of the end of World War II. In 1947, in an American-inspired effort to meet its IMF obligations, the British restored current account convertibility, permitting nonresidents to exchange freely for other currencies the sterling they had acquired during the exchange of goods and services. The result was a well-documented disaster: a flood of sterling sales forced the British to suspend convertibility within less than a month. The British experience and the more realistic appraisal of economic conditions elsewhere in Europe made it clear that it would be some time before the Articles of Agreement would actually influence the conduct of international monetary relations.

Reflecting not only its predominance in the international system but also its commitment to the eventual restoration of an open world economy, the United States acted quickly and effectively to close the chasm that had opened between the realities of the postwar world and the world that had been envisioned by the architects of and delegates to the Bretton Woods conference. In 1949, in a move perceived as necessary at the time but which would later undercut U.S. interests, the United States persuaded the European states to devalue their currencies — the British by as much as 30.5 per cent. Employing the highly effective incentive of Marshall Plan aid, totaling approximately $17 billion over four years, the United States, through a variety of trade and monetary measures, prompted a rationalization and enormous expansion of intra-European trade. In the process, the United States condoned the use by West European states of exchange controls for the explicit purpose of discriminating against its own exports. By December 1958, West European reconstruction had proceeded sufficiently to allow the current account convertibility obligations required under Bretton Woods to be assumed.

This transitional period demonstrates the glaring inability of would-be monetary planners to anticipate the future and to design a useful, comprehensive blueprint for the organization of international financial relations. More recent efforts to reform the monetary system — the negotiation of Special Drawing Rights, the Committee of Twenty, and the substitution account, reviewed below — suggest that this problem is characteristic of ambitious attempts at reform.

The transitional period also emphasizes the importance of disproportionate U.S. power. The willingness of the United States during the 1947-58 period to assume the responsibility for and act in the interests of the system as a whole is congruent with the dominant position the United States then occupied in both the international political and economic hierarchy of power.[10] As some variants of collective goods theory

[10] This is the argument of "hegemonic stability" theorists. See, e.g., Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929-1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

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predict, the public good of system maintenance is more likely to be supplied when just such a situation of disproportionate power exists. Therefore, any effort to enhance the systemic aspects of contemporary international monetary relations will confront a situation more difficult than the one that existed at the close of World War II. It is true that there are now a small number of relatively powerful and wealthy nations whose individual interests in an efficiently functioning world economy is large enough to persuade each to bear some of the burdens of operating that system. But it is also true that the apportionment of these costs and the temptation to take a free ride make any effort at comprehensive reform more difficult now than under the conditions that prevailed in the mid 1940s. The present pattern of a more equal, or at least less unequal, distribution of interstate power will make bargaining intense at any conference that occurs and renders its outcome unpredictable.

Bretton Woods: 1959-65

The operation of the international monetary system between 1959 and 1965 displayed a striking superficial resemblance to the Bretton Woods agreement. Major nations, with the exception of Canada, declared and maintained par values. These were changed infrequently: France devalued in 1959; West Germany and the Netherlands revalued in 1961. Only Japan among the advanced industrialized nations maintained exchange controls on current account transactions; the Japanese lifted their restrictions in 1964. Largely in eclipse until 1958, the International Monetary Fund began to provide short-term balance-of-payments financing for its member nations. On this foundation of stable and liberal monetary relations, international trade flourished.

Yet appearances can be misleading. The Bretton Woods system functioned as apparently successfully as it did during these years less as a consequence of adherence to its constitutional principles than as a consequence of what Benjamin J. Cohen has described as the bargain struck between the United States and Europe.[11] The ready acquiescence of the United States to an international payments deficit was balanced by an equal readiness on the part of the Europeans to accumulate dollars as international reserves. Balance-of-payments adjustment could be avoided because financing was a satisfactory alternative for both parties to the bargain. The United States was content with a deficit that allowed it to spend freely abroad in pursuit of political-military and foreign in-

[11] Benjamin J. Cohen, "The Revolution in Atlantic Economic Relations: A Bargain Comes Unstuck," in *The United States and Western Europe: Political, Economic, and Strategic Perspectives*, ed. Wolfram F. Hanrieder (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1974).

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vestment purposes without significantly compromising its domestic economic autonomy; the Europeans, for the most part, were content with surplus positions that enabled them to support export and import-competing industries without unduly exacerbating domestic inflation.[12]

This situation would last only as long as U.S. inflation and payments deficits imparted stability rather than instability to the system. In 1965 and thereafter, as President Lyndon Johnson attempted both to prosecute the war in Vietnam and to pursue his Great Society without a tax increase, U.S. inflation rose and the payments deficit was kept manageable only by the imposition of a variety of capital controls and reliance on a series of ad hoc measures to defend the dollar. Under a system of fixed exchange rates and convertible currencies, the U.S. inflationary spiral had inflationary consequences elsewhere as well. As the decade wore on, nations tied to U.S. macroeconomic policy trends became progressively more disenchanted with the postwar bargain.

In addition, when the secular balance of power underlying the original Bretton Woods agreement began to change, political objections to the operation of the system began to be expressed. The French, in particular, began to charge that the postwar monetary system afforded the United States "exorbitant privileges" in the international sphere. According to the French indictment, it allowed the United States to prosecute an imperial war in Vietnam by shifting some of the financial burdens of that war to other nations. It also allowed the United States to sustain a capital outflow that gave American multinational corporations the opportunity to expand in Western Europe at the expense of indigenous corporations.

The United States too became dissatisfied with the operation of the system. It particularly objected to what it perceived as the unwillingness of other nations, notably West Germany and Japan, to assume responsibilities for the smooth operation of the monetary system congruent with their increasing political and economic power. U.S. decisionmakers began to believe that the determination of several nations to maintain balance-of-payments surpluses was fundamentally inconsistent with the need of the United States to reverse the overvaluation of the dollar that was plaguing its export and import-competing industries. On August 15, 1971, the United States, acting on that belief, would close the gold window, suspending the convertibility of the dollar into gold and forcing an end to the postwar monetary system.

So the Bretton Woods system worked in practice as long as it did only because of the U.S. willingness to lead and other nations'

[12] Not all the European nations enjoyed surpluses in this period. The British were an obvious exception.

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willingness to follow. Charles P. Kindleberger has argued persuasively that there tends to be an inevitable entropy in any such system, as the leader is tempted to abuse its position of power and the followers to express their resentment at the abuse.[13] Therefore, the course and evolution of the Bretton Woods system do not suggest it as an unambiguously positive model for any ambitious attempt to reform the present system.

The Past as Prologue?

Considered from almost any angle, calls for an international monetary conference on the order of Bretton Woods are ill-conceived — even if the objectives of such calls are not to resurrect the Bretton Woods system but instead to undertake a comprehensive reform of the system better suited to contemporary political and economic realities. Grand international conferences or even extended negotiations with the objective of profoundly reforming the international monetary system have a poor track record. The "successful" conference at Bretton Woods in 1944 had been preceded by the failures of the Genoa Conference in 1922 and of the London Economic Conference in 1933. The Bretton Woods convocation was followed by at least three other ambitious negotiations to reform the system, two of which failed outright and one of which proved to be of marginal importance. Initiated in 1972 to design a successor to Bretton Woods, the Committee of Twenty, so named because its members represented the twenty IMF constituencies elected to the executive board of the IMF, labored for two years to produce a charter for a new system, only to see its efforts overwhelmed by the more immediate problems incident to the 1973 rise in oil prices and the consensus that a return to any kind of par value system was inconceivable under the economic conditions prevailing in the early 1970s.[14] More recent efforts to negotiate a substitution account, designed to increase exchange-market stability and to enhance the role of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) at the expense of the dollar, ran aground suddenly in 1980. Confronted simultaneously by a rise in the dollar's value and the refusal of the United States to assume any liability for possible losses in the value of the account's assets during its lifetime, intensive efforts by and within the IMF to move the system in the direction of the SDR by means of the substitution account failed, consuming in the process a good deal of human and political capital. In retrospect, the negotiations that began in 1964 and eventually produced the first allocation of SDRs in 1970 were also afflicted by a clash between

[13] See Charles P. Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides," *International Studies Quarterly*, June 1981, pp. 242-54.

[14] The efforts of the Committee of Twenty are recounted in *International Monetary Reform: Documents of the Committee of Twenty* (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1974).

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anticipated and actual reality.[15] The SDR was designed to supplant, not wholly but in part, the role of the dollar as an international reserve asset and to afford the IMF a greater degree of control over the creation of such assets. However, the explosion of private lending in the 1970s and the inability to constrain U.S. deficits effectively have moved the SDR to the margins of international finance.

This history suggests that there may be intractable problems inherent in any attempt to reform the monetary system in a comprehensive way. Many years ago, Charles E. Lindblom and David Braybrooke argued that efforts at what they termed "synoptic" or highly rational, very ambitious decisionmaking were unlikely to succeed and indeed were inherently undesirable because of the inordinate demands imposed by such systems on human decisionmakers working in an uncertain and complex environment.[16] Their argument seems applicable to attempts at grand reform of (rather than piecemeal, ad hoc adjustments at the margins of) the international monetary system. The inability of negotiators in the past to anticipate economic developments of central importance to their negotiations suggests that there is a large element of irreducible uncertainty that may render futile any attempt at comprehensive monetary reform.

The past and, in some aspects, the present are not unqualifiedly poor prologues for the future of international monetary relations, however. As was true during the Bretton Woods era and as remains the case today, there are a variety of low-profile but useful arenas for discussing and occasionally resolving problems relating to the conduct of international monetary relations. Reliance on these arenas and the informal consultations and coordination that go on within them may be optimal for present times and problems. The variety of arenas that exist offers policymakers a potentially viable alternative to an international monetary conference with a long agenda of issues that are thereby destined to assume high political salience. For example, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) at Basel regularly brings together central bankers to discuss international financial issues, among other things. Working Party Three of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) brings together officials of OECD finance ministries or treasuries in an effort to coordinate the domestic economic policies of member nations. The Interim Committee of the IMF, the successor to the Committee of Twenty, is a convocation of high-level government officials that meets semiannually to discuss monetary issues. The executive board of the IMF is in continuous session in Washington.

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[15] See Stephen D. Cohen, *International Monetary Reform, 1964-69: The Political Dimension* (New York: Praeger, 1970).

[16] David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process* (New York: Free Press, 1963).

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There is no dearth of well-established and internationally representative forums that could be employed if greater international coordination and cooperation are deemed essential. Their use in the current international debt crisis shows that they can be effective. Confronted with an urgent need to cooperate in the interests of the stability of the world financial system, the advanced industrialized nations, the less-developed nations, creditor nation banks, and the IMF have managed to use existing institutions to preserve the international financial system. Although there may be doubts about the capacity to preserve the system in this way in the long run, the debt situation does serve to illustrate that where the will to cooperate exists, the institutional mechanisms to facilitate such cooperation are adequate. That they are not similarly used to resolve problems of exchange-rate instability, for example, suggests the absence of sufficient political will to tackle issues perceived to be of less urgency than debt. An international monetary conference will only make this dearth of political interest more glaringly apparent; it is unlikely to change it.

Thus, recent appeals for a monetary conference on the order of Bretton Woods are probably doomed to political obscurity. The changes in underlying political and economic conditions since World War II make the successful outcome of any such conference unlikely. The history of such conferences and problems inherent in them also augur ill for a fruitful international meeting. And the fact that existing institutions have not been used to any great extent to resolve problems inherent in the existing system suggests that political leaders may not perceive these problems to be as severe as some observers suggest. For all these reasons, prospects for a new Bretton Woods — of any sort — are dim.

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MOSCOW AND THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT IN LATIN AMERICA

by Pedro Ramet and Fernando Lopez-Alves

The increasingly close ties between Nicaragua and the Soviet Union and the concomitant spread of Soviet-supplied guerrilla war, first to Guatemala and subsequently to El Salvador, are symptomatic of a new phase in Soviet policy toward Latin America.[1] This new phase is characterized by (1) the radicalization of Central American politics, (2) consequent Soviet perception that major changes may be in the offing, and (3) an intensification of involvement on the part of the Soviet Union and of Soviet proxies and associates (primarily Cuba, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Libya, and the PLO) in supporting leftist guerrilla groups and in reinforcing the revolutionary tendencies of leftist regimes (chiefly Nicaragua and, until the U.S. invasion, Grenada). Thus, Moscow's new opportunities in Latin America are more the result of growing indigenous anti-American sentiment in the region than of Soviet initiative.

It is important to understand that the Soviets do not recognize the legitimacy of spheres of influence. Hence, those in the West who write about Eastern Europe being a "legitimate" zone of Soviet interest and Latin America being a "legitimate" zone of U.S. interest fool themselves when they expect the Soviets to accept this line of thinking. In addition to the fact that this approach helps to account for the anti-American backlash in Latin America today (and is, in any event, scarcely

[1] Although the Kremlin has never been given to thinking in terms of spheres of influence and has maintained a global interest since the earliest days of the Bolshevik Revolution and the Comintern, Latin America has traditionally been the area most beyond Soviet reach and thus the area to which the Soviets have paid the least attention. See James D. Theberge, *The Soviet Presence in Latin America* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1974), pp. 3, 6; Leon Goure and Morris Rothenberg, *Soviet Penetration of Latin America* (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1975), p. 127; and Centro Americano de Estudios, *Centroamerica: crisis y politica international* (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1982), pp. 195-96.

Pedro Ramet is an Assistant Professor in the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington. A Soviet and East European specialist, he is the author of *Sadat and the Kremlin* (California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, 1980), and *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1963-1983* (forthcoming from Indiana University Press), and editor of *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics* (forthcoming from Duke University Press).

Fernando Lopez-Alves is a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at UCLA and a specialist in Latin American affairs. Before coming to the United States he taught at the Law School of the National University of Buenos Aires, Argentina, and in the Department of Political Science at Simon Bolivar University in Caracas, Venezuela. His articles have appeared in the Venezuelan journals *Zona Franca, Tiempo Real,* and *Contextos.*

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a doctrine whose "legitimacy" small nations will ever be inclined to accept), the Soviets repudiate it because they refuse to accept limits to their imperial expansion. The Soviets will support any leftist group and back any insurrectionary movement which promises to erode the U.S. position and to open new opportunities to the Soviets. The Soviets are not gripped by an obsession with absolute control; they play a cautious game and have been quite satisfied to make small gains in sundry locales. In this context, it is perhaps not so surprising that some of Moscow's biggest Third World successes (Cuba, India, Libya, Nicaragua, Syria, and South Yemen) have been gained without the traditional Communist parties (CPs) playing any major role.

It seems preferable, when discussing Latin America, to speak of Soviet interests there rather than of Soviet goals. While it is clear that the diminution of U.S. influence, the expansion of Soviet trade contacts and political influence, and the installation of collectivist regimes inspired by "anticapitalist" sentiment are all in the Soviet interest — which the Soviets can reasonably be expected to further where they deem it feasible — to speak of goals is to speak of specific policy objectives that may vary both from country to country and from one year to the next. To speak of Soviet goals in Latin America, then, can be seriously misleading, since to do so suggests the very inflexibility that the Soviets most abhor. Trained from youth to look for evidence of the dialectical view of history, Soviet policymakers endeavor to be alert to political flux and the consequent change in the weight of variables (though, for all that, the Soviets have been known to display a fondness for comparing sundry developments around the globe to specific episodes, even to specific months, in their own national experience, often with considerable distortion).

The Latin American political landscape is a complex one. An economic inequality supported by U.S. corporate interests has unavoidably been associated with ever more assertive anti-American currents, and anti-Americanism seems (often mistakenly) to open new opportunities for the Soviets. Yet Moscow has learned to be wary of Third World leaders whose purpose in promoting bilateral relations may be considerably at variance with Soviet interests (the cases of Somalia, Iraq, and even Cuba between 1960 and 1968 come to mind), and, if nothing else, the Soviets' recent experience in Iran has taught them that anti-Americanism does not automatically translate into the desire to cooperate with the Soviets and may even exist in tandem with anti-Sovietism.

It is sometimes thought in the West that the Soviets have incomparable advantages in dealing with the Third World. Chief among them are said to be, first, the fact that the Soviet Union cannot be identified

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with the colonialism of the period before World War II (unless, of course, one wishes to talk about Mongolia) and, second, the supposition that instability and revolution in the Third World are apt to work in the Soviets' favor. Both these assumptions, however, are seriously flawed. In the first case, the image of Soviet "purity" is both mitigated considerably by a general distrust in the Third World of Great Powers of any political hue (and hence the persistence of the Nonaligned Movement) and badly tarnished by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which was almost universally condemned in the Third World. As for the notion that revolution is apt to favor the Soviets or lead to communism, one need only think of Jonas Savimbi in Angola and Eden Pastora ("Commander Zero") in Nicaragua to realize that revolution has no automatic proclivities but necessarily threatens vested interests in the status quo, whoever they might be.

The Soviets have been slow to extend their field of interest to Latin America, and although they presided over the establishment of some seventeen Communist parties in Latin America between 1918 and 1950, they remained largely absorbed with Germany and China throughout the Stalin period. Under Khrushchev, the Soviets began to think globally, and developed close relations with various Middle East and African states. At this juncture, Moscow placed a premium on the development of good state-to-state relations and showed itself willing to sacrifice local Communist parties in the interests of good state relations. Local CPs were advised to cooperate with Soviet client regimes.[2]

Soviet policy in Latin America, and the Third World generally, must take into account a complex web of interacting forces including moderate regimes (like those of Venezuela and Mexico), leftist regimes (Cuba, Nicaragua, and, until recently, Grenada), the local CPs, various Trotskyite groups, leftist guerrillas who may or may not be amenable to communization, and miscellaneous other radical groups, such as the Montoneros of Argentina and the Tupamaros of Uruguay. The Soviets have tried to encourage all forces for change without committing themselves to any — which is a tricky balancing act, even for the Soviets.

Aside from local CPs and Trotskyites, Soviet advisers, economic aid and trade, and KGB subversion (lately focused very much on Argentina[3]), the Soviets have, in the past decade, made systematic use of a network of proxies and associates, including East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Libya, the PLO, North Korea, and Cuba. These proxies provide

[2] Roger E. Kanet, "Soviet Attitudes toward Developing Nations since Stalin," in Roger E. Kanet, ed., *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 34-36.

[3] Brian Freemantle, *KGB* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982), p. 120; and Theberge, *The Soviet Presence,* pp. 34-35.

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technical and economic assistance to "progressive" regimes, ship or transship arms both to those regimes and to leftist insurgents and terrorists, and provide guerrilla training to insurgents in training camps in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Libya, Cuba, and elsewhere. The resulting network has itself become a factor in Latin American politics, as recent contacts between local leftists and Libyan and PLO backers, as well as Basque terrorists, make plain.[4]

Recent Soviet involvement in Latin America seems to reflect a change in Soviet perceptions about opportunities for penetration in this hemisphere and about the specific utility of the aforementioned foreign policy instruments.

Moscow's Initial Entry into Latin America, 1961-70

Moscow's early pessimism about the prospects of communist revolution in Latin America was not altered by Castro's 1961 conversion to Marxism-Leninism. In fact, despite the Kremlin's readiness to finance Castro's Cuba,[5] Moscow and Havana were sharply divided in the mid 1960s over precisely this question, with Castro and his lieutenant, Ernesto "Che" Guevara,[6] urging the export of revolution guerrilla-style and Soviet spokesmen urging restraint.

For Moscow, Castro's eagerness to export revolution and the presence of revolution-prone leftists in Latin America represented a real dilemma. On the one hand, Moscow believed that the Cuban experience was sui generis, and that less militant tactics were apt to prove more useful elsewhere on the continent. On the other hand, Moscow was

[4] The PLO has been actively involved with Latin American leftism since 1966, when PLO representatives attended the first conference of the Cuban-sponsored Organization of Peoples' Solidarity of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In 1972, the PLO signed an agreement with Cuba, opening up its bases in Lebanon, South Yemen, and Libya for the training of Latin American guerrillas; the Cubans provided the training instructors. As of 1983, the PLO was training and supplying Haitian leftist guerrillas and flying reconnaissance and transport missions for the Nicaraguan Air Force. Libya's Colonel Qaddafi has been in contact with leftist guerrillas in both El Salvador and Haiti and met in July 1982 with leftist guerrillas from Antigua, St. Lucia, Dominica, Barbados, and St. Vincent. Qaddafi has also maintained warm relations with the leftist regimes in Grenada, Nicaragua, and Surinam and has provided economic support to the Nicaraguan Sandinista regime. For more details, see *Foreign Report,* November 28, 1979, p. 6; July 1, 1982, p. 8; September 23, 1982, p. 8; and March 24, 1983, p. 8; *Los Angeles Times,* January 16, 1983; *Business Week,* April 18, 1983, p. 54; *Congressional Record,* August 18, 1980, p. H7072; Radio Tripoli, March 12, 1981, and JANA-Tripoli, March 25, 1981, and April 9, 1982, translated respectively in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (North Africa), March 13, 1981, March 27, 1981, and April 12, 1982; and Manilo Tirado, *La Revolucion Sandinista* (Mexico City: Editorial Nuestro Tiempo, 1983), p. 165. See, also, Edward S. Herman, *The Real Terror Network* (Boston: South End Press, 1982), p. 59. Regarding the role of Basque terrorists, see *Christian Science Monitor,* January 17, 1984.

[5] See V. V. Volsky, *SSR i Latinskaya Amerika, 1917-1967* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1967), pp. 158-69.

[6] Actually, there were some tensions between Castro and Guevara in this period, though Castro eventually came over to Guevara's position on guerrilla warfare. See Edward Gonzalez, *Cuba under Castro: The Limits of Charisma* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974).

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interested in maintaining influence over these sundry groups, Cuba included, and to do this, it seemed necessary to offer some support to the armed struggle. Hence, late in his term of office, Khrushchev decided to come to an understanding with the Castroist groups. Castro had, at that point, not yet endorsed the Soviet position in the Sino-Soviet rift, and Khrushchev perceived, not without reason, that there was a danger of Castro edging closer to Maoism and taking with him the entire gallimaufry of Castroist parties in Latin America. Hence, in late 1964, in what has come to be called the "Havana Compromise," Moscow gave its endorsement to the strategy of armed struggle, albeit in only five Latin American countries — Venezuela, Colombia, Honduras, Paraguay, and Haiti. During 1964 and 1965, *Pravda* repeatedly ran articles supporting guerrilla warfare in the Western Hemisphere, and, in January 1965, specifically endorsed guerrilla warfare in Venezuela, Guatemala, "and various other countries." Shortly thereafter, two couriers, bearing $330,000 in Soviet cash earmarked for the Venezuelan guerrillas, were arrested by Venezuelan police.[7] Later, at the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America meeting in Havana, S. R. Rashidov, head of the Soviet delegation, delivered a fiery speech in support of armed revolutionary struggle and declared that the Soviet Union was ready to assist guerrillas in Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, and Guatemala.[8]

Except for the funds sent to Venezuelan guerrillas, however, there is little evidence of direct Soviet aid to advocates of armed struggle in this period. One possible explanation of the disjunction between the temporary rhetorical endorsement of armed struggle and the absence of concrete assistance is that it took the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership two years to consolidate its control and to define its policies. In the interim it would have been loath to make any firm commitments and perhaps also unable to assert a clear line among diverse opinion groups in the Soviet political elite.

Despite Cuba's support for guerrillas in Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Peru, and Nicaragua, Moscow preferred to pursue the normalization of diplomatic relations and trade—even with the anti-Castro governments of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela.[9] Hence, Moscow denied that Latin America was "objectively" ripe for revolution, and, together with its loyal CPs, insisted on the possibility of a peaceful path

[7] Carla Anne Robbins, *The Cuban Threat* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983), pp. 30, 151.

[8] Donald D. Pizinger, "Present Soviet Policy in Latin America," in *Naval War College Review,* April 1969, pp. 101-2, 109; and Robbins, *The Cuban Threat,* pp. 151-52.

[9] Gonzalez, *Cuba Under Castro,* p. 137; Robbins, *The Cuban Threat,* pp. 51-52, 247; Jorge Dominguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 383-85, 387, 390; *New York Times,* February 24, 1981; William E. Ratliff, *Castroism and Communism in Latin America, 1959-76* (Stanford, Calif.: AEI Hoover Policy Studies, 1976), p. 41; and *Los Angeles Times,* March 24, 1981.

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to power. *Pravda* criticized Castro repeatedly for "petit bourgeois revolutionism," and Castro replied in kind, assailing Moscow, in a 1967 speech, for its policy of détente and lashing out at the Latin American CPs loyal to Moscow.[10]

Those leftists who adopted guerrilla tactics did so without help from Moscow and by the late 1960s, the Venezuelan armed struggle had evaporated, the Peruvian guerrillas had been destroyed, the Colombian guerrilla movement had withered away, and the Brazilian leftist urban insurgency had collapsed.[11] The Guatemalan coup of 1963, moreover, created a precedent for future anti-Communist and anti-leftist repression in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.

Moscow was unruffled by these developments since it had set no store by guerrilla insurgency. On the contrary, Moscow blamed the "ultraleftists" for contributing to setbacks in several countries. In a lengthy article in November 1968, *Pravda* railed against

> the various ultraleftist groups of adventurists that have sprung up in recent years under the influence of anti-Marxist, Maoist ideas that have been disseminated. . . . Such groups have come into being in Brazil, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Chile, and Bolivia. The political platform of these leftist schismatic groups actually has nothing in common with communism and coincides completely with the platform of the Trotskyite groups. . . . [Indeed,] the ultraleftists have completely discarded the Marxist-Leninist theory of the socialist revolution [since,] . . . in their opinion, armed struggle can be called into being artificially at any time in any country, regardless of conditions.[12]

Soviet optimism was stimulated in the late 1960s and early 1970s by the rise of anti-American regimes in Peru, Panama, Ecuador, and Honduras, which were favorably inclined toward cooperation with the Soviet Union. Moscow accordingly instructed its loyal CPs to cooperate with anti-American regimes and lend them support. By the end of 1968, moreover, through a combination of economic and political pressure, Moscow had bridled its wayward Cuban ally and brought it into line, and, after Cuba's disastrous sugar campaign of 1970, Castro patched up his relations with the orthodox CPs of Latin America.

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[10] Boris Goldenberg, "Fidel Castros Revolutionstheorie im Konflikt mit Moskau," in *Europa Archiv*, September 25, 1967, pp. 649-50, 652.

[11] See Benedict Cross (pseudonym), "Marxism in Venezuela," in *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1973, pp. 58-59; Goldenberg, "Fidel Castros Revolutionstheorie," p. 656; and Riordan Roett, "Brazilian Communism: A History of Failure," in *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1976, pp. 79-80.

[12] *Pravda*, November 20, 1968, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (*CDSP*), December 11, 1968, p. 21.

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The Lessons of Chile, 1970-79

The election of Salvador Allende, at the head of a leftist bloc, as president of Chile in autumn 1970 seemed to confirm the rectitude of Moscow's gradualist policy. The Chilean election was consonant with Moscow's predilection to have the local CPs abjure guerrilla warfare and seek legalization as a basis for the expansion of their activities. Moscow likewise welcomed the relative moderation in Allende's program and praised his government for having rejected "attempts to nudge it into an adventurist forward leap."[13]

In an article for the CPSU organ, *Kommunist,* Boris Ponomarev, head of the International Department of the Central Committee Secretariat, made the most of Chilean developments. "The victory of the National Unity Bloc in Chile," he wrote there, "the progressive changes in Peru and the serious successes achieved by the revolutionary struggle in Uruguay and several other countries lead us to believe that the revolutionary process here is continuing to develop at a pace faster than in other parts of the nonsocialist world."[14] Ponomarev drew several conclusions from Allende's accession, among them that Communist collaboration with Socialists in electoral coalitions can produce electoral victory and that socialist-communist governments can take power by peaceful means.[15] But while some Soviet experts in Moscow's Latin America Institute were by and large optimistic about the prospects for Allende's program, others—that is, those in the Institute of World Economy and International Relations—predicted it would be overthrown by military coup.[16] Thus, at no point could Moscow's attitude toward Allende be characterized as equanimous.

Moscow was clearly unwilling to bankroll the Chilean revolution and therefore refrained from recognizing the Allende regime as a bona fide Socialist regime. Although well aware of Allende's economic needs (with a Chilean foreign debt exceeding $2 billion by early 1972), they provided only a modest amount of aid—a total of $183 million between 1971 and 1973, according to U.S. State Department figures.[17]

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[13] *Pravda,* November 4, 1971, trans. in *CDSP,* November 30, 1971, p. 16.

[14] Boris Ponomarev, "Characteristics of the Revolutionary Process in Latin America," reprinted in T. Stephen Cheston and Bernhard Loeffke, eds., *Aspects of Soviet Policy toward Latin America* (New York: MSS, 1974), p. 31.

[15] Ibid., pp. 33-34.

[16] Bernhard Loeffke and T. Stephen Cheston, "Factors in Policy Formulation toward Latin America," in Cheston and Loeffke, eds., *Aspects of Soviet Policy,* p. 80.

[17] Joseph L. Nogee and John W. Sloan, "Allende's Chile and the Soviet Union," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs,* August 1979, pp. 353-56. See, also, John C. M. Oglesby, "Chile unter Allende: auswärtige Beziehungen und innere Probleme," *Europa Archiv,* August 25, 1972; and R. Ulyanovsky, "The Third World — Problems of Socialist Orientation," *International Affairs* (Moscow), September 1971, p. 28.

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After the military coup that removed Allende from power, Moscow reassessed its position on gradualism and armed struggle. Its conclusions were stated by Ponomarev in mid 1974. According to Ponomarev, the Chilean reversal was attributable in part to the inability of the Chilean CP to maintain the necessary flexibility to switch to a policy of violence when the situation called for it. "The events in Chile," Ponomarev argued,

> are a further reminder of the importance of maintaining revolutionary gains, of the tremendous importance of being prepared to promptly change forms of struggle, peaceful and nonpeaceful, of the ability to repel the counterrevolutionary violence of the bourgeoisie with revolutionary violence. Those events are also a reminder of the need to approach the issue of the peaceful, non-armed road to a victorious revolution from a correct Leninist position. The peaceful development of the revolution is guaranteed not only by an alignment of social forces under which the bourgeoisie would not venture to start a civil war, but by the constant preparedness of the revolutionary vanguard and the masses—in deed and not in words—to use the boldest means of struggle should the situation require it.[18]

Initially, Moscow seems to have been discouraged by the Chilean coup, and though an electoral strategy seemed to be seriously handicapped, O. Tikhonov argued, in the January 1974 issue of *Kommunist,* that revolution was not exportable à la Che Guevara either.[19] Still, the general consensus among Soviet observers of the Latin American scene, in the course of the postmortem after Chile, was that the recourse to extra-legal means should not have been eschewed.[20] It is a direct line from this conclusion to a Soviet encouragement of guerrilla activity in Latin America.

That Moscow was leaning now toward armed struggle as the primary (though not exclusive) means of social-political transformation in Latin America was suggested by the publication in the party organ, *Kommunist,* in January 1975, of a strident article by Ruben Dario Souza, general-secretary of the People's Party of Panama. Souza boldly spoke of a turning point in the "liberation" struggle in Latin America and claimed that Latin America had become a "socio-political volcano"[21]—an early warning, two to three years before most U.S. observers noticed any change. Souza continued, with calculated praise for the Soviets: "The peaceful community of socialist states, which is led by the Soviet Union, possessing gigantic economic, political and scientific-technical potential,

[18] Boris Ponomarev, "The World Situation and the Revolutionary Process," *World Marxist Review,* June 1974, pp. 10-11.

[19] O. Tikhonov, "Nekotorye aspekti opyta kubinskoi revolutsii," *Kommunist,* January 1974.

[20] Jerry F. Hough, "The Evolving Soviet Debate on Latin America," *Latin American Research Review,* vol. 16, no. 1, 1981, pp. 131-32.

[21] Dario Souza, "Revolutsiya i kontrarevolutsiya v Latinskoi Amerike," *Kommunist,* January 1975, pp. 86, 88.

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appears as a decisive factor in the progressive development of mankind."[22] In and of itself, this doesn't mean much, but in the context of a discussion of political trends in Latin America, it may be taken to indicate that certain radicals, such as Souza, hoped to get more assistance from the Soviet Union.

In point of fact, this is an old refrain, as leftist guerrillas have repeatedly sought assistance from either the Soviets or the Cubans over the years. Even the anti-Soviet Tupamaros of Uruguay at one time approached the Cubans for assistance;[23] and as Cuban influence expanded, guerrillas all over the continent came to think of Cuba as a potential source of support, even in the Southern Cone.

Within the context of the Kremlin's debate over its Latin American policy, the case for armed struggle was buttressed by the failure of destabilization efforts against semi-liberal regimes in the Southern Cone to produce results. It appeared that destabilization had brought about rightist regimes more violent and more hostile to communism than their predecessors. The Uruguayan case is illustrative. Here, the well-organized Uruguayan CP had hoped that endemic labor unrest and widespread governmental corruption would provide a fertile nest in which disruptive political action could produce polarization and the collapse of the government. Instead, the military intervened and the Uruguayan CP was forcibly suppressed.

Demoralized by these setbacks in Chile, Uruguay, and elsewhere, Latin American leftists came to agree with Castro that socialism could be achieved only through revolutionary war and the adoption of a policy of immediate economic and social transformation. This became the consensus of all guerrilla groups and of almost all non-armed revolutionary movements in the region. In these circumstances, the Kremlin may well have concluded that the endorsement of guerrilla warfare in Latin America could not be avoided and that guerrilla insurgency, especially if penetrated by Soviet advisers, could redound to Soviet benefit. The Soviets joined the Cubans in providing arms to the Sandinista guerrillas in Nicaragua,[24] while other Soviet proxies and associates became involved in the new strategy. North Korea funneled money to leftist guerrillas in Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay; helped to set up an Argentine guerrilla base at Satta in December 1973; trained guerrillas from Argentina, Guatemala, and Peru; and supplied the Leftist Revolutionary

[22] Ibid., p. 89.

[23] Interview conducted by Fernando Lopez-Alves, Mexico City, June 1983. The attempt, however, was not successful in terms of material aid, and the sparse logistical assistance and training the Cubans provided was too sporadic to result in any substantial gain for the MLN.

[24] *Pravda,* June 25, 1979, summarized in *World Affairs Report,* September 1979, p. 277.

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Chile movement with small arms and other equipment.[25] East Germany's Solidarity Committee, officially described as a "non-party body," has been funneling assistance to guerrilla movements in the Third World for a number of years. Under committee president Kurt Seibt, it had, by the end of 1980, enabled 750 cadres of various guerrilla movements to receive training in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Among this number were guerrillas from Chile and Uruguay.[26] Cuba—presumably with tacit Soviet consent—also sharply increased weapons aid to guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala in the late 1970s.[27]

The ensuing shift in Soviet policies, it should be pointed out, did not mean an abandonment of caution, and while Soviet fear of a frontal confrontation with the United States may have diminished since the 1960s, the Kremlin remains concerned to avoid crisis escalation. Thus, for instance, a recent CIA report[28] maintains that Moscow and even Havana have been urging Salvadoran guerrillas to negotiate with the United States in order to decrease the likelihood of a substantial U.S. military build-up in the region.[29] This conclusion seems to be reinforced by the fact that El Salvador is geopolitically less important than Nicaragua, and that the Salvadoran operation could jeopardize what the Soviets have already achieved in Nicaragua. Moscow has recently increased its aid to the Sandinistas[30] because the strategic position now achieved in Nicaragua might be endangered by the Washington-backed "contras," but even given these new increases, Soviet assistance to Nicaragua remains well below Nicaragua's actual needs. Undoubtedly, part of the reason for Soviet frugality here has been the general stagnation of the Soviet economy. A recent NATO study concluded that "Soviet economic aid to client states—unlike arms, in which the Soviet economy is specialized—may be closer than ever to its limit, particularly in view of the growing, competing economic requirements of Eastern Europe."[31] The 0.02 per cent of the estimated Soviet GNP accounted for by economic aid abroad is not negligible, according to Soviet watchers, and to that must be added

[25] Nack An and Rose An, "North Korean Military Assistance," in John F. Copper and Daniel S. Papp, eds., *Communist Nations' Military Assistance* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), p. 172.

[26] David Childs, *The GDR: Moscow's German Ally* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 298.

[27] W. Raymond Duncan, "Cuban Military Assistance to the Third World," in Copper and Papp, eds., *Communist Nations' Military Assistance,* p. 139.

[28] See *New York Times,* August 7, 1983.

[29] *The Economist,* London, July 23, 1983, p. 28; *Wall Street Journal,* August 15, 1983; and *The Guardian,* August 21, 1983.

[30] *The Economist* (July 30, 1983), p. 11.

[31] Quoted in *Christian Science Monitor,* January 4, 1983. See, also, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects* (Washington: GPO, 1977); Philip Hanson, "Economic Constraints on Soviet Policies in the 1980s," *International Affairs* (London), Winter 1980-81; Abram Bergson, "Soviet Economic Slowdown and the 1981-85 Plan," *Problems of Communism,* May–June 1981; Seweryn Bialer, "The Andropov Succession," *New York Review of Books,* February 3, 1983, pp. 26-30; and *The Guardian,* August 14, 1983.

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the cost of Soviet military and economic entanglement in other parts, especially Cuba, which costs the Soviets $8 to $10 million per day, and Afghanistan, which tallies up a bill of $3 to $4 million per day, with no end to the war in sight (an Indian source estimated that military occupation would last at least ten years).[32]

Sandinistas and New Opportunities

Nicaragua's Sandinistas received scarcely any direct support from the Soviets during the revolutionary struggle. The Socialist Party of Nicaragua (PSN) followed the prevailing conciliatory line that characterized pro-Soviet Latin American CPs at that time, repudiating the "Castroite" embrace of armed struggle. Unlike the Uruguayan and Chilean CPs, the PSN (founded in 1937) never acquired political importance—its membership has never exceeded 250—and its relations with other Nicaraguan leftist organizations were always scant. Indeed, its policy toward the Sandinista guerrillas, the leading revolutionary force in Nicaragua, was one of lukewarm self-restraint and general cautiousness; the party's abstention from the guerrilla struggle evoked distrust on the part of the Sandinistas, and by the time the party finally joined the struggle in late 1977, the rift between the PSN and the Sandinistas was already well established.

To be sure, Soviet involvement in Nicaragua's revolution sharply contrasts with that of the Cubans, who supported the Sandinistas from the very outset. The importance of Cuba for Nicaragua was not limited, however, to military advice and training during the Sandinista struggle against Somoza. On the contrary, Castro also served as a broker for the Sandinistas within the Socialist bloc.

Yet, however modest Soviet aid to the Sandinista guerrillas may have been, the Soviets were quick to establish state-to-state and party-to-party relations with the new Sandinista regime, and quick to draw conclusions from the guerrilla victory. The March 1980 issue of *Latinskaya Amerika* was devoted to taking stock of the new situation produced by the Sandinista triumph. Boris Koval wrote here, in a stunning passage, that "the Nicaraguan experience [has] demolished the previous simplistic interpretation of guerrilla actions, confirmed the justice of many of Che Guevara's strategic principles, and crystallized his idea of creating a

[32] W. Raymond Duncan, "Moscow, the Caribbean and Central America," in Robert Wesson, ed., *Communism in Central America and the Caribbean* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 6; Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Policy in Central America," *Survey*, Autumn–Winter 1983, p. 298; *Christian Science Monitor*, December 22, 1982; and *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), September 1, 1982.

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powerful popular guerrilla movement."[33] S. A. Mikoyan, editor of *Latinskaya Amerika,* likewise offered a posthumous rehabilitation of Che Guevara and pointed out that "up to now only the armed path has led to revolutionary victory in Latin America."[34] And, in the same issue, N. Leonov underlined the conclusion that "the armed road . . . is the most promising in the specific conditions of most of the Latin American countries."[35] Later that year, the authoritative CPSU journal, *Kommunist,* published a speech by Salvadoran CP leader Shafik Handal in which he declared that proletarian revolution could succeed in El Salvador only by means of guerrilla warfare.[36] By 1982, Moscow had concluded that not only El Salvador and Guatemala, but also Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Bolivia were ripe for revolution. The Kremlin appears to entertain hopes of seeing revolution erupt also in Honduras within the near future, while in Paraguay, the CP has declared that the time is ripe to set up an "anti-dictatorship front."[37]

The ravages of the guerrilla struggle, which set back the Nicaraguan economy several years and left 200,000 families homeless,[38] encouraged the Sandinistas to be receptive to aid from any quarter, East or West. But even aside from the fact that President Reagan has been doing his best to quash leftist insurgency in El Salvador (which the Nicaraguans have wanted to stimulate) and to destabilize the Sandinista regime itself—both of which cannot help but push the Sandinistas closer to the Soviets—there is the fact that the anti-Americanism immanent in the Sandinista revolt from the very beginning was only reinforced by Washington's efforts to save Somoza.[39] Insofar as the struggle against Somoza was at the same time a struggle against the "Colossus of the North," present U.S.-Nicaraguan rancor is scarcely a cause for wonder.

To be sure, anti-Americanism facilitates closer contacts with the Soviets, and constitutes an incalculable barrier to any tangible im-

[33] Quoted in Robert S. Leiken, *Soviet Strategy in Latin America,* Washington Paper no. 93 (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 34.

[34] S. A. Mikoyan, "Ob osobennostyah revolutsii v Nikaragua i ee urokah s tochki zreniya teorii i praktiki osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya," *Latinskaya Amerika,* March 1980, p. 35.

[35] Quoted in Leiken, *Soviet Strategy in Latin America,* p. 34.

[36] Ibid., p. 35.

[37] Eduardo Viera, "The Political Climate Is Changing," *World Marxist Review,* January 1982, p. 67; Raul Vidal, "For the Chilean People's Freedom and Happiness," *World Marxist Review,* February 1982, p. 40; "Latin America: Decade with a Hard Beginning," *World Marxist Review,* March 1982, pp. 21-22, 24; "Dramatic Stage in the History of a Continent," *World Marxist Review,* May 1982, p. 17; and *Neues Deutschland,* September 27, 1983.

[38] Regarding Nicaragua's economic straits, see Jean M. Cariot and Veronique Soule, *Nicaragua: Le Modele Sandiniste* (Paris: Sycomore, 1981), p. 13 and passim; Gabriel Alegria and D. J. Flakoll, *Nicaragua: La Revolucion Sandinista* (Mexico City: Era, 1982), p. 5 and passim; Tirado, *La Revolucion Sandinista,* pp. 99-104; and Arturo Cruz, "Nicaragua's Imperiled Revolution," *Foreign Affairs,* Summer 1983, pp. 1035-36.

[39] For a recent account of anti-Americanism in Nicaragua, see Stephen Kinzer, "Nicaragua: The Beleaguered Revolution," *New York Times Magazine,* August 28, 1983, pp. 22-31.

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provement in relations between the United States and the Sandinistas. The Soviet Union appears, thus, as a "natural" backer for the new regime, though it must be emphasized that the political clout of the Soviets in Nicaragua today is more a result of the legacy of U.S.-Nicaraguan relations and underlying distrust than of any real mutual commitment between the Soviet Union and Nicaragua.

All the same, the Sandinistas have been eager to develop their Eastern connections and their new ties with the Socialist bloc have, after all, a dynamic of their own. The Sandinistas have found receptive ears in certain quarters, too. Thus, while some U.S. observers[40] continue to argue that the Sandinistas are not necessarily moving in the direction of communism and stress the degree of pluralism that still exists in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas have sent a very different message to Moscow. As early as September 1980, for example, Tomas Borge, a member of the Sandinista leadership, declared:

> We propose to create an organized revolutionary party, leading on the basis of scientific principles, realizing its leadership role, the guardian of high morals, a party with a clear political strategy, which does not limit itself to the struggle for partial reforms.[41]

In recognition of the validity of this claim, a Soviet source described the Sandinista Front, in 1981, as the "vanguard" (*avangarda*) of the Nicaraguan people.[42]

The Soviets could also only be encouraged by the headlong radicalism shown in the "72-Hour Document." As Max Singer notes, this document, a record of a special three-day presentation by the Sandinista Directorate to FSLN cadres September 21-23, 1979, shows the Sandinistas speaking of their intention to eject their non-Marxist allies at a suitable opportunity and to build a Marxist-Leninist system under the protection of the Soviet Union.[43] Similarly, the Sandinistas' impatient visit to Cuba, within days of their victory, spoke eloquently of their anti-Americanism and admiration for the Cuban revolution.[44]

In spite of this, the Soviets were slow to extend concrete material aid. In March 1980, the Soviets rebuffed a Sandinista request for economic aid, but agreed to provide technical, scientific, and cultural assistance; in addition, Moscow offered customary technical assistance in fishing, hydroelectric power and the textile industry. Nicaragua's low

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[40] E.g., Robert S. Leiken, "Eastern Winds in Latin America," *Foreign Policy,* Spring 1981; and Richard E. Feinberg, "Central America: No Easy Answers," *Foreign Affairs,* Summer 1981.

[41] *Barricada,* September 16, 1980, quoted in I. M. Bulychev, "Uspehi i problemy sandinistskoi revolutsii," *Latinskaya Amerika,* July 1981, p. 29.

[42] Bulychev, "Uspehi i problemy," p. 26.

[43] Max Singer, "The Record in Latin America," *Commentary,* December 1982, p. 44.

[44] "Cuba: Compañeros," *Latin America Political Report,* August 3, 1979, p. 236.

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priority in Soviet eyes even in 1981 was suggested by the tangible difficulty of Central Committee spokesman Leonid Zamyatin, at the CPSU Congress in February of that year, in remembering whether Nicaraguans spoke Spanish or Portuguese. In his principal address to the Congress, moreover, Brezhnev made no mention of Central America, and while meeting with the leaders of Ethiopia and Angola, Brezhnev denied an audience to Carlos Nuñez Tellez, president of the governing council in Nicaragua.[45]

Uncertainty about the political maturity of the Sandinistas and about the U.S. response to the Nicaraguan revolution may be to blame for Moscow's initial reluctance to commit itself to Nicaragua's support. Moscow's inability speedily to fill the vacuum created by U.S. economic sanctions against Nicaragua may also have been a factor, and, even in 1982, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe accounted for only 6.2 per cent of Nicaraguan exports and 11.5 per cent of Nicaraguan imports.[46]

The Kremlin seems to have decided sometime in the course of 1981 to commit itself more explicitly to Nicaragua, and, in December 1981, Moscow's ambassador to Nicaragua was quoted as saying that the Soviet Union stood "ready to defend Nicaragua in the event of an American attack."[47] The Soviets made their first tangible contribution to the Nicaraguan revolution in 1981, with a shipment of 20,000 tons of wheat. Another 7,000 tons of scarce Soviet wheat arrived in Nicaragua in November 1983.[48] In January 1982, the Soviets provided some $220 million in credits, and in March 1983, Nicaragua signed a trade agreement with Poland and a three-year, $170 million aid and trade agreement with Bulgaria. Nicaragua signed additional economic agreements with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany in the course of 1983, and, in February 1984, Daniel Ortega, head of the Nicaraguan junta, paid a visit to East Germany's Erich Honecker.[49]

As early as March 1980, a high-level Sandinista delegation, including interior Minister Tomas Borge and Defense Minister Humberto Ortega, traveled to Moscow and signed a series of agreements. Soon after, the Soviet embassy in Managua was expanded appreciably.[50] About the same time, East Berlin received a delegation of high-ranking Nica-

[45] Jonathan Steele, *Soviet Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 220-21.

[46] *Christian Science Monitor,* December 6, 1983.

[47] Quoted in *Los Angeles Times,* December 9, 1981.

[48] *Neues Deutschland,* November 18, 1983.

[49] *Wall Street Journal,* May 11, 1982; PAP (Warsaw), March 30, 1983, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), April 1, 1983; *Los Angeles Times,* March 26, 1983; *Barricada,* March 13, 1983; Managua Sistema Sandinista TV, March 18, 1983, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) 83262, *Latin America Report,* April 14, 1983, p. 132; *Prace* (Prague), April 9, 1983; trans. in JPRS 83316, *East Europe Report,* April 22, 1983, p. 15; *Rude Pravo,* August 27, 1983, trans. in JPRS 84391, *East Europe Report,* September 22, 1983, p. 18; *Neues Deutschland,* December 5, 1983, and February 15, 1984.

[50] Jan Knippers Black, "Government and Politics," *Nicaragua: A Country Study* (Washington: American University Press, 1982), p. 214.

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raguan military officers; the East Germans and Nicaraguans were said to have reached "unanimity on all matters discussed."[51] A subsequent meeting between Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov with Army Chief of Staff Marshal Nikolai Orgakov and Minister Humberto Ortega on November 20, 1981 may be further evidence of a Soviet upgrading of Nicaragua's status in 1981.[52] Daniel Ortega visited Moscow in May 1982, November 1982, and March 1983, and at one point Brezhnev evidently had planned to pay an official visit to Nicaragua.[53] Nicaraguan military delegations visited Moscow in autumn 1982 and spring 1984, and, between 1982 and 1983, a number of high-ranking Nicaraguan delegations visited Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR.[54]

The Sandinistas had enjoyed support from a variety of sources during their struggle for power, including Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, Cuba, and the Soviet Union. The former four states quickly lost any real influence in Nicaragua, however. On the other hand, the Sandinistas have established party-to-party relations with the CPSU, the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED), the Bulgarian Communist Party, and the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Other Sandinista political bodies have established links with their counterparts in the GDR, Bulgaria, and Hungary. And in May 1982, Nicaragua joined the Intersputnik Telecommunications Consortium in its first accession to a multilateral Communist organization.[55] East German and Cuban advisers arrived to help the Sandinistas build up a Nicaraguan secret police modeled on the KGB, to consolidate political control in the army, and to develop the citizens' militia committees.[56] Some seventy Soviet military advisers were reported to be in Nicaragua already in March 1982, and, by early 1983, it was reported that there were some 6,000 Cubans in Nicaragua (2,000 of them military and security personnel), 100 East German advisers, and some 100 Bulgarians, and in June 1983, Cuba dispatched its veteran of African wars, General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, to Nicaragua to help the Managua regime.[57] The Sandinistas' eagerness for tighter affiliation with the Soviet

[51] Childs, *The GDR,* pp. 291, 312.

[52] *Neues Deutschland,* November 21-22, 1981.

[53] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung,* May 6, 1982; *Pravda,* March 26, 1983, trans. in *CDSP,* April 20, 1983, p. 20; and AFP (Paris), May 10, 1982, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Soviet Union), May 11, 1982.

[54] *Krasnaya zvezda,* October 19, 1982, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Soviet Union), October 29, 1982; *World Affairs Report,* June 1982; *Barricada,* November 25, 1981; *New York Times,* August 7, 1983; *Neues Deutschland,* October 20, 1983; Radio Prague, November 29, 1982, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), December 7, 1982; and Robert Rand, "Nicaraguan Defense Chief May Seek Increase in Soviet Aid," *Radio Liberty Research,* March 30, 1984, p. 1.

[55] Morris Rothenberg, "Latin America in Soviet Eyes," *Problems of Communism,* September–October 1983, p. 9.

[56] Constantine Menges, "Central America and Its Enemies," *Commentary,* August 1981, p. 34; Singer, "The Record in Latin America," p. 43; and Black, "Government and Politics," pp. 213-14.

[57] *Frankfurter Allgemeine,* March 11, 1982; *Los Angeles Times,* January 24, 1983; *Time,* February 14, 1983; *Christian Science Monitor,* June 20, 1983; and Kinzer, "Nicaragua: the Beleaguered Revolution," p. 73.

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bloc has been signaled by repeated avowals that Sandinism and Marxism-Leninism are the same.[58] Within this context it is understandable that the Sandinistas felt it necessary to drive the once vigorous independent newspaper, *La Prensa,* into a corner and to proscribe publication of any articles critical of the Soviet Union or any of its bloc allies.[59] Obviously, the Sandinistas had nothing critical to say about the Soviet role in Afghanistan—"a faraway country of which we know nothing."

As political and economic ties between Nicaragua and the bloc have developed, the Soviet Union has also been forthcoming with modest amounts of military equipment. The first anniversary victory parade on July 19, 1980 showed off some ninety-six East German W-50 trucks, eighteen Soviet ZPU light antiaircraft guns, and six Soviet SA-7 surface-to-air missile launchers, in addition to other weaponry.[60] Other bloc weapons known to have been in the Sandinista arsenal by the end of 1980 include more than fifty Soviet T-54/55 tanks, at least eight 122-mm and twelve 155-mm howitzers, more than 800 military supply trucks, twelve mobile missile launchers, and, since the end of 1982, also electronic radar equipment.[61] In April 1980, Borge made a secret visit to Pyongyang to solicit North Korean military aid. Several North Korean military advisers appeared in Nicaragua in March of the following year to help train the Sandinista army.[62] In 1981 the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe shipped some 66,000 tons of military hardware to Cuba—an amount more than in any other year since the missile crisis of 1962. Much of this was transshipped to Nicaragua. In addition, the Nicaraguans received some eighty MiG fighters, five helicopters, patrol boats, armored personnel carriers, transport aircraft, spare parts for AN-26 transport aircraft, and other equipment directly from the Soviets between 1981 and 1983.[63] Between 1979 and 1982, Nicaragua had received an estimated $125 million in military equipment and supplies from the Soviet Union alone, and during 1983 another 15,000 tons of Soviet bloc arms and equipment reached the Sandinista army.[64]

Soviet officials now openly declare themselves prepared to support the Sandinistas and other Caribbean Leninists "politically in every

[58] Cruz, "Nicaragua's Imperiled Revolution," pp. 1033, 1036-38, 1040, 1045; Rothenberg, "Latin America in Soviet Eyes," p. 7; and Richard H. Ullman, "At War with Nicaragua," *Foreign Affairs,* Fall 1983, p. 47.

[59] *Christian Science Monitor,* July 20, 1983.

[60] Black, "Government and Politics," p. 213.

[61] Christoph Mühlemann, "Die herausgeforderte Grossmacht," *Schweizer Monatshefte,* November 1983, p. 884.

[62] An and An, "North Korean Military Assistance," p. 172.

[63] *Los Angeles Times,* June 2, 1981; *Foreign Report,* June 4, 1981; *Frankfurter Allgemeine,* March 11, 1982; *La Prensa,* April 28, 1982; *El Nuevo Diario,* June 20, 1982; *Los Angeles Times,* June 20, 1983, and August 6, 1983; and Rand, "Nicaraguan Defense Chief," p. 1.

[64] Thomas E. Enders, "Nicaragua: Threat to Peace in Central America," *Department of State Bulletin,* June 1983, p. 76.

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way."[65] As early as 1981, Nicaraguan pilots were going to Cuba and Bulgaria for training in the use of Soviet-built MiGs, and as of late 1983, some seventy additional MiGs were said to be waiting in Cuba for transshipment to Nicaragua as soon as Nicaraguan pilots completed the Bulgarian flight instruction course.[66] There have also been military contacts between the Sandinistas and both Libyans and the PLO.[67]

Soviet Support for Guerrillas

The Soviet Union, through its caution and initial hesitation to become directly entangled with Latin American guerrillas, showed itself guilty of the "unLeninist" sin of "tailism," that is, the proclivity of opportunistically following trends already set by others rather than of leading the working class to proletarian revolution.[68] Thus, it was the Sandinista revolution which proved pivotal in changing Soviet thinking about the Western Hemisphere, and the Soviets now admitted that the Sandinista revolution constituted a vindication of the old Castroism of Che Guevara.[69]

Yet as early as 1974, the KGB had helped to set up a coordination agency (the so-called Junta de Coordinacion Revolucionaria), and by 1980, according to a CIA study, the Soviets were spending some $200 million per year in support of guerrilla movements around the world.[70] The Soviet Union started sending military supplies to the Salvadoran guerrillas as early as late 1979, shortly after the Sandinista triumph in Nicaragua, and Reagan administration spokesmen claimed that some 800 tons of Soviet weaponry had reached the Salvadoran guerrillas by September 1980.[71] According to Jiri Valenta, the recent Soviet rehabilitation of Che Guevara is no less than a token of the fact that "the Soviets and Cubans now have a unified Third World strategy which reflects the overall coordination of their foreign policies. The Soviets' continued eco-

[65] Quoted in Valenta, "Soviet Policy in Central America," p. 299.

[66] James Nelson Goodsell, "Nicaragua," in Richard F. Staar, ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1982* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 128; Paul E. Sigmund, "Latin America: Change or Continuity?" *Foreign Affairs,* vol. 60, no. 3, 1981 ("America and the World 1981"), p. 641; and Valenta, "Soviet Policy in Central America," p. 295.

[67] Menges, "Central America and its Enemies," pp. 33-35; TASS, April 23, 1983, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Soviet Union), April 26, 1983; and JANA (Tripoli), May 19, 1983, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (North Africa), May 20, 1983.

[68] "*Khvostizm* [tailism], from the expression 'to trail behind,' is an opportunist ideology and set of tactics consisting of [the] diminution of revolutionary tasks and the role of the working class, reduction of its political and economic demands to the level of consciousness of the backward masses, repudiation of revolutionary struggle and denial of the leading role of the Party and the importance of Marxist theory." *Encyclopedic Dictionary* (Moscow, 1963), as translated in *CDSP,* July 10, 1968, p. 4n.

[69] Robert Lindner, "Castros zweite Offensive," *Osteuropa,* March 1982, p. 226.

[70] *Rheinischer Merkur,* April 24, 1981.

[71] *New York Times,* February 24, 1981.

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nomic and security support of the island is contingent upon this understanding."[72]

Castro served as a conduit of military aid to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador, too; and, in a precedent-breaking move, the Communist Party of El Salvador declared in January 1980 that armed struggle was the only path to power—the first absolute endorsement of guerrilla struggle by a Latin American CP[73]—and, shortly thereafter, adopted a ten-point program calling for the forcible overthrow of the government and the subsequent introduction of "profound social transformations" on the Leninist model.[74] But, as we have seen, Soviet thinking about Central America changed in two stages: in late 1979, as a result of the Sandinista revolution, Soviet observers of the Latin American scene came to view violent revolutionary change as imminent; and in mid 1981, the Soviet political apparatus decided to lend its full backing to the Sandinista revolution. The two Moscow visits by Shafik Handal, general secretary of the Salvadoran CP, in 1980 came too soon, thus, for him to benefit from Soviet reassessment, and Handal returned to El Salvador frustrated with the low level of his reception and disappointed at evident Soviet reluctance to step up military aid to the insurgents.[75]

It is worth noting, however, that in early 1981, quantities of rifles, pistols, light machine guns, and mortars sent by Vietnam turned up in El Salvador. The GDR has also provided military assistance to the Salvadoran guerrillas. And by early 1982, Moscow had expressly endorsed the guerrilla movement in El Salvador and called for the unification of guerrilla-revolutionary forces in Guatemala.[76] By 1983, moreover, Soviet and Cuban military advisers in Nicaragua were running advanced guerrilla training courses for Salvadoran guerrillas and leftist guerrillas from other countries in the region.[77]

Nicaragua became involved in stimulating guerrilla activity in other ways, too, transshipping Soviet and Cuban arms to El Salvador (with at least fifty helicopters reaching Salvadoran guerrillas each month from Managua),[78] allowing the Basque terrorist organization ETA to open offices in Nicaragua (to coordinate terrorist activities in Mexico, Venezuela, and

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[72] Valenta, "Soviet Policy in Central America," p. 288.

[73] Lindner, "Castros zweite Offensive," p. 235.

[74] "Revolutions Are Never the Same," *World Marxist Review,* April 1982, p. 45.

[75] Steele, *Soviet Power,* p. 221.

[76] Douglas Pike, "Vietnam's Military Assistance," in Copper and Papp, eds., *Communist Nations' Military Assistance,* p. 164; Trond Gilberg, "Eastern European Assistance to the Third World," in Copper and Papp, eds., ibid., p. 84; and Radio Moscow, February 12, 1982, as cited in Mark N. Katz, "The Soviet-Cuban Connection," *International Security,* Summer 1983, p. 97.

[77] Valenta, "Soviet Policy in Central America," p. 295; and Singer, "The Record in Latin America," p. 32.

[78] Duncan, "Moscow, the Caribbean, and Central America," p. 12; James Nelson Goodsell, "Nicaragua," in Wesson, ed., *Communism in Central America and the Caribbean,* p. 55; Colonel John D. Waghelstein, recently in charge of American training of Salvadoran troops, in lecture at UCLA, January 12, 1984; and Enders, "Nicaragua: Threat," p. 79.

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Costa Rica),[79] playing host to Mario Firmenich of the Argentine Montoneros groups in 1979,[80] and collaborating with a Cuban plan to stimulate guerrilla war in Honduras.[81] By early 1982, if not before, Nicaragua was also supplying arms to leftist guerrillas in Guatemala and Costa Rica, while Cuba has recently undertaken to train Colombian and Bolivian guerrillas.[82] The Bogota newspaper, *El Siglo,* claimed that Cuba has also been training members of the Venezuelan Red Flag guerrilla movement and implied some coordination between Cubans and the Uruguayan Tupamaros, now said to be operating on the Colombian-Venezuelan border.[83] A new leftist insurgency in Haiti has been fueled by Libyan training and supplies; and in Peru, where there are still more than 100 Soviet advisers, a leftist guerrilla band has lately ruffled the government's equanimity.[84] Both represent possible future opportunities for Soviet activity.

Recently, in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Grenada, Cuba has been urging Salvadoran guerrillas to be flexible and has shown a new restraint vis-à-vis Central America. According to Rodolfo Cerdas, a former member of the Costa Rican CP, this has resulted in a newly revived division between Cuba and the Soviet Union: more specifically, the Cuban-backed general secretary of the Costa Rican CP, Manuel Mora, who held that armed revolution was not possible in Costa Rica, has recently been replaced by Humberto Vargas, a Soviet protégé described as more militant.[85]

The Soviet-guerrilla symbiosis is pragmatic, unstable, and contingent on variations in Soviet diplomacy. Hence, as Soviet-Argentine relations have warmed up in the past few years, terrorism in Argentina has withered away as Libya, Cuba, and other pro-Soviet actors have cut off aid to the Montoneros and other similar groups in Argentina.[86]

Conclusion

The Soviets have always seen guerrilla warfare as a "possible" tactic,[87] never as "necessary" a priori, and have constantly argued that

[79] *Christian Science Monitor,* January 17, 1984.

[80] *Latin America Political Report,* August 10, 1979, p. 248.

[81] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung,* October 11, 1983. See, also, *Central America Report,* September 2, 1983, p. 268.

[82] Alex Alexiev, *Soviet Strategy in the Third World and Nicaragua,* Rand Corporation Report no. P-6752 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, March 1982), p. 8; Sigmund, "Latin America," p. 645; and *Frankfurter Allgemeine,* October 1, 1983.

[83] *El Siglo* (Bogota), October 22, 1983, trans. in JPRS 84851, *Latin America Report,* November 30, 1983, p. 16.

[84] *Business Week,* April 18, 1983, p. 54; *Christian Science Monitor,* June 3, 1983, and June 27, 1983; and *Los Angeles Times,* July 8, 1983.

[85] *The Times* (London), March 26, 1984.

[86] *Somos* (Buenos Aires), June 10, 1983, trans. in JPRS 83879, *Latin America Report,* July 14, 1983, pp. 4-5.

[87] For an early endorsement of armed struggle as a possible tactic in Latin America, see A. Sivolobov, "Krestianskoe dvizhenie v Latinskoi Amerike," *Kommunist,* August 1964, pp. 105-6.

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conditions in the specific country must be ripe for revolution for it to succeed. This is in stark contrast to the ultra-hard image[88] of Soviet behavior which is fond of citing early Comintern declarations from the 1920s and interpreting current events in the light of them.[89] That the Soviet Union remains eager to spread collectivism seems quite obvious, but this does not mean that the Soviets are blind to the realities of world politics. Indeed, some may be surprised at how little the Soviet emphasis on each of the terms in this equation (guerrillas, electoral coalitions, CP support of "progressive" regimes) has changed since the early 1960s, where Latin America is concerned. The image one gets is of precocious self-willed Marxist parties straining to do battle, but being restrained by a tolerant and more mature Mother Russia. Mother Russia is of course anxious for her (adopted) children to "do well" and to take after her, but considers herself wiser, by virtue of her greater experience. The only qualification that might be added is that some of her children are now "coming of age."

There are numerous examples which illustrate this point. In early 1974, for instance, at a time when Soviet observers were still concentrating on expanding good state-to-state relations on the continent and on reinforcing anti-Americanism generally, a conference of Latin American Communist Party representatives, organized by *World Marxist Review,* concluded that the revolutionary process in Latin America was expanding—which probably means that they felt it ought to be expanded.[90] Later, in the wake of the Sandinistas' first insurrection against Somoza in September 1978, Castro "remained cautious, and advised the Sandinistas against an early attempt at another insurrection."[91] More recently, the Salvadoran Left has, at times, been dissatisfied with the level of Sandinista support and a captured guerrilla document charged the Sandinistas with being "very conservative" when it came to support of revolution in neighboring countries.[92] At the same time, both Moscow and Havana have been urging the Salvadoran guerrillas to negotiate.

One common fallacy that one encounters in the writings of the more enthusiastic American advocates of détente is that since Cuban-backed groups, once in power, are not likely to be subservient to Cuba, the spread of collectivism in the hemisphere is, relatively speaking, innocent and something to which the United States can adjust itself. Fur-

[88] See William Welch, *American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, 1970).

[89] For an example of this approach, see Herbert Romerstein, *Soviet Support for International Terrorism* (Washington: The Foundation for Democratic Education, 1981).

[90] "Latin America: Experience and Lessons of Revolutionary Struggle," *World Marxist Review,* May 1974, p. 99.

[91] Feinberg, "Central America: No Easy Answers," p. 1125.

[92] Ibid., p. 1130.

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thermore, since Soviet-backed groups, once in power, are not likely to be subservient to Moscow, and since, in any case, Moscow cannot afford another Cuba, leftist regimes may continue to remain integrated in the Western economic system and may be no more inimical to Western interests than military rulers of the "banana republic" mold.[93] In line with this proposition, proponents of détente sometimes write as if the Sandinistas turned to Cuba only because of their "uncertainty about ultimate American intentions."[94] This latter proposition is historically false, since President Carter deliberately endeavored to continue business as usual by dispersing some $60 million already allocated for Nicaragua while Somoza was in power and by seeking an additional $75 million in aid, in September 1979, to strengthen the Nicaraguan economy.[95] This proposition also founders because it ignores the profound anti-American sentiment and the whole history of U.S. domination of Latin America, which lie at the very heart of the Sandinista revolution and which are important factors in probably every country in Latin America today. The former proposition (that the United States need not fear totalitarianism since totalitarian regimes will also do business) is curious and, in a sense, reprehensible, because it amounts to an argument that the United States has no interest whatsoever in democracy abroad or in the self-determination of peoples as long as countries will do business with us. This total disregard for the interests of foreign peoples is one of the principal reasons for the anti-Americanism in Latin America today.

This brings us to another fallacy in certain Western writings[96]—the implicit assumption that guerrilla warfare is the prime tool by which the Soviets seek to expand their influence. In fact, however, only Cuba and Nicaragua have established collectivist regimes in the Western Hemisphere in this fashion. The short-lived leftist regime of Michael Manley came to power in Jamaica through an electoral victory (as had Allende in Chile earlier) and lost power in the same fashion, Grenada became "socialist" through a mini-coup, and Surinam seemed for a while to be sliding toward Cuba in an incremental way.[97] Romerstein, Sterling, and other critics of the Right speak as if it were only because of the machinations of the Soviet Union and Cuba that the United States finds itself

[93] Ibid., pp. 1126-27; Eldon Kenworthy, "Central America: Beyond the Credibility Trap," *World Policy,* Fall 1983, pp. 182-84, 187, 194; and Richard E. Feinberg and Kenneth A. Oye, "After the Fall: US Policy toward Radical Regimes," *World Policy,* Fall 1983, p. 201.

[94] Reinberg, "Central America: No Easy Answers," p. 1131.

[95] Rhoda Pearl Rabkin, "US-Soviet Rivalry in Central America and the Caribbean," *Journal of International Affairs,* Fall-Winter 1980-81, p. 341.

[96] See, for example, Romerstein, *Soviet Support for International Terrorism;* and Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981).

[97] Regarding Surinam, see *Foreign Report,* December 9, 1982, p. 7; and *Christian Science Monitor,* January 18, 1984.

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in a Latin American mire. But this argument seriously underestimates the extent to which the United States has, by supporting exploitative dictators and petty thieves, created the conditions that now make an anti-American backlash not merely inevitable but in fact an organic component of progressive thought in Latin America. Thus, among both soft-liners and hard-liners, there are those who miss the pivotal importance of indigenous anti-Americanism in Latin America and whose policy recommendations, therefore, are unrelated to the principal force underpinning leftist politics in Latin America. The Kissinger Commission, likewise, for all its sensitivity to economic hardship, failed to take this factor into account and noted only that "perhaps the United States should have paid more attention to Central America sooner."[98] The Kissinger Commission then cited the Monroe Doctrine as an example of "US policies toward the nations of the Americas that have succeeded,"[99] evidently oblivious to the fact that Latin American nations view the Monroe Doctrine rather the way East Europeans view the Brezhnev Doctrine.

The underestimation of indigenous factors is often accomplished by the fallacious notion that revolution is an exportable commodity. This ignores the fact that the special circumstances that bring about the deep social, political, and economic transformations that characterize a revolutionary process cannot be created by the mere infusion of arms to a radical band. Neither the Soviet Union nor any other state can create revolutionary processes ex nihilo. Nevertheless, one can support guerrilla groups in a revolutionary situation—and it is clear that much of Central America is ripe for revolution—calculating that whether successful or not, the struggle will benefit oneself and weaken one's rival.

The Soviets have some natural advantages over the United States in the contest for influence in Latin America. These include: (1) sheer geographic distance, making the Soviets appear less threatening; (2) greater Soviet readiness to ride the winds of change; (3) the clear identification of the Soviet Union with specific groups and ideas, and specifically with calls for the redistribution of wealth and the establishment of economic equality; (4) the whole history of U.S. exploitation of the region, and resulting anti-American sentiment; and (5) a growing belief in the Third World that the Soviets understand Third World problems, while Americans do not.

Yet it is important to recognize that the United States also has some advantages in this arena, notably: (1) greater frequency of contacts with most of the countries in the region; (2) much longer acquaintance,

[98] *The Report of the President's National Bipartisan Commission on Central America* [Kissinger Commission Report], foreword by Henry A. Kissinger (New York: Macmillan, 1984), p. 2.

[99] Ibid., p. 9.

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in academic and research circles, with Latin American problems, and thus presumably greater depth in regional expertise; (3) the ability to funnel much more economic aid than the Soviets can provide (and it is economic aid, not military aid, which after all improves the lot of any society); and (4) the colossal advantage that pluralism ought to have over utopian collectivism, given that collectivism has always produced oppression, terror, economic inefficiency, and lies.

Guns can create facts, but it is important to recognize that a foreign policy that relies solely or chiefly on guns can win only if it wins totally. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has the power to win totally; neither, in other words, can impose its will in Latin America. Hence, any foreign policy premised on the self-sufficiency of military aid is foredoomed. The Soviet Union seems to have recognized somewhat better than the United States that a successful foreign policy must appeal not only to the governments and ruling cliques but also, and we would add primarily (even more so in a revolutionary context) to the people of the country, to those who may, in a pinch, overthrow the old regime and create a vacuum into which a new political force thrusts itself.

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

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

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THE STRATEGIC BOMBER DEBATE TODAY*

by Michael E. Brown

Modernization of the U.S. strategic bomber force has been a highly controversial issue for decades.[1] Although new bomber programs thrived in the early postwar years, they have fared less well in the missile age. The missile-gap scare of the late 1950s and the Sputnik episode gave a boost to U.S. ICBM development efforts, and the U-2 incident of May 1960 dramatized the apparent ascendancy of the missile over the bomber. Questions were raised about the viability, utility, and cost effectiveness of the strategic bomber. Was it obsolete in the missile age?

Many concluded that it was and, consequently, the 1960s and 1970s saw relatively little strategic bomber modernization.[2] President Kennedy canceled the B-70 program and closed the B-52 production lines. The B-47 and B-58 bombers were later phased out of the strategic inventory. President Carter canceled the B-1 program in 1977, arguing that B-52s armed with cruise missiles could do the B-1's job and that they would be more cost effective than the B-1. One might have concluded in the late 1970s that the strategic bomber was dying out.

It is interesting to see how this situation has changed in just the past few years. ICBMs are no longer seen as a strategic panacea. They have worrisome effects on strategic stability because of their first-strike capabilities and basing vulnerabilities.[3] Bombers, on the other hand, generally do not pose much of a first-strike threat, and they do enhance the survivability of our strategic forces in many important ways. They can effectively perform a variety of strategic missions, and they do obligate

* I would like to thank Stanley Brown, Kelly Burke, Karyn McCarthy, John Mearsheimer, and Jack Snyder for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.

[1] Although there were early procurement controversies in the late 1940s and even before World War II, the situation changed dramatically when the ballistic missile programs began to compete with the strategic bomber programs in the mid 1950s. See Edmund Beard, *Developing the ICBM* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), passim; and Desmond Ball, *Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), passim. See, also, chap. 5 of my *Flying Blind: Decision Making in the U.S. Strategic Bomber Program* (forthcoming).

[2] The last B-52 was delivered to the air force on October 26, 1962, in the midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Although the B-52s still in service have been updated and modified on a number of occasions over the years, the only major addition to the strategic bomber force structure in the late 1960s and 1970s was a fleet of about seventy-five FB-111s, modified fighters.

[3] Many of the problems now associated with ICBM programs — including basing vulnerabilities and the instabilities caused by multiple-warhead ICBMs — were analyzed by the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, which reported to President Reagan in April 1983.

Michael E. Brown is an Assistant Professor of political science at Vassar College.

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the Soviets to devote some of their military resources to air defense, a relatively benign area of activity from our point of view.[4] Moreover, the recent emergence of stealth technologies has suggested that the strategic bomber could be a very effective strategic system, even against modern air defenses. For these reasons, bomber modernization is being seen as a viable and attractive strategic option — and one that is long overdue.

As a result, the terms of the strategic bomber debate have shifted dramatically in the past few years. It is remarkable to see that the bomber debate today is no longer over *whether* the strategic bomber is needed, but over *which* bomber should replace the B-52 and how the cruise missile should be incorporated into the new force structure. Most analysts have taken one of two basic positions on the bomber modernization issue, supporting either the three-bomber plan or the two-bomber plan.[5]

The three-bomber plan is essentially what the Reagan administration has proposed. The administration would like to keep most of the B-52s, resurrect the B-1 in the form of a modified B-1B, and develop the "radar-invisible" or "stealthy" bomber.[6] Its plan calls for the first squadron of B-1Bs to be operational in 1986 and for the Stealth bomber, also known as the advanced-technology bomber, to be ready in the early 1990s.[7]

According to the administration, the most pressing problem facing the strategic bomber force is the imminent obsolescence of the B-52 as a penetrating bomber. Because of its performance limitations and rapidly improving Soviet air defenses, the B-52 will have to get by as a "stand-off" bomber and cruise missile carrier (CMC), beginning in the

[4] Bombers are generally not effective as first-strike systems because they are slow and visible on air defense radar. They consequently provide the defender with enough warning time for a response. Bombers contribute to the overall survivability of the triad by complicating the enemy's attack problem: it is difficult to attack bomber bases and ICBM silos simultaneously. This was also certified by the president's commission in its dismissal of the "window of vulnerability" problem. The survivability of bombers themselves is a function of dispersal, their quick reaction capabilities, and the relative "hardness" of the aircraft.

[5] The three-bomber plan calls for the deployment of the B-52, B-1B, and the Stealth bomber. The two-bomber plan calls for the deployment of just the B-52 and the Stealth. The B-1B would be canceled. Most analysts seem to favor one plan or the other. Very few have *publicly* come out for the cancellation of both the B-1B and the Stealth, leaving us with just the B-52s as cruise missile carriers. And there is even less talk today of abandoning the bomber-ALCM (air-launched cruise missile) leg of the triad altogether.

[6] The Reagan administration's plan is sometimes known as a two-bomber plan because it calls for the procurement of two new bombers. It should not be confused with the two-bomber plan as defined in this article. The development of the Stealth bomber preceded the Reagan administration and in fact was an issue in the 1980 presidential campaign. See "Carter Clarifies Position on Stealth Aircraft Leaks," *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* September 15, 1980, p. 23.

[7] There has been some controversy over the Stealth's initial operational capability (IOC) date, in part because of conflicting testimony from the Pentagon on the subject. This controversy is discussed in greater detail below.

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mid 1980s for some of the older models.[8] Based on the assumption that it is essential to maintain a potent penetration capability in the strategic bomber force, the three-bomber plan would begin to utilize the B-1B as a penetrating bomber in 1986 while gradually transforming the B-52s into CMCs.[9] Later, in the 1990s, the Stealth bomber would begin to replace the B-1B as the air force's penetrating bomber, the B-1B would be relied on more as a CMC, and the B-52 would finally be phased out altogether. In implementing this plan, the administration has kept the Stealth program in the developmental stage while moving the B-1B through advanced development and toward production.[10] This plan has come under intense criticism.

The administration's critics have essentially advocated a two-bomber plan. They have suggested that the B-52 might serve as an effective penetrating bomber until the end of the 1980s and that the Stealth bomber might be ready before the 1990s, perhaps as early as 1987 if its development program were to be accelerated.[11] Given this timetable, they wonder, why should we spend $200 million or more per plane for 100 B-1Bs? If there really is not much of a gap between the B-52 and Stealth, then an "interim" bomber would not seem to be necessary. Moreover, they argue, the B-1B promises to be a mediocre penetrating bomber; it might become obsolete as a penetrator soon after the B-52 and, in any event, cannot match the penetration capabilities of the Stealth bomber. Implicit in this argument is the assumption that the B-1B has some major strategic deficiencies while the Stealth bomber, with its invisibility and extraordinary penetration capabilities, is just around the corner. Many distinguished scholars, defense analysts, politicians, and political commentators have called for the cancellation of the B-1B program on these grounds.[12]

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[8] The idea of utilizing the B-52 as a CMC is of course not a new one, although it is being implemented at the present time. See "Cruise Missile Bombers Will Go on Daily Alert," *New York Times,* December 8, 1982.

[9] Some of the older B-52s will be retired rather than updated. Two main reasons are generally given for having a *penetrating* bomber in the force structure. First, it would be able to locate and destroy hidden or mobile strategic targets. Preprogrammed missiles, including cruise missiles, would not be able to conduct this kind of retaliatory search-and-destroy mission. Second, it prevents the Soviets from concentrating all of their air defense efforts against our cruise missiles.

[10] As a result, the administration's fiscal 1984 budget request for the B-1B program was $6.9 billion and only about $500 million for the Stealth program. See "A Shootout Looms Over Bombers," *Business Week,* February 21, 1983, p. 116D; and *New York Times,* February 1, 1983.

[11] The plan to accelerate the Stealth IOC to 1987 or 1988 is apparently a Northrop proposal, although Secretary of Defense Weinberger added to the controversy by suggesting that a 1989 or 1990 IOC might be a possibility. This issue is discussed in more detail below. See "3-Year Advance of Stealth Plane Rejected by U.S.," *New York Times,* August 4, 1982; *Business Week,* April 19, 1982, p. 73; and *Strategic Force Modernization Programs, Hearings Before the Senate Armed Services Committee,* 97th Cong., 1st sess., October-November 1981, p. 311. See, also, Weinberger's comments in Frank Greve, "Is the B-1 a Plane Whose Time Has Come?" *Philadelphia Inquirer Magazine,* March 18, 1984, p. 22.

[12] Harold Brown, secretary of defense in the Carter administration, has argued that the B-1B should be allowed to rest in peace while we moved full steam ahead on the Stealth bomber. The Stealth

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There are serious problems with both of these plans. The advocates of the two-bomber plan badly underestimate the capabilities and versatility of the B-1B and they are far too sanguine about the limitations and risks that are associated with the Stealth bomber program. The Reagan administration, for its part, has to defend the ineconomies associated with two separate procurement programs and its underexploitation of the B-1B's long-term strategic potential.

The argument here is that the B-1 should be the mainstay of the strategic bomber force structure. This argument is based on a number of technological, developmental, and operational considerations. First, the B-1B *is* a Stealth bomber, although it is not *the* Stealth bomber. The key point here is that one must distinguish between the various Stealth technologies that are under development and the Stealth bomber itself. Many of these Stealth technologies are transferable to other programs, such as the B-1B program. In fact, many of them have already been transferred to the B-1B program, substantially enhancing the performance capabilities of that aircraft. The B-1B is consequently a much more formidable aircraft than either the B-52 or the original B-1. And a "highly stealthed" B-1C could be even more formidable. The B-1B's penetration capabilities are reflected in its radar cross section (RCS), which is roughly ten times better than that of the original B-1 and 100 times better than that of the B-52.[13] These enhanced capabilities should enable the B-1B to penetrate against the "look down, shoot down" air defense system that the Soviets might deploy later in the decade. The B-52 is not expected to be effective against this system. Although the Stealth bomber's RCS will undoubtedly be better than that of the B-1B, we have to recognize that the Stealth's development and production programs might be prob-

could then enter the force in 1989, according to his estimates. See his article in the *Washington Post,* November 13, 1981, reprinted in *Strategic Force Modernization Programs,* pp. 391-94. William Kaufmann of MIT and The Brookings Institution has also called for the cancellation of the B-1B. See his "The Defense Budget" in Joseph A. Pechman, ed., *Setting National Priorities: The 1984 Budget* (Washington: Brookings, 1983), p. 60. In February 1983 a bipartisan group of former high government officials (including Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Cyrus Vance, and Peter Petersen) proposed the cancellation of the B-1B program, for an estimated savings of $31.9 billion. See "Congress and the 1984 Reagan Budget: Toward a New Bipartisanship?" *Economic Policy Issues,* no. 2, 1983. Senator Gary Hart argued against the B-1B and in favor of the Stealth bomber, saying, "If we put a lot of the money that the Administration proposes for the B-1 program into the Stealth program, accelerated it, we would shrink the window from the other side. . . . Stealth is a breakthrough. It would leapfrog technology instead of challenging technology." See *New York Times,* October 11, 1981. His case against the B-1B is reiterated in his position paper, "A Military Reform Defense Budget for FY 1984," pp. 32-33. Senator Edward Kennedy has called the B-1B a "temporary fix" that would provide only a "marginal improvement" over the B-52. See *Hartford Courant,* July 14, 1983. *Newsweek* came out against the B-1B in December 1982, suggesting that it is "too expensive" and that it "can be earmarked for burial." See *Newsweek,* December 20, 1982. The *New York Times* has called for "more speed in producing the Stealth bomber," arguing that the B-1B "will be superseded by the new Stealth bomber almost as soon as it is built." On another occasion, the *Times* commented, "There's a strong case for excising the B-1 bomber, considering how soon the Stealth bomber would replace it." See the editorial page for June 22, 1982; February 14, 1983; March 23, 1983.

[13] These improvements are discussed in more detail in the next section of this article. For a quick reference, see *Strategic Force Modernization Programs,* pp. 93, 161, 305, 355.

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lematic, precisely because the most ambitious — and therefore the riskiest — of the Stealth technologies will be reserved for that program. There are some major risks and unknowns associated with the Stealth bomber's development program and, as a result, acceleration of that program would be foolhardy.

Second, the B-1B's development and production programs appear to be *relatively* trouble-free. We already have a great deal of experience with the B-1 airframe (as a result of flight testing in the 1970s) and the B-1B system is not heavily reliant on unproven or exotic technologies. The B-1B's procurement cost estimates are, therefore, also *relatively* reliable. The opposite is true in the case of the Stealth bomber. The costs and potential development problems of the Stealth program have not weighed heavily in the current debate precisely because so little is known about them at this point in time. These unknowns should be the cause of great concern. And although Stealth has a great deal of potential as a penetrator, it is essential to remember that this potential has not yet been realized. We must be careful not to equate predicted capabilities with actual capabilities. This is especially important in the case of a high-risk program such as the Stealth bomber's development program. Finally, we should reiterate that this is precisely the kind of technologically ambitious development program that should not be accelerated, as many of the Stealth's advocates would have us do. The Stealth bomber should be kept on a back burner until all of its exotic technologies are fully developed. Even then, we will have to decide if its penetration advantages over the B-1B are worth the cost of an entire procurement program. The Stealth bomber will look even less attractive if a B-1C can offer some of these operational advantages without the Stealth bomber's development risks and total program costs.

Third, the B-1B is a versatile system — unlike the Stealth bomber. In addition to being a very effective penetrator, the B-1B promises to be a very efficient cruise missile carrier, because of its size, payload, and internal carrying capacity. The Stealth bomber, on the other hand, is reportedly being designed as a highly specialized, relatively small penetration bomber that will be relatively ineffective as a CMC. If a cruise missile capability is an essential component of the strategic bomber force, then the Stealth bomber will have to be supplemented in one way or another.[14] And if improvements in Soviet air defenses close off the pen-

[14] We should insist on having *both* of these capabilities in the strategic bomber force because: (1) a reliance on either cruise missiles or penetrating bombers allows the Soviets to concentrate their air defense efforts on a single threat, thereby increasing the likelihood that the single threat will one day be neutralized; (2) cruise missiles might not be effective against some of the most important targets in the Soviet Union; (3) cruise missiles are still under development and they have not yet been perfected; and (4) penetrating bombers, because of their relatively high radar-visibility, might one day become

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etration mission altogether, then the Stealth bomber might become prematurely obsolete, or at least prohibitively cost ineffective as a carrier. The Stealth bomber consequently has some major strategic liabilities while the B-1B stands out as a versatile and flexible strategic system. Given its built-in growth capability and its cruise missile capability, the B-1B might outlast the Stealth bomber as a useful strategic system. The B-1B is certainly not an "interim" system.

As seductive as the idea of an "invisible" bomber is, the exotic Stealth bomber program could lead to a developmental nightmare and a strategic dead end. What looks like a panacea could turn out to be a serious mistake unless we make a systematic analysis of the issues that are presently before us. We can do this by examining (1) the Stealth technologies that are critical to bomber modernization today, (2) the bomber options themselves, and (3) the reasons so many analysts have been captivated by the Stealth bomber's exotic technologies.

Stealth Technology

There is more to Stealth technology than an electronic cloaking device or a coat of invisibility paint. The Stealth program is based on three distinct sets of technologies, some of which are in only the early stages of development. The Stealth package includes advances in aerodynamics, avionics, and materials.

The Stealth bomber's special ability to achieve radar-invisibility will depend on the program's ability to consolidate some fairly major technological advances in all of these areas in a timely manner. Some of these technological developments, however, have already begun to mature, and they are transferable to other programs, such as the B-1B program, the ALCM program, Lockheed's program to build a Stealth fighter aircraft, and even to helicopter programs.[15] The more ambitious Stealth technologies will of course have to be reserved for the Stealth bomber because it will be preceded by a longer development program. The key point here is that the unique aspects of the Stealth bomber

vulnerable to advanced Soviet air defense systems. Both of these capabilities are important and they do tend to complement one another. The air-launched cruise missile programs have experienced a number of technical problems, including some relating to the guidance and propulsion systems, indicating that these weapons have not yet been perfected. It might be premature to rely on them. Moreover, cruise missiles will always face some major operational problems, including: (1) operating over the unusual terrain of the Soviet Union; (2) operating against a Soviet air defense system that will be focused on this system; (3) operating after being kept in storage for long periods of time without being tested. See "Cruise Missile Passes Tests but Its Critics Score Too," *New York Times,* July 17, 1983.

[15] "Pentagon May Use Stealth Technology in Several Weapons Besides New Bomber," *Wall Street Journal,* March 17, 1982; "Air Force Said to Move Up Production on Missile to Sneak by Radar," *New York Times,* February 16, 1983; "Struggle Shaping Up on Bomber Award," *New York Times,* October 6, 1982; "New Helicopters to Fight Radar with Stealth," *Hartford Courant,* April 3, 1983; and *Business Week,* April 19, 1982.

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program are almost by definition the most ambitious technological developments. They are, therefore, the riskiest of the Stealth technologies.

The first set of Stealth technological advances is in the area of aerodynamics. The basic idea is to reduce the overall visibility of an aircraft by carefully designing the body (or airframe) of the aircraft. A number of innovative aerodynamic solutions are being applied to the problem of reducing an aircraft's radar-reflectivity (measured in terms of its RCS) and its infra-red signature (IRS).[16] The lower the RCS and IRS, the less visible the aircraft is on air defense radar. The parts of an aircraft that contribute most to its RCS and IRS are its engines and the sharp, angular "joint" between the fuselage and the wings. Engines, for example, are now being "hidden" more carefully than ever before. They are being buried in the fuselage whenever possible; engine inlets are being designed to cut down on the sharp corners and angles that are highly reflective; and engine exhaust is being more carefully screened. In addition, wings are being "blended" more gently into the fuselage to cut down on some of the reflective angles.[17] One might contrast this approach to the design of the B-52, which has eight engines prominently spread out along its long, angular wings.

The Stealth bomber is being designed from scratch with these considerations in mind. Its design, not surprisingly, represents a radical departure from contemporary aircraft designs. In the course of blending the wing into the fuselage, the Stealth has reportedly been turned into a delta-winged aircraft that is literally "all wing" (or "all body," depending on one's point of view). As a result, there simply is no highly reflective joint between its wing and body. Its engines are completely buried in the fuselage.[18] The Stealth bomber's novel aerodynamic design is the principal reason for its low visibility.

The design of the B-1B is still based fundamentally on the design of the original swing-wing B-1. As a result, it cannot utilize some of the more revolutionary innovations in Stealth aerodynamics. Even so, its airframe has been smoothed out and its engine nacelles have been redesigned. The net effect of these aerodynamic refinements is nonetheless substantial: the RCS of the B-1B is one-tenth that of the original B-1.[19]

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[16] The sound level and visual characteristics of an aircraft also affect its detectability, although these are somewhat less critical factors.

[17] *New York Times,* August 21, 1980; *Newsweek,* October 19, 1981, p. 64; *Business Week,* April 19, 1982, pp. 72-73; and "New B-1 Bomber May Take Off Soon," *Business Week,* May 25, 1981, pp. 160, 163.

[18] In addition to the sources cited in the preceding note, see "Future Strategic Manned Bomber Plan Awaits Political, Funding Decisions," *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* June 16, 1980, pp. 137-41; and *Hartford Courant,* September 12, 1980.

[19] *Strategic Force Modernization Programs,* p. 93.

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In any event, the Stealth bomber's radical design is something of a mixed blessing. Although it is the source of its low visibility, it could also be the source of some development problems. Although delta-wing and even all-wing aircraft are not entirely new, we have had relatively little recent experience with this family of aircraft and virtually no experience with them at the very low altitudes that are now being emphasized.[20] Any aircraft based on a radical and unproven design faces a long and potentially tumultuous flight-test program. This is especially true in the case of the all-wing Stealth. Indeed, there have been several reports indicating that one or two of Lockheed's Stealth fighters crashed in early flight tests.[21] The basic aerodynamic configuration of the B-1B has of course already been tested. The original B-1 prototypes underwent approximately 2,000 hours of operational testing in the 1970s and, as a result, the B-1B is based on a proven design.[22]

The second set of Stealth technological advances is in the area of avionics (aviation electronics). Many important advances have been made in recent years in forward-looking radar, terrain-following radar, terrain-avoiding radar, guidance and navigation systems, radar jamming and communications jamming, tail-warning radar, and other electronic countermeasures (ECMs) and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCMs).[23] Together, they have made it easier for aircraft to fly at extremely low altitudes (where there is more radar "clutter") and to befuddle enemy air defense systems.[24]

The main advantage that the Stealth bomber has in this area is essentially a function of its low RCS: because the aircraft is barely "visible" in the first place, it faces a less formidable defensive avionics problem. Its main liability in this area is its size: because it is a relatively small aircraft, it does not have a great deal of carrying capacity or avionics growth capability.

The B-1B is a larger aircraft and it consequently has more carrying capacity and avionics growth capability. The avionics advances that have already been made are being incorporated into the B-1B. In fact, one of the major differences between the original B-1 and the B-1B

[20] The experiences we had years ago with the delta-winged B-58 and B-70 and the all-wing B-49 were not at all encouraging. The B-58 and B-70 and the all-wing B-49 were notoriously ineffective at low altitudes because of their prodigious fuel consumption. See my *Flying Blind,* chaps. 3-5.

[21] *New York Times,* August 21, 1980; *Wall Street Journal,* March 17, 1982; and *Newsweek,* October 19, 1981, p. 64.

[22] *Strategic Force Modernization Programs,* p. 132.

[23] Robert Caroll, "Facing the Manned Bomber Dilemma," *Defense Electronics,* May 1981, pp. 100-4.

[24] The RCS of an aircraft depends in part on the angle from which it is viewed. The advantage of low-altitude penetration is that there is a lot of "ground clutter," which also sends signals back to airborne radar systems. The trade-off here is that the ground also presents a "clobber problem" for the bomber. The net effect is that the defensive avionics problem (jamming) is a bit easier and the offensive avionics problems (navigation and guidance) are more challenging for a low-altitude bomber.

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is the improved avionics package that will be carried on the newer aircraft. Richard DeLauer, the undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, has testified that the B-1B's defensive avionics systems will be able to achieve the jamming power levels necessary to mask its remaining RCS.[25] Others have testified that the B-1B should be able to neutralize advanced Soviet air defenses, including the "look down, shoot down" systems that might be deployed later in the 1980s.[26] Moreover, because of its growth capability, the B-1B has more room than the Stealth for additional avionics. This kind of flexibility is always valuable.

The third and final set of Stealth technological advances is in the area of materials. One of the ways to reduce the radar-reflectivity of an aircraft is to coat the metal skin of the plane with special materials that are relatively radar-absorbent. Several new kinds of materials are reportedly being developed and considered in this context, including special paints, plastic polymer coatings, fiber-glass composite materials, and black graphite sheets.[27]

Again, some of these technologies have already been developed and they are being applied to contemporary programs, such as the B-1B and the ALCM programs. In fact, the air force recently canceled more than half of the ALCM's initial production run because the production of the second-generation Stealth ALCM is an imminent possibility.[28] Some of these materials, then, are in a fairly advanced state of development, and they will be used to enhance the penetration capabilities of the B-1B. The developers of the B-1B have been especially aggressive in incorporating these advances into the B-1B program.[29]

Other advances, however, are still in an early stage of development, and, again, it is these more radical possibilities that are apparently being considered for the Stealth bomber. Exotic materials, such as black graphite sheets, might cover the airframe's surfaces.[30] One report suggests that the airframe itself might be constructed entirely of new composite materials rather than steel or titanium.[31] Although these exotic materials could help to make the aircraft virtually invisible, they could also disrupt the entire development effort. Their development might not go according to plan, precisely because exotic technologies are inherently

[25] *Strategic Force Modernization Programs*, p. 305.
[26] Ibid., pp. 132, 305.
[27] *New York Times*, August 21, 1980; *Business Week*, April 19, 1982, p. 72; *Newsweek*, October 19, 1981, p. 64; and "Stealth Technology: New Progress in Concealing Planes," *New York Times*, May 31, 1983.
[28] *New York Times*, February 16, 1983.
[29] *New York Times*, October 6, 1982.
[30] *Business Week*, April 19, 1982.
[31] *New York Times*, May 31, 1983.

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experimental, and in that event the whole program could be seriously compromised.

The case of the B-70 development program is especially instructive. The B-70 was designed in the 1950s to be a Mach 3.0 bomber, meaning that it would fly much faster than the conventional aircraft of that era. The complication was that the skin of the aircraft would get exceptionally hot in the course of this high-speed flying, too hot for conventional aircraft construction materials such as aluminum. More exotic materials had to be used instead, and these materials proved to be most problematic. The wing panels of the B-70, for example, were made of stainless steel honeycomb sandwiches that had to be individually crafted and welded together in an expensive and time-consuming process. The entire process was new and rather experimental. There were chronic problems in developing the materials and in perfecting the production processes. These problems seriously delayed the entire program, and in the end there were still some unresolved technological puzzles. Ultimately, of course, the B-70 program was canceled, and one of the strikes against the program was the projected production costs of the aircraft. It was an expensive aircraft because of the materials that went into it and the production costs associated with them. There were many material-development problems that were virtually disregarded at the outset of the program and some exorbitant production costs that were the unanticipated but inevitable by-products of these exotic materials.[32]

The information that is available about the Stealth bomber's design suggests some striking parallels between the Stealth program and the B-70 program. The moral of the B-70 story is that exotic aerodynamics and materials are neither simple nor inexpensive, and their development is not straightforward. It is essential, therefore, for us to appreciate the Stealth bomber's potential development problems, production problems, production costs, and long-term operating costs at the outset of the program.[33] Like the Stealth enthusiasts, the B-70's early supporters were also captivated by the promise of exceptional aircraft performance, but they made a serious and expensive mistake in neglecting the realities of aircraft development and production.

There are, then, several distinct Stealth technologies under development. Some are further along than others, some are in the process of being applied to other programs, and some of the more ambitious developments will be the exclusive province of the Stealth bomber itself. The key point is that the B-1B's penetration capabilities will be enhanced

[32] See chap. 5 in my *Flying Blind*.

[33] Exotic materials will undoubtedly be very expensive to maintain and there might also be some reliability and durability problems associated with them.

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TABLE I

AIRCRAFT RADAR CROSS SECTIONS[a]
(in square meters)

B-52[b]	100
Original B-1[c]	10
B-1B[d]	1
Stealth Bomber[e]	<1
Stealth ALCM[f]	0.1

[a] Radar cross sections can be measured from any azimuth or degree of elevation. These figures provide an indication of the various aircrafts' relative capabilities.

[b] The RCS of the B-52 has been reported to be approximately 100 square meters as well as 100 times greater than that of the B-1B. See "Stealth Technology: Progress in Concealing Planes," *New York Times,* May 31, 1983. For an earlier estimate (90-100 sq. mi.), see Douglas D. Mitchell, *Bomber Options for Replacing B-52's,* Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief no. IB81107, May 1982, p. 16. See, also, the testimony in *Strategic Force Modernization Programs, Hearings Before the Senate Armed Services Committee,* 97th Cong., 1st sess., October-November 1981, pp. 161, 355.

[c] The RCS of the original B-1 has been reported to be ten square meters and ten times that of the B-1B. See "Stealth Technology"; and *Business Week,* April 19, 1982, p. 72. See, also, *Strategic Force Modernization Programs,* pp. 93, 305, 355.

[d] See Mitchell, *Bomber Options,* p. 16; and "Stealth Technology." An earlier estimate puts the B-1B's RCS at 1-3 square meters. See *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* March 9, 1981, p. 31.

[e] All of the estimates on the Stealth bomber are conjectural at this point because the program is still in such an early stage of development. Published congressional testimony indicates that the Stealth bomber will be "somewhat better" or even "considerably better" than the B-1B in penetration capabilities. See *Strategic Force Modernization Programs,* p. 319. More poetic commentators have suggested that the Stealth will have the RCS of a "sparrow" or a "pigeon," or that it will present only an "undetectable echo." The most wildly optimistic estimate (from industry sources, presumably) is that its RCS will be only one-millionth of a square meter. See *Business Week,* April 19, 1982, p. 72; "Stealth Technology"; and Robert Caroll, "Facing the Manned Bomber Dilemma," *Defense Electronics,* May 1981, p. 102.

[f] Reported in "3-Year Advance of Stealth Plane Rejected by U.S.," *New York Times,* August 4, 1982.

by some of these Stealth technologies and the penetration capabilities of the Stealth bomber could be even more impressive. The effects of these Stealth technologies are indicated in Table I.

Several important conclusions can be drawn from these figures. First, each new bomber is more difficult to detect than its predecessor.[34] The Stealth technologies are the latest developments to contribute to this

[34] An aircraft's penetration capability is basically a function of its detectability (RCS, IRS), avionics (radar jamming and other ECM), mission profile (low- or high-altitude attack), and the capabilities of the air defense system.

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trend, and many of these Stealth technologies can be found in the B-1B. The B-1B is consequently a much more capable aircraft than the original B-1 and should not be confused with that older system.

Second, if the B-52 will continue to retain some penetration capabilities until the end of the 1980s — as many maintain — then we can understand why the B-1B will continue to function as a penetrating bomber for some time thereafter.[35] The B-1B's improved RCS and penetration capabilities will enable it to penetrate the advanced Soviet air defenses that will make the B-52 obsolete as a penetrator. The B-1B and the B-52 will not become obsolete as penetrators at the same time. The B-1B is a superior aircraft and should be effective as a penetrator well into the 1990s.

Third, the B-1B is not necessarily the ultimate version of the B-1. The B-1B could be superseded by an even more advanced B-1C, for example. Each new model would benefit from the engineering experience obtained with its predecessors. Moreover, each new model would benefit from a certain economy of scale. Some of the most successful weapon procurement programs since 1945 have featured such "model improvements." The B-52 model series that has thrived for over thirty years stands out as an example of this kind of highly successful program. There are already indications that Rockwell, the system contractor for the B-1B, has enlisted Lockheed, one of the leading developers of Stealth technologies, to begin work on an even stealthier version of the B-1B.[36]

Fourth, although the Stealth bomber will undoubtedly be less visible than the B-1B, relatively little is known about the Stealth's actual capabilities because the program is in such an early stage of development. Performance estimates are therefore highly speculative. The estimates for the B-1B, however, are relatively reliable because the aircraft itself is a derivative of a known and flight-tested design. There is, after all, a solid body of data on the B-1, and estimates for the B-1B can be extrapolated from that data base.

Fifth and last, Stealth technologies are being applied to cruise missiles. If a very low RCS will be needed to penetrate Soviet air defenses in the future, than a "stealthed" cruise missile will probably be more capable than a Stealth bomber, simply because the RCS of the missile is so low to begin with. The Stealth bomber is not necessarily the ultimate penetrator, only the best manned penetrator currently under development.

[35] *Strategic Force Modernization Programs,* pp. 124, 264, 319.
[36] *New York Times,* October 6, 1982; and *Business Week,* April 19, 1982, p. 72, and February 21, 1983, p. 116H.

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The Options

In addition to the B-1B and the Stealth bomber, two other options have been considered during the recent procurement deliberations: a "modernized" B-52 and a "stretched" FB-111. These options need to be examined and evaluated in terms of their likely strategic performance, potential development problems, and projected program costs.

The B-52 and the FB-111 are familiar options — a modernized B-52 and a stretched FB-111 have been on the option list since the mid 1960s — and their liabilities are also rather familiar. The FB-111, no matter how many times it is stretched or redesigned, is still a modified fighter adapted to the strategic bombardment mission. It has severe range, payload, and avionics limitations that cannot be completely overcome. Moreover, the FB-111's heavy reliance on tanker support makes any FB-111 mission an expensive, complicated, and vulnerable operation. As a result, the FB-111 has not fared well in most cost-effectiveness analyses.[37]

The B-52 fleet has been updated, modified, and modernized on a fairly regular basis ever since the 1960s. Although further modernization is still an option at this point, extensive modernization is becoming a less attractive option as time goes by. Most of the B-52's major performance characteristics cannot be significantly improved. Its pre-launch survivability, for example, is suspect because it cannot be widely dispersed; it requires a long, 150-foot-wide runway, and few airfields meet these criteria.[38] Moreover, it is a relatively slow, soft aircraft. As far as pre-launch survivability is concerned, this means the aircraft spends a lot of time around the airfield and it is also fairly vulnerable to blast, radiation, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects.

Another consideration for B-52 modernization is the futility of trying to improve its penetration capabilities with most of the Stealth technologies. Although the B-52 does have substantial avionics growth capabilities, it also has the RCS and IRS of a "burning barn door," and there is relatively little avionics can do to mask them. Its engines are exposed out on the wings and, as a result, the B-52 cannot be "stealthed" the way the B-1 can. Moreover, the B-52 cannot penetrate as low or as fast as the B-1B. Since the B-52 cannot fly at extremely low altitudes, it is relatively easy to detect. And the B-52's low-altitude penetration speed is only Mach 0.55, compared to the B-1B's Mach 0.85, which suggests that the B-52 would have to spend an inordinate amount of time in any

[37] John J. Kohout, "A Post B-1 Look at the Manned Strategic Bomber," *Air University Review*, July-August 1979, pp. 41, 45, 48; and Alton H. Quanbeck and Archie L. Wood, *Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force* (Washington: Brookings, 1976), passim.

[38] *Strategic Force Modernization Programs*, p. 36.

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hostile strategic environment.[39] Most estimates indicate that the most modern of the B-52s — the B-52Hs — will be effective penetrators only until the end of this decade, when the Soviets are expected to deploy a "look down, shoot down" system.[40]

At some point, structural fatigue will become an insurmountable problem for the B-52 fleet. The aircraft will simply wear out eventually, but it is difficult to pinpoint when this will happen. The late-model B-52s should still be flying in the mid 1990s, but they will be on the verge of retirement by then.[41] The costs of the B-52 program, however, are easier to estimate. The cost estimates for the modernization program alone range up to $20 billion to $28 billion, roughly the same as the procurement costs for the B-1B.[42] The operating and maintenance costs for this aging fleet are even more exorbitant. The Pentagon has estimated that the total cost through the end of the century for the existing B-52 and FB-111 fleet could come to $93 billion.[43]

The B-1B's performance, cost, and availability make it a highly competitive option. Its pre-launch survivability is an important strategic asset at a time when a great deal of attention is being paid to pre-emptive instabilities and first-strike vulnerabilities. The B-1B's pre-launch survivability is a function of its dispersibility, its reaction and escape capabilities, and its structural hardness. Because it is a swing-wing aircraft, it doesn't need a long runway; the B-1 was designed to have a takeoff distance of 7,500 feet, allowing it to be dispersed to more than 320 military and civilian airfields.[44] Because it is a hard, fast aircraft, it spends relatively little time in the danger zone. It was designed to withstand EMP effects. It is far superior to the B-52 on all of these counts.

In evaluating the B-1B's capabilities as a strategic system it is absolutely essential to remember that it can double as both a penetrating bomber and an efficient cruise missile carrier. The consensus at the Pentagon now is that the B-1B will be an effective penetrator "well into the 1990s," and some have suggested that it might be effective until the late 1990s and even into the next century. An advanced B-1C would be even more formidable. In any event, the B-1B is expected to be effective against the Soviet "look down, shoot down" air defense systems that might be

[39] Ibid., pp. 359, 355, 157.

[40] Ibid., pp. 124, 264, 319.

[41] Ibid. See, also, Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1984*, pp. 223-24.

[42] These high estimates suggest the B-52 modernization that might be undertaken in the absence of the B-1B. Cited in Douglas D. Mitchell, *Bomber Options For Replacing B-52's*, Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief no. IB81107, p. 16.

[43] This estimate is for modernizing, operating, and maintaining the current bomber force, which includes B-52s and FB-111s, until the end of the century. It appears to be based on the assumption that no B-1Bs or Stealth bombers are incorporated into the force structure. See *Strategic Force Modernization Programs*, p. 309.

[44] A. A. Tinajero, *B-1 Strategic Bomber Program*, Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief no. IB75040, July 1977, p. 2.

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deployed later in this decade.[45] The B-1B will also be a very efficient CMC when it moves away from the penetration mission. It has substantial internal and external carrying capabilities. The current plan calls for it to carry eight ALCMs internally and fourteen externally for a total of twenty-two, two more than the B-52.[46]

The B-1B's flexibility as both a penetrator and an efficient CMC is a fundamentally important strategic asset. Again, the case of the B-70 is instructive. The B-70's design was "optimized" for extremely high-altitude flight in the late 1950s because it was assumed that high-altitude attacks were the most likely to succeed. As a result, the B-70 was aerodynamically unsuited for low-altitude flight. When Soviet developments in surface-to-air missiles began to close off the high-altitude corridor, the B-70 became increasingly vulnerable and the program was canceled within a matter of years. The lesson of the B-70 case is that flexibility is a valuable asset in a system: it provides a hedge against unforeseen developments. The B-1B's substantial cruise missile capability gives it the kind of flexibility one wants to see in any strategic system.

Some developmental considerations have already been noted. The airframe and aerodynamics of the B-1B are of a proven design — and this should be a major issue in the debate. Because the program revolves around proven technologies, it is already moving through advanced development and into production. The first test flight of the B-1B is scheduled for December 1984, an initial operational capability (IOC) is anticipated for 1986, and all 100 aircraft are scheduled to be delivered by 1988.[47] Although delays in the schedules of major weapon development programs are the rule, the B-1B should be a notable exception. The basic design of the aircraft has already been tested and most of the other critical technologies associated with the program are in hand. As a result, its development program is relatively straightforward and predictable. In fact, the schedule of the program has recently been accelerated in response to the competitive pressures brought to bear by the Stealth program. The point of note here is that the B-1B program is the kind of program that can be accelerated: it contains few technological unknowns.[48]

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[45] *Strategic Force Modernization Programs,* pp. 132, 305.

[46] The B-1B could carry a variety of loads, including even more than twenty-two cruise missiles. See ibid., pp. 91-92, 355.

[47] "Bomber Facility Construction Running Ahead of Schedule," *Washington Post,* September 2, 1982.

[48] The first nine aircraft are to be built on production tooling, meaning that production plans are being finalized even as the development program is continuing. This kind of program — with some concurrent development and production — would be extremely risky in any program that still contained major technological uncertainties. The design of the B-1B, however, is already in the process of being frozen. See *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* October 12, 1981, p. 21; and *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, Hearings Before the Senate Armed Services Committee,* 97th Cong., 2d sess. February-March 1982, p. 4555. See, also, *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* February 27, 1984, pp. 16-17.

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The costs of the B-1B program have naturally attracted considerable attention. The official estimates from the Pentagon fluctuated before settling on a figure of $20.5 billion for a 100-aircraft program (1981 dollars). Another estimate from the Pentagon put the cost of the program at $29.5 billion (then-year dollars). Estimates from the Congressional Budget Office and the General Accounting Office have been even higher, ranging up to $39.8 billion (then-year dollars).[49] Some of these differences are attributable to different accounting systems and different inflation factors; the rest might be attributable to relative degrees of organizational optimism and pessimism. In this case, however, a little optimism might not be unwarranted: the B-1B procurement program seems to be relatively straightforward and the Reagan administration has publicly committed itself to these official program cost estimates. These technological and political factors should help to keep the B-1B's costs under control.

The Stealth bomber's main claim to fame is its penetration capability, and this is largely a function of its predicted RCS and IRS. Although the Stealth might be difficult to detect, a system's overall strategic effectiveness is also a function of its payload. The Stealth bomber is not a large aircraft — it had to be small to be "invisible" — and its small payload affects both its strategic utility and its cost effectiveness. According to the air force's deputy chief of staff for research and development, Kelly Burke, the fact that the Stealth is harder to detect tends to be offset by the fact that the B-1B carries more. Published estimates indicate that the internal payload of the B-1B is about 75,000 pounds and that the Stealth's is about 40,000 pounds — and this is after the Stealth's design had been "scaled up" to make it more competitive with the B-1B. Keep in mind that the Stealth's RCS will also increase as it is "scaled up," meaning that it loses some competitive advantages as it gains others.[50]

Some operational considerations are also relevant here. The Stealth bomber's superior penetration capabilities might be superfluous in the context of a large-scale nuclear war, when Soviet air defenses have already been degraded by a missile strike. (The B-1B's penetration advantages over the B-52, on the other hand, might not be superfluous against self-contained "look down, shoot down" systems.) The Stealth bomber's penetration advantages might not be operationally significant.

[49] *Strategic Force Modernization Programs,* pp. 44, 130-31, 149-53, 356-58; *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983,* pp. 1051, 4571-78; and Mitchell, *Bomber Options,* p. 11.

[50] Burke's testimony is in *Strategic Force Modernization Programs,* p. 319. Payload estimates can be found in "B-1/Stealth Competition Emerges," *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* February 27, 1984, pp. 16-17.

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The Stealth bomber's main strategic liability is related to its payload problem. Because of its payload limitations, the Stealth will not be very capable as a cruise missile carrier. Although the Stealth bomber will be able to carry some cruise missiles, it will be much less capable than the B-1B in this regard.[51] Moreover, the Stealth's *internal* carrying capacity will be rather limited. To be efficient as a CMC, the Stealth will have to carry some cruise missiles externally, under its wings. This of course will increase the aircraft's RCS substantially. In this event, the Stealth bomber will not be especially stealthy and it still will not be as capable as the B-1B. According to the Pentagon, "cruise missile carriage was not a major design consideration" for the Stealth bomber.[52]

Another strategic liability is the Stealth bomber's range. Small aircraft have small fuel tanks and they consequently have to rely more on tankers for refueling. Not only are tankers expensive, they also are the weak link in any long-range mission: they are vulnerable on the ground and they are relatively vulnerable in the air. The Stealth's dependability and cost competitiveness are compromised by its heavy reliance on tankers. The B-1B, on the other hand, is less reliant on tanker support.[53]

Although the pre-launch survivability of the Stealth is something of an unknown, we might assume that a small aircraft could be dispersed to many airfields. Both the B-1B and the Stealth are being designed with base escape capabilities (quick-start capabilities and short-takeoff capabilities) in mind.[54] The B-1B, however, is likely to be structurally harder than the all-wing Stealth.

Some developmental considerations are worth re-emphasizing. The Stealth bomber's development program contains some formidable technological unknowns, especially in the critical areas of aerodynamics and materials. This is the kind of development program that should proceed carefully and cautiously. An extensive flight-test program involving several prototype aircraft would be highly recommended here. All of the program's major technological problems should be fully resolved before production of the aircraft begins.

Supporters of the Stealth program, however, have called for accelerating the program by several years. Although the Stealth IOC is officially set for "the early 1990s," generally taken to mean 1991, supporters of the program have suggested that a squadron of aircraft could

[51] *Strategic Force Modernization Programs,* pp. 299, 355.
[52] Ibid.
[53] The B-1B's unrefueled range has been estimated to be 6,000 nautical miles (nm), as opposed to the Stealth's unrefueled range of 5,000 nm. See *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* February 27, 1984, pp. 16-17.
[54] Ibid., p. 307.

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be flying by 1988 or 1987, just a year or two after the B-1B's IOC.[55] It has also been suggested that the first flight of a Stealth prototype might take place in 1985 or even late 1984, again making it superficially competitive with the B-1B program.[56] The point that needs to be stressed in comparing these two programs is that the B-1B is based on mature technologies that can be moved directly into production. Even if a Stealth prototype is successfully flight-tested in 1984 or 1985, the Stealth *production* program is not a fait accompli. Production of a blended airframe covered with graphite sheets or made with composite materials will be tricky, problematic, frustrating, and expensive. These production problems are inherent in this kind of program and they stand between us and a Stealth IOC. As noted earlier, the Stealth production program could experience some of the production crises that plagued the B-70 program. In any event, producing the Stealth will be much more challenging than the B-1B. The first flight of the Stealth prototype is just the beginning of the Stealth development program, not the end of it, and these developmental realities must not be ignored.

The cost estimates for the Stealth program are extremely tentative at this point, and that should be a source of great concern. Estimates of procurement costs range from about $20 billion to $35 billion for a 100- to 132-aircraft program.[57] These estimates, however, are in 1981 dollars, and the Stealth would be produced at some point in the future. The costs of the program in then-year dollars might range from $30 billion to even $50 billion.[58] At this point, we can't be certain about the Stealth's procurement costs: there are too many unknowns associated with this program. We do know, however, that the operating and maintenance costs of the Stealth will be unusually high. Exotic systems are always expensive to maintain and the Stealth will compound this expense with its tanker requirements. The Stealth bomber will be more expensive to develop, procure, operate, and maintain than the B-1B.

A hidden cost of the Stealth program might not emerge until the 1990s when the B-52 has to be replaced as a cruise missile carrier. In the absence of the B-1B, the Stealth bomber's cruise missile capabilities will probably have to be supplemented in one way or another. Not only would a new cruise missile carrier program be expensive, but the carrier itself would need many of the capabilities currently found in the B-1B,

[55] Ibid., pp. 311, 347. See, also, *Business Week,* April 19, 1982, p. 73; and *New York Times,* June 22, 1982.

[56] *Business Week,* February 21, 1983, p. 116D, and April 19, 1982, pp. 72-73.

[57] These estimates are highly tentative and a lot depends on whether or not the Stealth is preceded by the B-1B. See Mitchell, *Bomber Options,* pp. 12-16; and *New York Times,* October 6, 1982, and May 31, 1983.

[58] Then-year estimates are even more speculative at this point. If a "high estimate in then-year dollars" for the B-1B is around $40 billion (with a production program in the mid 1980s), then a similar estimate for Stealth (with a production program in the early 1990s) might be $40 to $50 billion.

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including pre-launch survivability and avionics-carrying capabilities. Development of a viable cruise missile carrier would become even more critical if the penetration mission were to be closed off altogether. The Stealth bomber will always be a pure penetrator—and a very expensive penetrator at that.

We might note that some preliminary estimates indicate that a production run of 100 B-1C aircraft might cost only $10 billion, approximately $20 billion less than the Stealth would cost. Although these estimates come from advocates of the B-1B program, they do point to the economies of scale that are being sacrificed for the sake of the Stealth bomber program.[59] The B-1C itself would be both versatile and "highly stealthed." Its development and production program would benefit from our experience with the B-1B and it consequently would be relatively straightforward. This option would be given even more consideration in the months and years ahead.

The features of the main strategic bomber options are summarized in Table II. The main conclusion one can draw from this table is that there is a good case for choosing the B-1B over the other bomber options that are presently before us. The B-52 has some serious strategic limitations — in terms of pre-launch survivability and penetration capabilities, for example — and it is wearing out in any event. B-52 modernization simply cannot overcome all of these structural problems. Consequently, there won't be much of a long-term return on the investment made in B-52 modernization. The Stealth bomber, however, has some serious limitations of its own. It is too specialized, too dependent on the penetration mission, and too ineffective as a cruise missile carrier. Because it needs a supplemental force of cruise missile carriers and a large fleet of tankers and because its technologies are so experimental, the Stealth bomber's total program costs could be astronomical. Although the B-1B is not an inexpensive system, its costs are fairly well defined and an investment made in the B-1B will provide us with a strategic capability of one kind or another for twenty to thirty years. Its formidable strategic capabilities in conjunction with its versatility make the B-1B our most sensible option at this point in time. And in the years ahead, the procurement of a follow-on B-1C might appear to be increasingly sensible as an alternative to a separate Stealth bomber procurement program.

The Lure of Exotic Technologies

Given that there are some major advantages associated with the B-1B program and some major disadvantages associated with the Stealth program, why have so many people come out against the B-1B

[59] *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, February 27, 1984, pp. 16-17.

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TABLE II

MAJOR STRATEGIC BOMBER OPTIONS[a]

	B-52	*B-1B*	*Stealth*
First flight[b]	1952	1984	1984-87?
IOC as a penetrator[c]	1955	1986	1991
Obsolescent as penetrator[d]	1986-90	1990-2000	2000+
ALCM capacity (no. of ALCMs)[e]	12-20	22	*few*
Obsolescent as a CMC[f]	1990s	2000+	—
Procurement Costs ($ billions)[g]	20-28	20-40	20-50
Program Risks[h]	low	low	high

[a] This format was suggested by the table in Douglas D. Mitchell, *Bomber Options for Replacing B-52's,* Congressional Research Service Issue Brief no. IB81107, May 1982, p. 16.

[b] The B-1B contract originally called for the first flight in March 1985, but that schedule has been accelerated by a few months, according to recent reports. *Washington Post,* September 2, 1982. Northrop's internal target date for the Stealth's first flight has been reported to be "late 1984," making it competitive with the B-1B. *Business Week,* April 19, 1982, p. 73. Another report puts the date of the scheduled first flight in "fiscal 1985." *Business Week,* February 21, 1983, p. 116D. A more recent estimate says that the Stealth is scheduled to fly in December 1987. *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* February 27, 1984, p. 17.

[c] 1991 is apparently the Pentagon's target date for the Stealth IOC, and there has been some controversy over this date. Much of this controversy surrounds Secretary of Defense Weinberger's original estimate that the Stealth might be ready in 1989 or 1990. Later, the IOC was said to be the "early 1990s," generally taken to mean 1991. Critics have suggested that the Pentagon is trying to slow the Stealth program down in order to strengthen its case for the B-1B. In any event, given current funding levels, the later date is probably more accurate. See *Modernization of the U.S. Strategic Deterrent, Hearings Before the Senate Armed Services Committee,* 97th Cong., 1st sess. October-November 1981, pp. 6, 23. See, also, *Strategic Force Modernization Programs, Hearings Before the Senate Armed Services Committee,* 97th Cong., 1st sess., October-November 1981, pp. 311, 329-333. Finally, see "3-Year Advance of Stealth Plane Rejected by U.S.," *New York Times,* August 4, 1982; "Pentagon Wants Stealth Date to Become Invisible," *Washington Post,* March 13, 1982; "Congress Is in Doubt Over Cost and Need in Air Force Buildup," *New York Times,* April 8, 1982; *Business Week,* April 19, 1982, p. 73; and Mitchell, *Bomber Options,* pp. 13, 16.

[d] One has to note that strategic obsolescence is a gradual process with no clear cut-off date. Strategic systems fade away in effectiveness and in credibility. Weinberger has suggested that the B-52s will start to become obsolete as penetrators in the mid 1980s. The B-52Ds are already being phased out of the strategic inventory. It has been suggested that the B-52Gs will be able to penetrate until 1987-88 and that the B-52Hs will be able to penetrate until 1989-90. See

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TABLE II—*Continued*

the testimony by General B. L. Davis, commander of the Strategic Air Command, and other Pentagon testimony in *Strategic Force Modernization Programs,* pp. 124, 264, 319. See, also, "B-1 Decision Hinges on Questions of Timing," *New York Times,* November 8, 1981.

Again, there is some controversy over the obsolescence of the B-1B as a penetrator because the Pentagon has given conflicting testimony on this issue. Weinberger originally testified that the B-1B would be able to penetrate only until 1989 or 1990. General Davis has estimated that the B-1B will be an effective penetrator until 1995 or so. General Burke testified that "it would not surprise me if it turns out to go into the next century." See the testimony in *Strategic Force Modernization Programs,* pp. 276, 308, 318. Weinberger later revised his estimate to agree more with the air force's estimates. See "B-1 Decision"; and "Congress Is in Doubt."Stealth obsolescence will be a function of Soviet improvements in air defenses in the 1990s. This general estimate is widely held and also cited in Mitchell, *Bomber Options,* p. 16.

[e] The initial squadrons of B-52 CMCs will carry twelve ALCMs externally. Plans call for an internal carrying capacity of eight ALCMs on a rotary launcher, bringing the total capacity of the aircraft to twenty. See *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, Hearings Before the Senate Armed Services Committee,* 97th Cong., 2d sess. February-March 1982, p. 4565. See, also, "Cruise Missile Bombers Will Go on Daily Alert," *New York Times,* December 8, 1982.

The B-1B's weapons loads are outlined in *Strategic Force Modernization Programs,* pp. 91-92. The B-1B's ALCM capability could be increased to thirty at some point, but current plans call for a load of twenty-two.

[f] The obsolecence of the B-52 as a CMC is largely a function of the durability of the aircraft itself. The air force has estimated that the last of the B-52s should be retired in the 1993-98 period. Others have suggested that the B-52Hs, at least, will be flying until 2000 or so. See Mitchell, *Bomber Options,* pp. 7 and 16. The B-1B will be a viable CMC for the foreseeable future.

[g] The B-52 costs are modernization costs in 1981 dollars. These very high estimates suggest what extensive B-52 modernization might cost in the absence of the B-1B. See Mitchell, *Bomber Options,* p. 16. The B-1B cost estimates range from a "low estimate in 1981 dollars" (from the Pentagon) to a "high estimate in then-year dollars (from the GAO and the CBO). See *Strategic Force Modernization Programs,* pp. 44, 356-58. The Stealth cost estimates also range from a "low estimate in 1981 dollars" to a "high estimate in then-year dollars." Other recent estimates have been in the $27 billion to $30 billion range. See *Strategic Force Modernization Programs,* p. 359; Mitchell, *Bomber Options,* p. 16; "Stealth Technology," *New York Times,* May 31, 1983; and *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* February 27, 1984, pp. 16-17.

[h] Program risks include both development risks and potential production problems. B-52 modernization should only be constrained by airframe fatigue and avionics development. The B-1Bs should experience only routine materials and avionics hurdles.

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and in favor of Stealth? Some of these advocates undoubtedly have a hidden agenda: they are using the Stealth program to cancel the B-1B, hoping to cancel the Stealth bomber itself later on. Many commentators and congressmen, however, seem to be genuinely hypnotized by the lure of the exotic technologies and the capabilities promised in the Stealth program. Why are so many serious people so captivated by the exotic policy option?

First, exotic options are ambiguous options. An exotic weapon development program promises a great deal in terms of strategic performance and technological accomplishment. And program costs appear to be controllable. The attractiveness of these promises lies not only in what is being promised, but when the promises will be delivered: many years in the future. The distant future is rather ambiguous and it is fertile ground for wishful thinking. Performance estimates, cost estimates, and technological projections can be believed because there are few hard data available to refute them. Warnings can be discounted. Exotic programs can get a lot of mileage out of faith because little exists in the way of disconfirming proof.

More concrete policy options—like the B-1B—face a more challenging policy environment because some program costs and performance limitations are already known. These problems are therefore undeniable. Although similar problems (perhaps even more serious problems) will eventually emerge in the exotic programs, most of the signs are encouraging in the earliest days of an exciting research and development program. Politicians and policymakers are willing to buy into potential problems and unwilling to support programs with short-term difficulties because their concerns are near-term and political. To paraphrase Harry Truman: policymakers do not want to take any avoidable "heat," and they would prefer to "pass the buck" to the next generation. Concrete policy options like the B-1B generate a fair amount of short-term political heat. Exotic options are ambiguous enough to be politically expedient.

Second, exotic weapons seem to offer permanent solutions to the strategic problems of the day. A weapon based on the technology of the future will presumably be viable well into the future. The promise of more or less permanently resolving policy problems obviously has enormous political and psychological appeal. An "invisible" bomber promises a long-term military capability, and it apparently solves a range of nagging strategic problems. Again, it is essential to remember that exotic programs do not always live up to their promises. In fact, they are especially prone to developmental failures precisely because they revolve around the (unproven) technologies of the future. It is also essential to remember that

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less exotic programs might actually provide more real capability in the long run because they contain fewer technological risks.

Third, exotic weapons imply the existence of major strategic problems. To get any major weapon development program approved by the White House and Congress, one has to start with a serious strategic problem, and serious problems require dramatic solutions, almost by definition. If the threat is small, it is difficult to justify a new and expensive program; if the threat is substantial, then only an exotic program will do. The sad irony here is that mundane-looking programs are difficult to defend at the outset while exotic programs are often difficult to justify at the end, after their developmental and technological problems emerge.

Fourth, exotic weapon development programs are based on some simplistic and misguided assumptions about technological development. The United States has of course traditionally emphasized technologically sophisticated military hardware, and this is one of the implicit justifications for exotic programs such as the Stealth bomber. But a reliance on exotic programs might not be the surest or the safest way to achieve the technological advances on which we have come to rely. In fact, they might be counterproductive. Exotic programs such as the Stealth bomber program contain some major development risks, and these risks tend to be under-emphasized when the decisions are made to start and accelerate the programs. Potential development problems tend to be ignored because they are theoretically avoidable. We often make best-case assumptions about research and development, and in the United States there is an especially strong "can do" attitude toward technological problems. Strategic problems, on the other hand, are generally subjected to worst-case analyses. The net effect of these tendencies is that policymakers perceive a strong strategic demand and an unlimited technological supply at the same time. The selection of exotic options follows naturally from these basic perceptions.

This error is compounded when policymakers decide to accelerate their exotic programs to meet (perceived) pressing strategic needs. Exotic programs face a number of formidable development problems under the best of circumstances. Under the worst of circumstances, they tend to become developmental disasters. Historically, the biggest failures in the U.S. strategic bomber program were those that combined great technological adventure with an accelerated or concurrent development schedule. The B-58 and B-70 programs stand out in this regard. Not only were these programs exorbitantly expensive, in the long run they were also disappointments from a schedule and performance point of view. Exotic weapon development programs are always problematic and accelerating them only compounds the risk and the error.

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A program's potential develoment problems are fundamentally important considerations in making any program decision. Unfortunately, the development problems routinely associated with exotic programs tend to be played down. If real technological capabilities are so important to us, then one has to question the advisability of routinely relying on risky, speculative development programs when many of the same long-term advances can be obtained through a series of model improvements.

Although the B-1B program has been under way for about three years, its popularity has not exactly soared. It is likely to be a prominent issue in the 1984 presidential campaign as the debate over the defense budget and the federal deficit heats up. In evaluating the B-1B and Stealth bomber programs, it is essential to remember that the B-1B already incorporates many of the Stealth technologies. It is essential to measure the strategic utility of the bombers in terms of both penetration capabilities and cruise missile capabilities. It is also essential to recognize the kinds of development and production problems that could emerge in the two programs as well as the impact these relatively mundane-looking development concerns could ultimately have on the outcomes of the programs. Finally, it is essential to recognize that the Stealth bomber program is permeated with technological uncertainties and unknowns at this point. In the long run these unknowns could easily turn into serious practical problems. The B-1B would provide a long-term strategic capability and a foundation for a B-1C program while removing the temptation to accelerate production of the Stealth immediately.

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review essays

REVOLUTIONARY MYTH AND POLITICAL UNREASON

L'Occident et le Tiers Monde. By Carlos Rangel. Paris: Robert Laffont, 1982. 221 pp. 79F.

Critique of Political Reason. By Régis Debray. London and New York: Verso/Schocken Books, 1983. 361 pp. $11.50.

VLADIMIR TISMANEANU
THE FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

In his most recent book, Venezuelan political thinker and journalist Carlos Rangel has tackled the highly controversial topic of Third World revolutionary messianism and its relation to Socialist and Marxist-Leninist doctrines. Rangel's approach is aimed at demystifying the ideological substratum of "Third Worldism," which is defined as a pretentious hypostasis developed by Western Marxists and liberal intellectuals. The myth of the Third World is seen as having been deliberately invented and codified to rationalize the frustrations of Western radicals and liberals. One reason for this is their growing disaffection with or despair over the "delay" of the expected cataclysmic revolutionary collision in the "center," that is, in the core states of the West itself. Rangel's principal contribution lies in his unequivocal emphasis on the delusional dimension of a theoretical-ideological corpus that was intended to galvanize revolutionary energies in the underdeveloped countries.

Rangel's point of view is extremely polemical with regard to the prevalent Western fictions about the fate and the alleged "mission" of the Third World. One should mention, in this connection, that this uninhibited inquiry into the illusions, myths, and messianic expectations of leftist ideologues is not Rangel's first. In 1976, he published a volume whose very title was bound to touch off a strong counter-reaction from partisans of a consistently intolerant radicalism: *Du bon sauvage au bon révolutionnaire* [From noble savage to noble revolutionary],[1] a highly

[1] Published in English as *The Latin Americans, Their Love-Hate Relationship with the United States* (New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977).

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controversial attempt to transcend the ideological mystifications that determine the love-hate relationship between Latin American intellectual elites and the political-cultural values and institutions promoted by the United States. Convinced that present circumstances do not allow for any further frivolous complacency or sophistic ratiocination, Rangel insists on a lucid commitment to the genuine dilemmas of the Latin American continent and on the vital necessity of exorcizing the mythological aspects of ideologies anchored in resentment, envy, and utopian fervor.

In that book, Rangel also exposes the fallacies that impede an objective approach to the real problems of the Third World. The most important of the intellectual delusions shared and encouraged by Western socialists and liberals *engagés* is the dependency theory. Its representatives (André Gunder Frank, Pierre Jalée, Paul Baran, et al.) enjoyed a prominent position during the 1960s and early 1970s and exerted a formative influence on many Third World intellectuals. Taking into account the hegemonic status of this theory among leftist doctrinaires and militants, Rangel considers it necessary to highlight the sources of the Third Worldist mythologic radicalism and to insist on the interplay of objective and subjective factors in its genesis: "These erroneous ideas stemmed from generous impulses, genuine needs, and justifiable nationalist expectations inspired by Western nationalism; and they were exacerbated by imperialist domination and exploitation, by the humiliation inflicted on Third World elites through the racism, chauvinism, and overbearing pride of the West."[2] On the other hand, it is a matter of intellectual accuracy to reflect on the histrionic posturing of radical prophets, whose message cannot but be enhanced by the sacrificial rituals of "good and virtuous revolutionaries."

The injection of "fresh blood" required by the new utopian wave was provided by a most unorthodox breed of Marxist heroes: students and middle-class intellectuals, radical Catholic priests inspired by the theology of liberation, military officers like the Guatemalan Luis Turcios Lima, and only rarely urban proletarians or real *campesinos,* their revolutionary "historical mission" notwithstanding. Rangel perceptively describes the psycho-emotional mechanisms that turned the Marxist invitation to rebellion and subversion into such an appealing mythology. The prophets themselves, however, eventually became the victims of their destructive vision. Abimael Guzman, for example, former professor of Marxist philosophy at the University of Ayacucho in Peru, rejected the "opportunism" of the traditional Left and founded the Shining Path (Sen-

[2] Ibid., p. 112.

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dero Luminoso), a terrorist group that calls itself the "Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of the Thought of José Carlos Mariátegui."

The romantic obsessions of an impenitent Left constituted the basis for the ideology and salvational myth of Third Worldism: "It can therefore happen (and it *has* happened in the case of the so-called Third World, with its easy, enthusiastic acceptance of demagogic explanations for its lag) that successful demagogues identify and analyze collective neuroses, and play upon them in order to further their own ends."[3] Third Worldism can thus be regarded as an attempt to provide a justification for irrational emotions and a compensation for excruciating frustrations and unavowable defeats. In psychological terms, it gives expression to a collective neurosis or even a schizoid approach to the challenges of development. Its peremptory arrogance is an attempt to deny the existence of a collective inferiority complex that also inspires unpredictable social-religious upheavals and erratic revolutionary stances. Moreover, Third Worldism is to a certain extent an expression of Western intellectual alienation and a penchant for dictatorship and repression barely concealed by libertarian phraseology. It is rooted in the intellectual's need to believe, in that unextinguishable desire to be identified with a larger community and a self-sufficient ideology: "Such ideological attachments led to the suspension or discarding of what used to be regarded as the major defining characteristic of intellectuals: their critical thinking, their capacity for social-political criticism and demystification."[4]

Rangel indicates the channels (communicational, symbolical, emotional, institutional) through which such myths are spread and the intellectual configurations that seem to guarantee both their perpetuation and the continued obliteration of truth. The furious reaction of the Marxist and crypto-Marxist Left to Rangel's first book is in itself an argument for the accuracy of his views. This quasi-Zhdanovite intellectual attack was made in *Le Nouvel Observateur* and other radical-chic magazines by journalists, philosophers, and sociologists who uncritically subscribe to the dogmas of the beleaguered Left. One need only recall the bitter vituperations against him by the proponents of guerrilla warfare to realize that Rangel's recently published volume was destined to arouse similar impassioned attitudes and acerbic polemics. Jean-François Revel grasped perfectly the risks involved in such a dangerous intellectual adventure. Because of the ideas Rangel's book promotes, Revel states, it seems destined to be greeted by "universal execration" for reasons that have little to do with the quality of his analysis or the value of his hypotheses.

[3] Ibid., p. 173.

[4] Paul Hollander, "Intellectuals, Estrangement, and Wish Fulfillment," *Transaction/Society*, July-August 1983, p. 18.

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The critical reception and public interest in the book tend to confirm certain specific relations between authority and domination in contemporary theoretical debates. They also indicate the far-reaching effects of axiological affinities and suggest several barely visible links between ideology and politics. The post-World War II literature of development has been combined with the quasi-nationalistic pathos of the Third World prophets and has engendered the prevailing "radical" mood in Western "progressive" elites. This has been a strange amalgamation which, more or less unobtrusively, continues even now, despite the abysmal failure of many once-glorified Third World revolutions.

Zealous adulation of any self-proclaimed "national liberation" movement reflects leftist norms of political "righteousness." The standard according to which these movements are examined and appraised, from a certain point of view, is their ability or at least promise to undermine what Franz Fanon, Samir Amin, André Gunder Frank, Charles Bettelheim, C. Wright Mills, and Jean-Paul Sartre tried to describe as "the unjust international order," the abhorred capitalist system.[5] (p. 82.) Third Worldism as an ideology was primarily the creation of Western pundits obsessed with a Hegelian-Marxist sense of history, a "rationalized mysticism," as Feuerbach put it, transformed into a fatalistic social determinism. Third Worldism was originally meant to counterbalance the lack of proletarian social militancy in advanced industrial societies.

From Fanon to Sartre, from Guevara to Debray, the myth of cathartic violence became the touchstone for a new concept: "proletarian internationalism." The theme of the global solidarity of the underprivileged acquired a tone of incantation and exhortation. The old Sorelian myth of revolutionary violence fed the Third Worldist conviction that violence alone was the means to overcome the dismal predicament of exploited nations. A sense of communion with a presumed revolutionary Zeitgeist has been the rationale for an alliance between militants and "progressives," the latter duped or self-deceived by inflamatory rhetoric and unable, or unwilling, to distinguish between reasonable goals and millenial daydreaming.

It would therefore be no exaggeration to say that the West invented Third Worldism. To put it in Rangel's terms, "This feeling of masochistic and suicidal culpability of the West" (p. 83) is actually its Achilles' heel. Rangel seeks to discover the underlying causes for the feelings of powerlessness and despair, for a paralysis that threatens to become epidemic in certain sectors of the Western intelligentsia. Starting as a mere ideology, Third Worldism, like a classical Marxist thesis, gained

[5] Regarding Mills' identification with the Cuban Revolution, see Irving Louis Horowitz' remarkable book, *C. Wright Mills: An American Utopian* (New York: Free Press, 1983).

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a genuine "material force." Embraced by the producers of Western society's symbolic capital (an increasing accumulation of self-representations), the myth can eventually erode this social order and endanger its capacity for survival as the only alternative to totalitarian bureaucratic regimes. Third Worldism is a corroding ideology, rooted in aversion to democratic values, unsatisfied collective dreams, and a craving for a neoromantic global community.

Rangel's study in no way neglects or plays down the present difficulties of the underdeveloped countries. On the contrary, he strives to discern those ideological devices whose main effect has been the obfuscation of the truth about the origins of economic discrepancies. He reveals the misleading character of the radical-leftist perspective that sees the West as responsible for all the misfortunes and failures of the Third World. Jean-François Revel poignantly emphasizes the meaning of Rangel's contribution, noting that this intellectual démarche "is the only one which could lead to the clear formulation of the problem of economic disparities between nations and would permit discovery of the solution to that problem."[6] Various chapters in Rangel's book insist on the cynical tendency of Marxist-Leninist regimes to appropriate the entire Third Worldist ideology and the infinite adaptability of "historical materialism" (Leninist, Stalinist, and neo-Stalinist) to international social-political dynamics.

Capitalizing on the alleged opposition between "proletarian" and "burgeois" nations—Mussolini was actually among the authors of this specious dichotomy—Third Worldism distorted images and reified symbols: for example, the "center" would have prospered only as a consequence of its "pillage and exploitation" of the "periphery." The domination-dependence relationship between advanced capitalist countries and underdeveloped ones has thus become the core of Third Worldist ideology. Third Worldism manipulates large abstractions and prefers to ignore historical cases that could contradict its allegations. The underlying myth of Third Worldism consists precisely of the old socialist-collectivist dogma that is suspicious of any form of private property and a fortiori of individual wealth, attributing them to theft or other unethical conduct. The West is therefore indicted for rapaciousness and lack of compassion and is personified as the archvillain. All exchanges between developed and underdeveloped countries are therefore defined as resulting in corruption and enslavement.

Third Worldism should be regarded as a compensatory mythology, a symbolic complement or palliative to the unbearable feeling

[6] Jean-François Revel, preface to *L'Occident et le Tiers Monde*, p. 10.

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of humiliation, of continual and inexorable failure, experienced by the political-intellectual elites in underdeveloped countries. It is actually an ersatz ideology that sublimates the resentment and hostility toward a pattern of civilization (development, democratic-pluralistic values, and so forth) perceived as both alienating and hardly affordable.

Essentially an ideology, Marxism has been converted in recent decades into a theoretical alibi for Third Worldist radicalism. The study of the fate of Marxism in the Third World involves an obligation to distinguish between the original nature of Marxism (Western, "critical," or "dialectical-humanist") and its institutional-bureaucratic evolution into Marxism-Leninism, as well as among the varieties of "scientific socialism" invoked by Third World prophets. In his role as revolutionary tribune and charismatic *caudillo,* for example, Fidel Castro takes advantage of Marxist rhetoric when he sees himself as speaking for a "proletarianized continent." Forged by Marxist and Socialist intellectuals in the West, the myth of the Third World was more or less surreptitiously exported to the emerging political classes of underdeveloped countries. Built upon an aversion to the constructive values of capitalism and, for that matter, of pluralist democracy, it is a contemporary manifestation of that strange nostalgia for tribal unity discussed by Karl R. Popper in *The Open Society and Its Enemies.*

Rangel argues for a reinterpretation of the mythology worked out by the Latin American Marxist intelligentsia, including the irresponsible celebration of such paranoid dictators as Francisco Solano Lopez in Paraguay, Manuel Isidor Belzù in Bolivia, and Juan Manuel de Rosas in Argentina. It is both distressing and instructive to contemplate the Left's commitment to imagining a "dialectical" counterhistory. The Marxist doctrinaires have thus conceived new galleries of saints, martyrs, and, naturally, traitors. Even a notorious psychopathic murderer like the conquistador Lope de Aguirre is "rehabilitated" and is seen as having worked toward a "bright future of freedom and justice."[7] (p. 122.)

An unrestrained cult of "roots," of the "proto-ethnic origins" of unperverted Indian blood, imbues the Latin American version of Third Worldism. Rangel's book offers an anatomy of this neoromantic anticapitalist mentality and the political idiosyncracies and historical phobias that shape it. The Venezuelan author defies the dogmas of Third Worldism, which he depicts as no more than a combination of platitudes and clichés imbued with rancor and resentment. "The truth," he insists, "is that the origins of backwardness and poverty lie in indigenous characteristics that existed before any contact with the West and represented forces of inertia

[7] Rangel mentions a novel recently published by the Venezuelan Communist writer Miguel Otero Silva, *Lope de Aguirre* [Prince of freedom] (Barcelona: Seix Baral, 1979).

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hindering a desired and desirable modernization." (p. 170.) It would therefore be preposterous to expect external remedies to cure Latin America's ills. Such an assumption, however, will always seem outrageous to obstinate radicals impervious to the suggestions of both common sense and lucid research.

Third Worldism is actually the millenialism of our times, a mythologized version of the chiliastic frenzy, an ecstatic quest for salvation by any and all means, since for the "virtuous revolutionary" the ends justify the means. In Karl Mannheim's words: "Chiliasm sees the revolution as a value in itself; not as an unavoidable means to a rationally set end, but as the only creative principle of the immediate present, as the longed-for realization of its aspiration in this world."[8] It is all the more difficult to debunk Third Worldist eschatology since it takes advantage of the appeal of the socialist dogma. Moreover, it benefits from the material support resulting from the "progressive" restoration of "the most implacable political absolutism" (p. 209) in the concrete form of Marxist-Leninist regimes.

As an oracle of Latin American messianic radicalism, Régis Debray saw the Third World as a fabulous historical laboratory. Nonetheless, in his latest book, *Critique of Political Reason*, he stresses the hidden potential of illusions, their strange stubbornness and disturbing phenomenology, their capacity for taking on a mystical aura and thereby provoking deeply felt religious experiences.

There are certain similarities to be found in Rangel's and Debray's approaches: above all, the fact that a former mentor of Latin American guerrillas and a leading critic of revolutionary delusions seem to share a certain disenchantment with the unhappy evolution of many Third World regimes. In other words, they seem equally skeptical of the Marxist-Leninist experiments of Third World dictators and the socialist verbiage that cloaks their totalitarian orientation. For Rangel, the current tragic disarray in the Third World, resulting more often than not in the installation of despotic regimes, repeats the ancient and almost always bloody story of the "chosen" elites, of the prophetic minorities or charismatic "vanguards" who defy the status quo and promise the advent of the millenium, the "realm of freedom," and "universal emancipation." For Régis Debray, an intimate knowledge of Latin American leftist radicalism is the principal argument for launching and substantiating a critique of political reason as such and, subsequently, of the revolutionary faith.

Debray's ambition is to go beyond the Marxist critique of ideology and thereby to reveal the conditions leading to ideological mis-

[8] Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, n.d.), p. 217.

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representation. Consistently using Althusser's metaphysical jargon, the former student of the Ecole Normale Supérieure attempted to unify the political-sociological and the epistemological analyses of ideology, to abandon his earlier allegiances in order to reach that fertile pathos of distance invoked by Nietzsche: "A critique of political reason can tell me what I cannot do but not what I must do. It states the impossible, not the desirable (or the detestable). Anyone who looks there for the outline of a 'position' and a fortiori a 'line' risks being profoundly mistaken." (pp. 52-53.)

For Debray, rebellion defines the human condition. Revolutionary fervor and the search for the millenium are seen as natural states of mind. Whereas Rangel undoubtedly belongs to a spiritual family including Popper, Aron, and Hayek, Debray remains a devout Marxist, all his doubts and questions notwithstanding. For this former *guerrillero* and present special adviser for international affairs to the French Socialist president, resistance and defiance seem to be the only legitimate political attitudes. As for those who persevere in traditional patterns of political conduct, they deserve only the malediction of the messianic preacher. There is a secret affinity between truth and praxis, according to Debray, the latter involving the unity of subjectivity and objectivity in the process of historical construction, destruction, and "dialectical" reconstruction. The first Debray has never completely vanished, although his voice is now somewhat muted and his perennial obsessions are masked by a simulated repentance. He knew how much to invest in revolution. He fell in love with dialectical concepts and tried to explore them in the fraternity of the guerrillas. His Marxism has always been a very peculiar one. Saturated with Althusserian ideas and highly resistant to "revisionism," Debray extolled revolutionary asceticism and was contemptuous of the guilty hedonism of "late capitalism." He has scornfully rejected the antitotalitarian stances of the "new philosophers" (André Glucksmann, Bernard-Henri Lévy, et al.) and refused to identify himself with a political-metaphysical discourse that went beyond, or even against, the revealed dogmas of historical materialism.

The young Debray celebrated the "long march of Castroism in Latin America," believing that "Fidelism labors like South America herself, in that immense, silent workshop, walled in, where the sun does not always rise at the appointed time — a workshop of ideas, of organizations, of arms and plans."[9] He enthusiastically supported and further elaborated Guevara's concept of the *foco insurreccional,* extolling "a united vanguard, honest, intransigent, nonsectarian, without any precon-

[9] Régis Debray, *Strategy for Revolution* (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 28.

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ceived model, ready to take the most unconventional paths to arrive at its ends, selected and steeled by the struggle; a vanguard which only the practice of *foco* guarantees."[10] The faith in the alleged "purity" of Fidelism stemmed from Debray's conviction that the European revolutionary elites were no longer able to launch the decisive assault, the cathartic, long-expected "historical breakthrough." He left Europe for Latin America and immersed himself in the guerrilla adventure hoping perhaps to become another Malraux, a combination of visionary and desperado in search of an impossible redemption. The Parisian intellectual and "sentimental Marxist"[11] thus rediscovered the enthralling appeal of "radical praxis." He had no desire to postpone his commitment through sterile self-questioning and "petty bourgeois" hesitations. The meaning of revolution was both praxiological and axiological: it offered an irresistible invitation to replace the framework of historical determinism with a new *ordo rerum*.

The European utopian dream was supposed to have re-emerged in the Latin American sierras, and the scion of a French bourgeois Catholic family decided to join the "party of truth." Debray ignored the traumatic lessons of the failure of guerrilla warfare and the betrayed promises of the Cuban Revolution. As for the victims of the revolution, they were regarded either as martyrs to the cause or, if they belonged to the "wrong side," as despicable scoundrels who had died in the service of an abominable "imperialism."

Debray's *Critique of Political Reason* speaks of the changing theoretical moods of the militant-philosopher and indicates his willingness to keep pace with the French intellectual mainstream. It is no longer fashionable on the Left Bank to be an orthodox Marxist, let alone an orthodox Maoist or Castroite: the members of the Tel Quel society are now the most virulent critics of the neo-Stalinist gulags. Another indication of this shift is that certain symptomatic modifications have been introduced in the editorial policy of the Maspéro publishing house. Historical materialism has become more and more synonymous with systematic mendacity, and, as a result, leftist intellectuals have increasingly indulged in self-pity, commiseration, and more or less justified indictments. As a consequence of this process of intellectual awakening, the tyrannies of the Third World have lost their aura of sanctity, and Fidel Castro's once saintly image, which Debray helped to create, has been tarnished.

Debray found it convenient to adhere to Mitterrand's political program, to throw down the machine gun in order to enjoy the fragrance of the Socialist rose. A new order of theoretical priorities hence became

[10] Ibid., p. 74.

[11] Eugene Weber, "A Sentimental Marxist," *New York Times Book Review*, January 29, 1984, p. 12.

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necessary, and the old orientation had to be revised to meet new ideological criteria. The universal explanation provided by Marxism had to undergo essential transformations, and its mythological kernel became the target of this operation. The result is hardly a devastating critique like those undertaken by political thinkers once associated with the group Socialisme ou Barbarie (Cornelius Castoriadis and Claude Lefort). It is rather a disaffected expression of the oscillations and lack of strategic vision of an unreconstructed practitioner of "revolutionary dialectics." Debray ignores Popper's masterful analysis of the poverty of historicism as well as Kolakowski's depiction of Marxism's rise and fall.[12] He prefers to attack the obsolete substance of such discredited dialectical postulates as the relationship between the proletariat and the revolutionary party, the mission of the vanguard party, and so forth.

Except for this, he abides by the same intransigent Jacobinic logic that inspired his earlier radical stances. He mentions the shamanistic function of ideology but fails to deal with the intrinisic connection between ideology and terrorism or the contribution ideology has made to totalitarian practices in this century. He also fails to assess the logical relationship between radicalism and rationalism or the correlation between rationalism and utopianism, which are both essential for an understanding of political reason (and/or unreason). As Jeane J. Kirkpatrick has pointed out:

> Rationalism not only encourages utopianism, but utopianism is a form of rationalism. Utopianism shares the characteristic features of rationalism: both are concerned more with the abstract than the concrete, with the possible than the probable, both are less concerned with people as they are than as they might be (at least as rationalists think they might be).[13]

Debray persistently avoids any thoroughgoing settlement of accounts with the revolutionary aberrations of Marxist origin and inspiration. The crisis of Marxism — which is of course a euphemism for its failure — should be explained in terms of its fallacious metaphysical premises, among which is the subordination of the individual to the state. Debray continues to nourish radical expectations, and his ostensible divorce from Marxism is more a demonstration of intellectual acrobatics than the convincing conclusion to an unfortunate romance. His sympathy for Guevara and Allende, on the one hand, and his present commitment to the implementation of Mitterrand's Socialist program, on the other hand, reveals his ambivalent attitude toward the meanderings of the

[12] Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, vol. 3, *The Breakdown* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).

[13] Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, *Dictatorship and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics* (New York: American Enterprise Institute, 1982), p. 11.

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"revolutionary spirit" in this century. In Debray's view, revolution has always been the ultimate historical value, and he gives no evidence of having revised this view, which is understandable, since "sanguine attitudes to 'Revolution' have existed mainly among comfortably situated intellectuals who resent their own societies, but suffer little from them."[14]

Debray would have been perhaps the more qualified to work out a critique of political unreason. As a theorist of guerrilla warfare, he belonged to a fraternity that did its best to convert Marxism into a religion of violence and revenge. A faithful worshiper of Castro's system, he cannot accept the notion of totalitarianism, which he tries to dismiss as a "screen-concept." More sinned against than sinning, Soviet-style regimes would thus represent not a universe of terror but rather one of incommensurable ennui: "The most blinding [cliché], of course, is the overworked concept of 'terror' that conceals a permanent and much more frightening characteristic of 'real socialism,' namely boredom." (pp. 10-11).

Rangel infers, Debray speculates. The former is firmly grounded in reason; the latter prefers the "labyrinthine approach" of the history of religion. What Rangel considers highly questionable — namely the theoretical relevance and the political accuracy of Third Worldist ideology — Debray seems to take for granted. In a certain sense, although deeply committed to the necessity of critique, Debray detects in Third Worldism the confirmation of his deepest fears. Once ideology is turned into religion, the result can be none other than a mythopoetic view of reality that shrouds the real world in an apocalyptic vision of sin, expiation, and final redemption.

Debray's intellectual career can perhaps best be understood in terms of the unquenchable longing for illumination that has marked it. Though subdued as a result of current political imperatives, the messianic drive remains central to his approach, and the Third World is the only remaining sphere of action for the Western Left:

> The whole world ought to be our laboratory. But the Third World is in the forefront of research, as it is only there that we can see unities breaking up and separate things coming together. Nations are appearing, territories are being mapped out and "social systems" are tested in places where, only ten years ago, there was nothing but sand and grass. That, in a word, is where the birth of the political can be caught. (p. 14.)

Debray sees his mission as fostering revolutionary Marxism, as providing an ideological-religious infrastructure for instances of radicalism. In comparison with Rangel's resolutely demystifying treatment of Third Worldism,

[14] Robert Conquest, "The Role of the Intellectual in International Understanding," *Encounter*, August 1978, p. 38.

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Debray's *Critique of Political Reason* perseveres in an adherence to Hegelian-Marxist constructions and consequently fails to offer anything more than another example of outdated dialectical prose.

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correspondence

What the Bishops Did and Did not Say

To the Editor:

In his characterization of the U.S. Catholic bishops' pastoral letter of May 1983, Keith Payne ["The Bishops and Nuclear Weapons," ORBIS, Fall 1983, pp. 535-43] describes it as "accepting the possession of nuclear weapons, but rejecting plans for using them," declares, "The non-use of nuclear weapons is the bishops' solution to the deterrence dilemma," and elsewhere characterizes the bishops as "in opposition to the U.S. . . . planning for nuclear retaliation in the event of a Soviet first strike." Similarly, Manfred R. Hamm ["The European Church and Arms Control," ORBIS, Fall 1983, pp. 543-54] opines, "They did not budge from their fundamental assumption that even the intent to use nuclear weapons without actually implementing their use is immoral," and describes their reluctant acceptance of nuclear weapons as applying "under certain conditions, the most important being that no step be taken to plan for or initiate their operational use."

Multiple repetition of a falsehood — both in ORBIS and in other critiques of the pastoral letter[1] — does not, however, make it true. The authors never give a quotation from the letter expressing the above sentiment — because they cannot.[2] *There is no such statement in the letter.* I can only wonder how it is that so many people, with some scholarly credentials, continue to make an assertion that is demonstrably false. That it fits their needs for rhetoric and persuasion is hardly an acceptable excuse.

I have refuted the charge at length elsewhere, and ORBIS readers can consult that treatment.[3] But the repeated error in the pages of this journal requires a brief explication here. The position of the pastoral letter is in fact considerably more subtle and logically consistent than

[1] See, most prominently, Albert Wohlstetter, "Bishops, Statesmen, and Other Strategists on the Bombing of Innocents," *Commentary,* June 1983, pp. 15-35.

[2] Lacking such a statement, Payne is reduced to quoting an article by Bruce Van Voorst about the *second* draft of the letter (which was twice superseded by versions of the letter itself, otherwise cited by Payne where it suits his purposes).

[3] Bruce Russett, "Ethical Dilemmas of Deterrence," *International Security,* Spring 1984, pp. 36-54.

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these critics pretend. The bishops do reject first use of nuclear weapons; they do reject deliberate use (or intended use) of nuclear weapons against civilian targets; and they do express the greatest skepticism about whether nuclear weapons could ever be used in a way in which the consequent deaths could be "proportionate" to any good achieved or evil avoided. But this last is not an outright rejection of the possibility. To the contrary, if they did reject any possible use whatever it would be superfluous to devote detailed attention to the questions of first use and use against population centers. A general prohibition would cover the subsets.

To understand why the bishops did not adopt an advocacy of possession but not use requires understanding the chain of reasoning they did produce. (For that, it helps to read the letter!) I summarize here:

(1) There are real dangers and threats in the world, dangers that may sometimes justify the use of lethal violence. But the use (or threat, or intent) of violent force is subject to restrictions associated with the just-war tradition.

(2) Deliberate attacks on civilians violate the just-war principle of discrimination, and the even more fundamental Catholic prohibition against deliberately taking innocent human life.

(3) Since virtually any wartime act may result in the death of some civilians, one is obliged to ask whether those foreseeable but unintended deaths will, in some sense, be proportionate to the ends sought. This criterion applies to the use of any weapons. But there is particular reason to *doubt* whether nuclear weapons can be used proportionately. The bases of doubt are several: Nuclear weapons (even "small," "clean," "accurate" ones) will, in most real-world cases where military targets and civilian centers are co-located, cause large-scale prompt civilian deaths — *perhaps* this alone would make the use of nuclear weapons disproportionate. Second, the longer-term social and ecological effects of any *large-scale* use of nuclear weapons, even only against military targets, would be so enormous as to overwhelm virtually any conception of "proportionality." Third, C^3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence) capabilities are so complex and fragile as to make extremely improbable that any initially "limited" or controlled use of nuclear weapons, under real wartime conditions, could remain limited or controlled in any meaningful sense — the chances of escalation are extremely high. In a hypothetical sense one might just imagine acceptably limited use. Different analysts evaluate the probabilities differently. But in the bishops' judgment (and they are by no means in a small minority with such a judgment) those probabilities are so low that:

(4) "The deliberate inflation of nuclear warfare, on however restricted a scale," cannot be morally justified.

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(5) The above steps do not rule out the possibility of attempting a restricted and proportionate use of nuclear weapons in retaliation for nuclear attack on oneself or one's allies. But they do challenge fundamentally the assumption that one can in any meaningful way expect to "win" or "prevail in" nuclear war.

(6) Rather, the notion of "limited," "acceptable" nuclear war leads to production and deployment of destabilizing weapons that would be useful in a first strike but also vulnerable to (and therefore inviting) an adversary's first strike. Thus the bishops explicitly criticize particular new weapons systems. (The MX and Pershing II alone are mentioned.)[4]

(7) If one forgoes the "first use" option, then other means of deterring war are required. These include both a general effort to lower the temperature of international hostility and a willingness to see "some strengthening of conventional defense."

(8) Concomitantly, the capabilities for potential destruction are now very much higher, on both sides, than are necessary to deter nuclear attack. Substantial mutually verifiable nuclear disarmament therefore could occur without diminishing either side's security.

(9) Moreover, such disarmament is not just possible but imperative, as are some limited, independent initiatives to start the process moving.

The above chain of reasoning leads to a reluctant and perhaps temporary acceptance of some forms of nuclear deterrence, not to the straw-person conclusion of possession but no use. The latter would pose some very severe difficulties; that is, if public, it is transparently a bluff that need deter no one; if private, it makes some near-heroic assumptions about C^3I (see point 3) and a commander in chief's ability actually to withhold his assent to retaliation after attack. To repeat, no such statement can be found in the letter. Reasonable people can disagree about several of the above judgments and the conclusions to which they lead — and the bishops explicitly acknowledge the possibility of such disagreement. But pretending that the bishops made an argument they did not in fact make is at least irresponsible, and possibly dishonest.

BRUCE RUSSETT
Yale University
Principal Consultant to the
Bishops' Ad Hoc Committee

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[4] Payne pretends that the "bishops are in opposition to . . . modernizing nuclear forces (e.g., MX, Trident, B-1B, Pershing II, and GLCMs)."

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What I Did and Did not Say, and Why

Reply to Russett:

I enjoyed reading Bruce Russett's comments on my short article, despite his occasionally graceless tenor. Russett raises four issues, three of which are rather petty. I will respond briefly to these and dwell on the fourth at some length.

First, it is implied, strongly and incorrectly, that neither Manfred Hamm nor I actually read the subject of our respective articles, the Catholic bishops' pastoral letter. This is a rather curious charge since I refer to the document eleven times, and quote from it directly on nine separate occasions.

Second, Russett charges that I only *pretend* that the bishops' letter is in opposition to nuclear force modernization programs in general, in addition to its opposition to so-called destabilizing forces. Such a criticism is extremely peculiar coming from someone who claims such comprehensive knowledge of the pastoral letter and the bishops' views. To quote from the document itself:

> In support of the concept of "sufficiency" as an adequate deterrent and in light of the present size and composition of both the U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals, *we recommend:*
>
> 1. Support for immediate, bilateral, verifiable agreements to halt the testing, production and deployment of new nuclear weapon systems. [Emphasis in original.][1]

Note 85 of the letter explains why the bishops chose to use the word "halt" instead of the more popular "freeze": "We have chosen our own language in this paragraph, not wanting either to be identified with one specific political initiative or to have our words used against specific political measures."

Other than the substitution of the word "halt," the bishops' recommendation is virtually identical to the call for a comprehensive nuclear freeze. This recommendation (particularly given the time of its writing) can hardly be seen as other than opposition to the new nuclear modernization programs I cited. Russett's criticism reflects either an astonishing lack of familiarity with the content of the letter, or an equally surprising misunderstanding of the effect a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon testing, production, and deployment would have on U.S. modernization programs.

Third, Russett laments "that so many people, with some scholarly credentials," have examined the letter and concluded that, on bal-

[1] National Conference of Catholic Bishops, "The Pastoral Letter on War and Peace, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response," *Origins*, May 19, 1983, p. 18.

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ance, it recommends not only a no-first-use policy, but also a position of no operational use of nuclear weapons. He charges that "pretending" that the bishops reject nuclear use generally "is at least irresponsible, and possibly dishonest."[2] Suffice it to note that impugning the integrity of the person(s) holding an opposing view is an old but nonetheless unseemly debaters' ploy.

The silence of the pastoral letter on the issue of what conditions would justify the employment of nuclear weapons leads to the fourth issue raised by Russett: What does the pastoral letter say in regard to nuclear use beyond its clear injunction against first use?

Russett criticizes me and others for concluding that the pastoral letter appears to reject not only the first use, but, more generally, any use of nuclear weapons. He rightly notes that there is no specific statement in the letter explicitly rejecting the use of nuclear weapons. However, the letter is replete with sentences strongly suggesting this sentiment, and I cited several. For example, the bishops write, "The political paradox of deterrence has also strained our moral conception. May a nation threaten what it may never do? May it possess what it may never use?"[3] This certainly appears to be an outright rejection of nuclear employment ("never" is fairly explicit concerning when nuclear weapons may be used) and goes even further to question the morality of possessing or threatening the use of nuclear weapons. The pastoral letter does *not* include a sentence that states, "Nuclear weapons may never be used under any conditions." However, it does contain sentences such as the one above, which leads the reader to make such an interpretation. The quotation offered in my article and repeated above is only one of several sentences strongly suggesting the rejection of nuclear use. For example:

> We live today, therefore, in the midst of a cosmic drama; we possess a power which should never be used, but which might be used if we do not reverse our direction.[4]

> One of the criteria of the just-war tradition is a reasonable hope of success in bringing about justice and peace. We must ask whether such a reasonable hope

[2] Russett specifically mentions three individuals, Albert Wohlstetter, Manfred Hamm, and myself, who have rendered this interpretation and then impugns the scholarship, sincerity, and honesty behind any such conclusion. To Russett's list of suspects could be added other individuals who separately have reached the same conclusion, including Colin Gray; Professor William O'Brien of Georgetown University, the country's leading expert on just-war theory and one intimately familiar with the pastoral letter; Father Francis Winters, S.J., of Georgetown University in comments on an earlier draft; and others, one of whom was a key participant in the writing of the pastoral letter and has acknowledged the same conclusion in private conversation. As Father Winters has observed, "For the Bishops have relied on the distinction . . . between the morality of using nuclear weapons and the morality of maintaining the arsenal even without the intention to use it. . . . . They have opted, with notable casuistic ingenuity, for possession of the strategic arsenal along with renunciation of the intention to employ it." See "A Fair Hearing for the Bishops," *Washington Quarterly,* Autumn 1982, pp. 136, 137.

[3] National Conference of Catholic Bishops, "The Pastoral Letter on War and Peace," p. 14.

[4] Ibid., p. 13.

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can exist once nuclear weapons have been exchanged. The burden of proof remains on those who assert that meaningful limitation is possible.[5]

Although reasons exist which move some to condemn reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence, we have not reached this conclusion for the reasons outlined in this letter. Nevertheless, there must be no misunderstanding of our profound skepticism about the moral acceptability of any use of nuclear weapons. It is obvious that the use of any weapons which violate the principle of discrimination merits unequivocal condemnation.[6]

The strong position we have taken against the use of nuclear weapons and particularly the stand against the initiation of nuclear war calls for further clarification of our view of the requirements for conventional defense.[7]

Nevertheless, because no exact wording appears rejecting any nuclear use a slight degree of ambiguity may be seen to exist concerning the issue. What Russett fails to note is that in my article I acknowledge this possible ambiguity. I stated: "Indeed, the pastoral letter is silent concerning what type of nuclear threat would be permissible in support of deterrence. Unfortunately, the bishops found it too 'awkward' to address that question. Given the adamant language against nuclear use, however, *the implication* of the letter is that all types of nuclear use are eschewed." (Emphasis added.)

Russett claims that the argument of the pastoral letter does not "rule out the possibility of attempting a restricted and proportionate use of nuclear weapons in retaliation for nuclear attack on oneself or one's allies." However, while I can and do offer evidence from the letter in support of my interpretation, Russett offers none in support of his. In fact, while there are many statements that seem to condemn nuclear use, there is not a single sentence that states, or even suggests, that there are operational conditions that might make nuclear use acceptable. Because there is no exact wording endorsing a complete rejection of nuclear use, Russett interprets the letter as allowing for nuclear employment under certain conditions, despite the fact that it suggests strongly that nuclear use could never be acceptable under operational conditions.

Ironically, Russett's letter reflects precisely those flaws for which he incorrectly condemns my article. He has presented an interpretation of the pastoral letter which, despite the letter's ambiguity, seems at odds with numerous statements therein, and he offers no quotations from the letter to support his interpretation.

One can only recognize a slight degree of ambiguity in the letter, regret that the bishops chose not to deal explicitly with the issue

[5] Ibid., p. 16.
[6] Ibid., p. 19.
[7] Ibid., p. 21.

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as to when the actual use of nuclear weapons would be acceptable, and render a judgment based upon a reasoned assessment of the letter. My judgment, and that of many others who have thoroughly examined the letter, is that despite a measure of silence and ambiguity on this issue, the bishops have rejected any operational use of nuclear weapons. This conclusion does not reflect "needs for rhetoric and persuasion," or an "irresponsible or possibly dishonest" analysis, as Russett states. The bishops could have explicitly stated their position, yet they did not. There should be no challenge to the integrity of those who are left to use reasoned judgment and grapple with interpretation.

Nothing in Russett's critique leads me to revise my interpretation of the pastoral letter — that, on balance, it endorses the possession but rejects the operational use of nuclear weapons. The bishops' concept of deterrence appears to be based upon the uncertainty that would confront Soviet leaders concerning whether the United States would retaliate even in the absence of explicit U.S. threats and plans to do so. Such an approach to deterrence should be recognized as a dangerous policy of bluff. Despite the subtlety with which the bishops have constructed their letter, their position would very likely increase the probability of war. The Soviet Union is likely to be impressed by a manifestly credible and visible retaliatory threat, not by eloquent philology. We have little evidence to inform us of exactly what is required to deter the Soviet Union under all conditions. Yet, during an acute crisis, when the efficacy of the U.S. deterrent threat is important, the United States must have the most credible deterrent feasible — and that is unlikely to be obtained with the deterrence-through-bluff approach of the pastoral letter. The letter has an air of unreality as a consequence of its endorsement of the notion that stability can be supported by the weak reed of nuclear bluff until disarmament and the establishment of an effective world authority provide a final solution.

As noted in my article, an approach to deterrence that encompasses a more balanced approach to offensive and defensive preparations still seems to be a more fruitful avenue than that taken by the bishops in an attempt to identify an effective deterrence policy that is also compatible with just-war requirements. Indeed, recent official reviews of advanced defensive technology lead me to reaffirm this as a more realistic long-term alternative to the solution suggested in the pastoral letter.

In summary, on those issues of substance Russett has raised, he is both mistaken and guilty of pushing his interpretation well beyond what the evidence will bear. Ironically, this reflects the type of scholarship of which he is rightly critical. He could do worse than meditate upon

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Christ's words in the Gospel according to St. Luke: "And why do you look at the speck that is in your brother's eye, but do not notice the log that is in your own eye."[8]

KEITH B. PAYNE
National Institute for Public Policy

[8] Luke 6:41.

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publications received

DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY HISTORY

Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945–1951. By Alan Bullock. New York: Norton, 1983. 912 pp. $37.50. In this, the third and final volume of his biography of Ernest Bevin, Alan Bullock narrates Bevin's years as Britain's foreign secretary. Based on a wide range of sources, including Bevin's papers, this is a masterful study of the man and his times. During those troubled years, which witnessed the onset of the Cold War, the first Arab-Israeli conflict, the beginning of the dissolution of Britain's empire, and the fighting in Korea, Bevin's skillful handling of Britain's foreign policy and the key role he played in the rebuilding of war-ravaged Europe place him in that small circle of individuals accorded the accolade of statesmen. Yet, as one obituary that appeared on his death in 1951 pointed out: "Ernest Bevin was not a working man who became a statesman. He remained a working man with all the attributes that this implies — and to these he added statesmanship. In this he was the first of his kind. He was a great Englishman. His life symbolises the rise of the British working people, not only to power, but to political responsibility." Lord Bullock's three-volume biography of Bevin is a remarkable achievement in scholarship, and this volume in particular will be of great value to those studying modern world politics.

Force and Statescraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time. By Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. 288 pp. $22.50 ($9.95, paper). A collection of nineteen essays on aspects of international politics organized into three sections and intended, evidently, as a supplementary text for university students. The first section, "The International System from the Seventeenth Century to the Present," is the most noteworthy and commendable. Any text that encourages historical awareness on the part of the student cannot be all bad, and indeed, these essays are generally quite good. The second section, "Maintaining the System: Problems of Force and Diplomacy," contains essays on negotiation, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, crisis management, war termination, and détente. These essays tend to be short and to the point,

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and, unlike many other presentations of these themes, are replete with historical examples and descriptions. Part III, "Ethical Imperatives and Foreign Policy," contains but two essays, one on Bismarck and Gladstone as Christian statesmen, and one more general piece on the ethical problems of the use of force in foreign policy. Neither of these two essays matches the level of sophistication of the rest of the book and, notwithstanding the importance of ethics and foreign policy as a topic, the book as a whole would have been better off without this final section. On balance, however, this offering ought to cheer the professor who has searched in vain for a historically grounded supplementary text for international relations courses.

France and the Origins of the First World War. By John F. V. Keiger. New York: St. Martin's, 1983. 201 pp. $25.00. **Russia and the Origins of the First World War.** By D. C. B. Lieven. New York: St. Martin's, 1983. 213 pp. $25.00. This summer marks the seventieth anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War. Despite the passage of time, the questions raised by an examination of the war's origins continue to fascinate both scholars and the general public. How did it come to pass that a successful terrorist attack could set off the chain of events that resulted in the outbreak of a general European war? Which statesmen and Great Powers were most responsible for this conflagration? What were the immediate and underlying causes for the conflict? And, since the past is often prologue, what lessons can be learned from the July Crisis that could help to prevent a similar descent into a general war? These questions have provoked a prolonged and often heated debate. The most recent round began some twenty years ago, when the German historian Fritz Fischer published his book *Griff nach der Weltmacht* in 1961. Since then, scholarly attention has been focused to a large extent on the responsibility of Germany for the war's outbreak. In effect, Fischer reopened the war-guilt question that had dominated the debate during the period between the two world wars. While Zara Steiner and F. H. Hinsley have provided a comprehensive examination of Britain's foreign policy before the First World War, much less attention has been devoted to the roles played by France and Russia. Germany, after all, was not the only Great Power to issue a blank check to its allies during the July Crisis, nor does Germany's internal political situation appear quite so desperate as it is often portrayed by scholars following Fritz Fischer's lead. It should be remembered that Britain was close to civil war over the question of Irish home rule and France was on the verge of a major colonial scandal during the summer of 1914. The publication, then, of these two fine studies by St. Martin's Press is good news. While neither of them strays

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far from the conclusions reached some forty years ago by Luigi Albertini — and, as a consequence, they tend to support the Fischer thesis about Germany's unique responsibility for the outbreak of the war — they nonetheless provide a useful corrective to an overly narrow focus on Germany. If these volumes are the catalyst for renewed interest among scholars in the motivations and actions of policymakers in France and Russia before 1914, they will have made an important contribution.

The Great War at Sea, 1914–1918. By Richard Hough. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. 369 pp. $25.00. The popular and prolific British naval historian Richard Hough has written an eminently readable single-volume account of the fighting at sea during the First World War. As Hough readily admits in his preface, this study is based in large part on the writings and research of the late Arthur J. Marder. Indeed, Hough has even dedicated this book to the memory of Marder. Yet his heavy reliance on Marder's research is also the source of this study's principal weaknesses. As in Marder's works, Hough's citations of unpublished documents are maddeningly vague and therefore of limited value to other scholars. A more serious flaw, however, is Hough's failure to make much use of research that has been done on naval developments in this era since the publication of Marder's five-volume history *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*. Hough only briefly mentions the controversy surrounding the fire-control system invented by Arthur H. Pollen, and his references make no mention of Jon Sumida's essay in *The Journal of Modern History* dealing with the design of British capital ships. It should also be mentioned that Hough's study is primarily concerned with the planning and operations of Britain's Royal Navy during the First World War. As a consequence, the fascinating new research on German naval policy in the Tirpitz era done by Volker Berghahn and Paul Kennedy is not mentioned in his references. Hough's study, then, must be seen as an overview of British naval policy and operations in the period of the First World War, not as a major contribution to our understanding of the naval developments of that era.

The King's Ships Were at Sea: The War in the North Sea, August 1914–February 1915. By James Goldrick. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984. 375 pp. $21.95. This book details the operations of the British and German navies in the North Sea during the initial stages of the First World War. During this period the two battle fleets — Britain's Grand Fleet and Germany's *Hochseeflotte* — did little more than cautiously spar with one another because neither side was prepared to risk their battle fleets in a decisive action. As a consequence, a naval stalemate

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set in with the North Sea as a kind of no man's land. In this well-written account, James Goldrick examines the reasons for the onset of this naval stalemate.

The Fall of the First British Empire: Origins of the War of American Independence. By Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. 458 pp. $24.00. The origin of the American Revolution is a question of great historical importance that has attracted the attention of many historians. Some of the most influential and learned of modern historians, like Lewis Namier, Edmund Morgan, and Bernard Bailyn, have examined the complex political dynamics that led to the secession of the thirteen colonies in North America from Britain's empire. In their recent book, Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson have written a historical narrative of the events between 1763 and 1775 that brought about the armed conflict between Britain and her settler colonies. They also provide their assessment of the contending theories advanced by historians to explain the origins of this war.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY

Presidential Economics: The Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond. By Herbert Stein. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. 414 pp. $16.95. A readable, comprehensive survey of the making of fiscal and monetary policy in the post-World War II period by a former chairman of the president's Council of Economic Advisors. Stein's assessment reflects his own fairly conservative views on economic policy, but his treatment of all administrations, even those with whom he worked in an official capacity, is balanced and does not shy away from complexity. Stein's ability to translate economic statistics and trends into language that even liberal arts majors can understand makes this book almost fun to read, which is more than can be said about most treatments of economic policy. Moreover, Stein has a talent for weaving political and idiosyncratic factors into his chronicle, and the ability to see the interweaving of domestic and international factors in the evolution of the U.S. economic condition that only an experienced practitioner is likely to possess. If a noneconomist wished to read only one fairly painless, ideologically eclectic, and plainly written account of U.S. economic policy, this would not be a bad choice.

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The Multinational Corporation in the 1980's. Edited by Charles P. Kindleberger and David B. Audretsch. Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 1983. 368 pp. No price given. The fifteen essays in this book are intended to provide an assessment of the current state of the art in studies of the multinational corporation. Various subfields of MNCs are surveyed. There are, for example, several essays discussing advances in theoretical efforts to understand the existence of multinational firms; several case studies of the effects of MNCs on either one or more nations or the nation-state system in general; and three essays concerned with various implications of MNCs for the United States. All of the essays were written "for presentation to advanced undergraduate economics majors," and several are particularly well-suited for classroom purposes. Among these is a clear, cogent, and concise analysis by Adhip Chaudhuri on the uncertainties inherent in any effort to estimate the effects on U.S. employment of American multinationals and an equally intelligent and clear discussion by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., on the relationship between U.S. power and the future of MNCs in the world economy.

Power and Protectionism: Strategies of the Newly Industrializing Countries. By David B. Yoffie. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. 282 pp. $30.00 ($15.00, paper). David Yoffie advances a counter-intuitive and provocative argument in *Power and Protectionism.* Analyzing the effects of voluntary export restraints (VERs) and orderly marketing arrangements (OMAs) imposed by the United States on East Asian textile and footwear exports, Yoffie argues that countries can and have prospered as a result of controls on their exports. Prosperity in the face of VERs and OMAs, Yoffie contends, follows from an ability to diversify products and markets, to recognize U.S. strategic myopia and the leakiness of U.S. controls, and to bargain with a clear eye on the potential for issue linkages and transnational coalitions. As Yoffie acknowledges, the applicability of his argument across time and space can be questioned: not all countries targeted by export restraints can adapt as flexibly as Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong; the U.S. may in the future abandon its commitment to pacifying domestic producers at the lowest possible real cost to trading relations; and the scope of export restraints may grow. The counterfactual nature of the argument also makes its validity hard to establish. Nevertheless, the insights into U.S. and East Asian trading strategies, the evidence amassed, and the originality of the argument merit the attention of scholars and practitioners alike.

The Political Economy of Growth. Edited by Dennis C. Mueller. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983. 285 pp. No price given.

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This book is custom made for those who either loved or hated *The Rise and Decline of Nations,* Mancur Olson's most recent and controversial book. Dennis Mueller's volume is a collection of thirteen essays, all written in response to a 1978 conference paper in which Olson discussed the idea at the core of his later book: economic growth across nations varies inversely with the strength and inclusiveness of special interest groups within nations. Since organizations prosper in times of peace, according to Olson, countries that "for the longest time had democratic freedom of organization without upheaval or invasion will suffer the most from growth-regressing organizations and combinations." In a phrase, the U.K. in the twentieth century. In the twelve pieces that respond to his, most written by economists, Olson is attacked from all sides. His analysis suffers, his critics charge, from conceptual, historical, statistical, and methodological errors. He also gets some support. J. C. Asselain and C. Morrison argue that Olson does not differentiate among types of change according to the duration of the consequences they might logically cause, nor does he consider that slow growth may provoke the rise of interest groups. Franz Lehner argues that the Swiss experience makes clear that interest-group analysis can be useless unless it includes an analysis of the bargaining system within which interest groups interact. On the other hand, Kwang Choi offers a statistical analysis which supports Olson's theory; John Hicks shows why interest groups might lead to a reduction in economic growth; and almost all the authors seem to agree that Olson's insight is a potentially powerful one — particularly if the critically important independent variable of interest-group strength could be usefully quantified.

The Oil Decade: Conflict and Cooperation in the West. By Robert J. Leiber. New York: Praeger, 1983. 157 pp. $25.95. A tidy little book about a complicated and potentially critical topic: the extent to which Western countries can cooperate on international energy issues and what is likely to happen if they do not. Part of the book is chronological analysis, a recounting of the origins of the energy problem and its evolution in the 1978-80 period in particular. Two cases — the United States and France — are studied in more detail in order to show the limitations of exclusively national policies. Finally, the book speculates on possible scenarios of recurrence for the energy crisis and suggests preparatory policies designed to avert future calamity. The book may have a few flaws, primarily sins of omission. For example, little is said about the relationship of energy economics on the one hand and the international banking system and debt crisis on the other. Still, the book's greatest value may lie in simply having recalled attention to this general issue. It is unfortunate that the "energy crisis" has fallen from policy consciousness

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as it has over the past three years, partly the consequence of an oil glut and partly the consequence of a U.S. administration determined to project laissez-faire principles the world over. Now is the time to bolster cooperative contingency planning, as Leiber suggests, but if the past is indeed prologue, it will not happen and too few people will take the time to look at this competent essay.

Emerging Standards of International Trade and Investment: Multinational Codes and Corporate Conduct. Edited by Seymour J. Rubin and Gary Clyde Hufbauer. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984. 201 pp. $38.95. The nine essays in this book address a variety of attempts by nominally sovereign nations to deal with several problems of coordination arising from the economic interdependence among them. Sponsored by the American Society of International Law, the essays examine international efforts that incorporate either "legalistic" (rule-making) approaches to cooperation or "softer" approaches relying on the "development of so-called 'voluntary' codes of conduct." The specific areas of international agreements (and disagreements) explored include, for example, the subsidies code developed during the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations, the futile effort to establish a multinational code on bribes to foreign government officials, and the UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations. Problems of implementation as well as negotiation are discussed, and there is a concluding chapter on "Lessons from the Codes."

MILITARY, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND ARMS CONTROL

Nuclear Weapons in Europe. Edited by Andrew J. Pierre. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1984. 118 pp. No price given. Four essays on this most controversial and fractious subject by William Hyland, Lawrence Freedman, Paul C. Warnke, and Karsten D. Voigt. There is also a short summarizing introduction by the editor. Of the four essays, two support the dual-track NATO decision of December 12, 1979, and two do not. The nay-sayers are Warnke, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under Carter and Voigt, a German Social-Democrat. Favoring the decision are Hyland, a former CIA, NSC, and State Department staffer, and Freedman, a well-known British academic. Interestingly enough, though Hyland and Freedman both support the dual-track decision, they are nevertheless critical of the rationale offerred for it by Western governments, and both arguments are conditional ones,

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tending to support the decision on political grounds *despite* the military risks they imply. These two articles come first, and put the reader somewhat ill at ease in preparation for the articles by Warnke and Voigt, which conclude the volume. Warnke argues that battlefield nuclear weapons, including Pershing II and cruise missiles, have no military utility, and so should be given up — ideally in the context of arms control negotiations. He does not address the issue of deterrence and its psychological dimensions. Voigt's essay is moderate in tone, arguing against nuclear weapons in Europe and for a conventionalization of NATO strategy. In the end, however, Voigt reveals himself a believer in that most popular of Social Democratic illusions: that a "security partnership" can be established between opposing sides in Europe irrespective of political and ideological cleavage. "The preservation of peace cannot be accomplished by the methods of deterrence. Anyone wishing to remove the risks it entails must therefore gradually replace the system of deterrence." Détente, says Voigt, is the place to start.

Nuclear Peril: The Politics of Proliferation. By Edward J. Markey with Douglas Walker. New York: Harper & Row, 1982. 183 pp. $14.95. **Defense Sense: The Search for a Rational Military Policy.** By Ronald V. Dellums, with R. H. Miller and H. Lee Halterman, edited by Patrick O'Heffernan. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1983. 384 pp. $29.95 ($8.95, paper). **The Maginot Line Syndrome: America's Hopeless Foreign Policy.** By Sidney Lens. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1983. 204 pp. $14.95. Three of the latest tracts from the American Left on subjects germane to defense policy and military affairs. All are from Harper & Row or Ballinger, which is a subsidiary of Harper & Row. All are predictable. Congressman Markey's book on proliferation is autobiographical in nature. It is essentially about his role (as he sees it) in the Tarapur vote of 1980. Markey tells the reader that his interest in non-proliferation stemmed from his opposition to nuclear power of all sorts. It was in 1979 that it occurred to him that "the ultimate problem with nuclear power is nuclear bombs." Throughout the book, Markey takes pot shots at the Reagan administration on a variety of issues and praises the nuclear freeze movement and the "forces of peace" at every turn. He pleads for a joining of "antinuclear" forces and attempts to convince those who are concerned about nuclear weapons that they also ought to oppose nuclear power — Markey's first crusade. The book has a distinctly self-righteous tone and contributes little to the historical record and nothing at all to scholarship. There is a glowing introduction by Senator Edward Kennedy.

Congressman Dellums' book is an outgrowth of hearings held under his auspices in summer 1982 on an alternative military budget. It

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was put together from testimony by two of his aides, and much of the text is in typical question-and-answer form. *Defense Sense* offers the reader the latest views of nearly all the major figures of the American Left, oldsters and some relative latecomers as well. The Institute for Policy Studies is well represented by Marcus G. Raskin, Michael Klare, Earl Ravenal, and Richard J. Barnet. SANE is represented by David Cortright and Seymour Melman. Revisionist historians are given their due by Walter LaFeber, and the Center for Defense Information is represented by the ubiquitous Admiral Gene R. LaRocque. Jeremy Stone of the American Federation of Scientists, William Winpisinger, president of the Federation of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, H. Jack Geiger of Physicians for Social Responsibility, former Senator J. William Fulbright, Terry Hearndon of the National Education Association, Bishop Walter F. Sullivan of Pax Christi, and Philip Berrigan help round out the list of contributors. The book's jacket contains paeans of praise from Andrew Young and Helen Caldicott, among others. This fall's election pits Congressman Dellums against none other than Eldridge Cleaver. This is not going to be a boring campaign.

Sidney Lens' book states a simple proposition: we are on the wrong side of progressive change in the world and we mistake our main problem (it is *not* the Soviet Union) and our main instrument of policy (it *should not* be nuclear weapons). According to Lens, editor of *The Progressive* and a member of the Chicago chapter of the U.S. Peace Council, the whole thing began when Franklin Roosevelt set out to remake imperialism in a more benign image and in trying to do so was drawn into entanglements with Europeans and Asians that Americans have otherwise been wise to avoid. The U.S. effort to expand trade and investment (as all good capitalist countries must "objectively" do) led us to align with reactionaries all over the globe. It is not Moscow's fault if they have picked up the pieces of our illusory policies. But this cannot go on any longer, says Lens, because the stakes are too high. So, "if we do not take a quantum jump toward a prorevolutionary and anti-nuclear policy we face extinction." According to the cover, Richard Falk really liked this book, for it "combines common sense, wisdom, knowledge, and empathy. . . ." Oh, brother.

Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense? By Robert W. Komer. Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Books, 1984. 134 pp. $19.00. In this thin book, Robert Komer assails the foreign and defense policies of the Reagan administration. Komer is particularly incensed by the Reagan administration's naval build-up, which he sees as being detrimental to the conduct of a "coalition strategy." In a foreword to this book, McGeorge Bundy seconds Komer's

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attack on the administration and salutes "his exemplary instinct for the jugular." The major flaw of this book is that Komer has set up a straw man in his attack on the administration's defense policy. Even Komer is forced to admit that naval power is a necessity for the conduct of a coalition strategy. The Carter administration, much to its chagrin, discovered during its last year in office that the U.S. Navy was not large enough to meet alliance commitments, and, as a consequence, was dangerously overextended. In the oft-quoted words of Admiral Hayward, then chief of naval operations, the United States was "trying to meet a three-ocean requirement with a one-and-a-half-ocean Navy." Here, then, was a serious mismatch between resources and commitments that the Carter administration had done little to correct. Komer's assertions to the contrary, the Reagan administration's naval shipbuilding is more in the nature of a deficiency program intended to correct this mismatch than it is an attempt at "global unilateralism or a form of neoisolationism."

Weapons and Hope. By Freeman Dyson. New York: Harper & Row, 1984. 340 pp. $17.95. Not just another book about nuclear weapons and the nuclear dilemma. Freeman Dyson is a British-born physicist of some renown who has here attempted to formulate a concept rather than a specific plan or proposal. He argues that the Soviet Union and the United States should dismantle their offensive nuclear weapons over a period of a few years, and at the same time work on building a non-nuclear endoatmospheric system of ballistic missile defense. Dyson's impulse is to ban nuclear weapons without banning war itself — in other words, to make the world safe for the inevitable, and not always ignoble, expression of human nature. Whatever one makes of the practicality of Dyson's suggestion, it represents at the very least another crack in the weakening edifice of mutual assured destruction, undertaken by a man who can in no sense of the word be described as a hawk. Arguments aside, the real reason to read this book is that it is written by a broadly educated, thoughtful, and experienced man. It is diverse in style, ranging from the autobiographical and philosophical to the analytical and historical. It is filled with anecdotes both interesting and insightful. And it is beautifully written, a delight to what may be called the mind's ear.

THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

All Stalin's Men. By Roy Medvedev. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1984. 184 pp. $14.95. The dissident Marxist historian, who

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has been under increased KGB harassment in Moscow since Brezhnev's death, presents political portraits of six of Stalin's associates: Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Suslov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov. All joined the party while Lenin was alive, rose to success under Stalin, survived the terror and remained politically active under Khrushchev. As typical representatives of the Stalinist system, "they were an unfriendly lot and they all fought with each other, which was exactly what Stalin wanted. . . . Anyone who was unable to commit a criminal act was not merely removed from power but physically eliminated. This special process of selection was one through which all six of these men passed more successfully than others."

Khrushchev. By Roy Medvedev. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1984. 292 pp. $9.95 (paper). Written with the assistance of several members of Khrushchev's family, including his son, Sergei, this biography records the late CPSU first secretary's shortcomings and achievements. Among the latter the author includes the rehabilitation, often posthumously, of 20 million of Stalin's victims, the transformation of the collective farm system, and the "radical revision" of Soviet foreign policy. Medvedev notes that few social or political reforms have been implemented by Khrushchev's successors, a circumstance enhancing his achievements in retrospect.

Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making Since 1966. By Steven L. Burg. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983. 365 pp. $37.50. This timely, thoughtful, well-researched study examines the institutional and political methods that foster cooperation and cohesion among the different nationality elites in Yugoslavia. The focus on post-1966 developments provides much information on the inner workings of a quasi-open Communist political system. The detailed case studies merit close attention by students of comparative politics.

The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism. By John B. Dunlop. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983. 363 pp. $32.50. Relying primarily on diverse Russian émigré sources, the author skillfully probes the character of Russian nationalism under Soviet Communist rule. In the process, he provides fascinating insights into hoary historical themes and political controversies. The chapters are discrete essays examining the meaning of Russian nationalism, its role in driving czarist and Soviet expansionism, and its importance in shaping the evolution of the Soviet system. An original and timely work of scholarship, this is a welcome

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contribution to speculations about the future of the Russians in the Soviet Union.

The Russian Revolutions of 1917: The Origins of Modern Communism. By Leonard Schapiro. New York: Basic Books, 1984. 256 pp. $19.95. The late author's last work draws on recent research by specialists focusing on certain aspects of the 1917-24 period and offers reflections on the provisional government's failure to defend itself effectively and the Bolsheviks' technique of victory. This comprehensive history concentrates on the dynamics of power, eschewing economic and social history and providing a needed supplement to E. H. Carr's history of the Bolsheviks' official policies. Chapter 10 usefully summarizes much recent work on the Bolshevik seizures of power in outlying areas.

The Soviet Budget. By Raymond Hutchings. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1983. 204 pp. $29.50 ($9.95, paper). One of only a few books in English on the subject, this volume seeks to analyze the Soviet budget within an integrated perspective of Soviet affairs. It not only notes that official Soviet budget numbers for defense spending are accepted only by "imbeciles," but also suggests that enhanced secretiveness in recent budget documents conceals a larger total of defense expenditures: The "gap between actual and reported defense spending started to open, or opened wider, about 1963-4."

Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy. By Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson. New York: Pergamon Press, 1984. 210 pp. $19.95 ($12.95, paper). An in-depth analysis of Soviet propaganda techniques, overt and covert, directed against the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. The volume includes a preface by Sidney Hook and interviews with Stanislav Levchenko, the former chief of the active measures group in the Tokyo KGB residency, and Ladislav Bittman, former deputy chief of the Disinformation Department of the Czechoslovak intelligence service. The subject of the volume is long neglected, the analysis sound, and the interviews authoritative. A critically important contribution for those concerned with Soviet efforts to exploit Western public opinion to further Soviet foreign policy objectives.

THE MIDDLE EAST

The High Walls of Jerusalem: A History of the Balfour Declaration and the Birth of the British Mandate for Palestine. By Ronald Sanders. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983. Price 746 pp. $24.95. A

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magnificent piece of historical writing, demonstrating the interplay between personalities and "grand" historical forces. This, combined with the engaging style of the narrative, makes the book seem much shorter than its 746 data-packed pages would suggest. It has been a long while since this fascinating period of history — conjoining the fates of the British Empire, the Middle East, and world Jewry — has been subject to serious effort. Leonard Stein's 1961 *The Balfour Declaration* has up to now been the standard serious work on this subject. Sanders' book in no way displaces Stein's, but transcends it to a certain extent. As Sanders himself notes, Stein's book is in a way another primary source, for he was Chaim Weizmann's long-time friend and was himself a participant in some of the events about which he wrote. But Sanders, unlike Stein, had access to a much fuller array of primary documents which proved Stein prophetic and skillful for the most part, but in error on occasion as well. Like Stein's earlier effort, *The High Walls of Jerusalem* is likely to stand the test of time.

From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict over Palestine. By Joan Peters. New York: Harper & Row, 1984. 601 pp. $24.95. The most tantalizing argument that this book makes — and that most reviewers have seized upon to describe — is that what today calls itself the Palestinian Arab nation does not have long or deep roots in Palestine, but rather immigrated into the area in response to activity undertaken in Palestine by the Zionist community. According to Peters and some other reviewers, this should "change our whole way of thinking" about the Arab-Israeli conflict. One hardly knows how to react to this. It should indeed change the way people for whom this "revelation" is news think about history — and that will be a goodly number. But within the scholarly community, the basic outlines of the phenomenon of Arab migration to Palestine has long been known, and many an essay on the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict has noted it. Moreover, Peters' claim that the British kept no records of this phenomenon is perplexing. One can walk to the shelves of any good library and find at least some data on this in British annual White Paper reports on the colonies, as this reviewer himself did some years ago. Besides, research is one thing, conclusions another. Peters has done a titanic research job, and what has heretofore been an outline of the truth is now a full-fledged tome. Moreover, Peters has described, better than any other English-language source, the details of Jewish migration from the Arab lands into Israel. But if all this is taken to show that there is no Palestinian nation, and thus no basis in demography for any Arab claim to western Palestine, then the author has a poor grasp indeed of nationalism. It is good that the

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scholarship in this book is available for all to see and that an already established fact has been elaborated and propagated. It is not good that an admirable labor should be pressed so obviously, and inappropriately, into the service of a highly partisan point of view.

The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann. Series B Papers, vol. 1, August 1898-July 1931, and vol. 2, December 1931-April 1952. Edited by Barnet Litvinoff. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1983; Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1984. 657 pp. (vol. 1); 739 pp. (vol. 2). $39.95 each. These two volumes represent the official writings and speeches of the first president of the State of Israel over a fifty-four-year period. Altogether, there are more than 250 documents, all translated into English (when necessary). Aside from throwing light on Weizmann himself — perhaps the premier figure in the pre-1948 history of Zionism — these documents also reflect the progress and changes in the Zionist movement itself. Together with Weizmann's letters (published in twenty-three volumes) these two volumes are an invaluable reference for historians and biographers.

In the Land of Israel. By Amos Oz. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1983. Translated by Maurie Goldberg-Bartura. 257 pp. $12.95. Amos Oz, one of Israel's most popular novelists, has attempted in this volume to portray the passions and the fissures of contemporary Israeli society, relying on the very words of those whose heated conversations with him form the raw material for this volume. Like all good novelists, he has not presented reality as he found it, but shaped it in the interest of art. Despite occasional exaggerations, the coldness of the printed word when set against the flapping tongue, and the hazards of translation, *In the Land of Israel* conveys the emotional side of Israeli politics that the author sought to capture. Anyone in search of the illogic of political discourse in general will find examples here, as will those in search of new varieties of the Masada complex. There is one thing more that the reader will find: a descendant of the generation of idealistic Labor Zionists looking upon the more normal, but also less ideologically picturesque, country that Israel has become. Oz's "soft" socialist, avowedly humanist and secular outlook strikes a resonant chord in many Westerners and Western Jews. It was this side of Israel's pioneer generations that was responsible in part for forging the heroic and noble image of Israel that persisted for so long. Oz's readers outside of Israel are more likely to share his sense of despair and frustration than those inside Israel. Thus, there are several reasons why this book is disturbing, provocative, and therefore worth reading.

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The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Perspectives. Edited by Alvin Z. Rubinstein. New York: Praeger, 1984. 221 pp. $27.95 ($13.95, paper). Finally, a clearly written, well-balanced, and up-to-date supplementary text on the Arab-Israeli conflict! And available in paperback, too! This book consists of six essays on various aspects of the conflict, one by the editor on "external determinants." The lead essay on the historical origins of the conflict is by Adam M. Garfinkle; another, on the interplay of military clashes and diplomacy, is by Itamar Rabinovich. There is a chapter on Israel by Alan Dowty, and one on the Palestinians by Aaron David Miller. Finally, an overview and some predictions about the future are offered by Haim Shaked. The book as a whole reads very well, particularly for a multi-authored work. There are no glaring omissions and little if any redundancy. Finally, insofar as any treatment of such an emotional topic can be fair, this one is. It is entirely free of cant and conjectural extravagance. Thus, it suggests itself not only to students but to the interested layperson as well, and even perhaps to some who are expert on the Middle East, but not necessarily on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Middle East Since Camp David. Edited by Robert O. Freedman. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984. 263 pp. $28.50 ($11.95, paper). A collection of nine essays on current developments in Mideast politics, divided into three parts, with an epilogue concerned mainly with events in Lebanon. The first section on superpower perspectives is covered by the editor, who writes on Soviet policy, and by Barry Rubin, who writes on U.S. policy. The second section, "Regional Perspectives," contains essays on the post-Camp David Arab world by Shireen T. and Robert E. Hunter, and one on Iran by Robert G. Darius. Part three deals with "domestic perspectives" since Camp David. Here there are four essays: one on Syria by John F. Devlin, one on Israel by Don Peretz, one on Egypt by Louis J. Cantori, and one on the PLO by Aaron David Miller. Most of the essays are quite good, and this would be a reasonable choice as a text for an introductory course on the international relations of the Middle East. If there are any flaws, the essays themselves are less to blame than the structure of the book. On the one hand, the book may try to do too much with too few essays, running the gamut from the superpowers to the domestic level. On the other hand, why is there no essay on Jordan or Iraq, two countries that have been on center stage of late, one because of the Reagan Plan and one because of the Gulf War? Nevertheless, this is a worthy effort and, together with the above noted book edited by Rubinstein, it will provide university professors with a much richer selection of teaching aids.

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The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies. By Meron Benvenisti. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1984. 97 pp. $25.00 ($15.00, paper). Ordinarily, ORBIS does not note monograph-length studies in these pages, but Benvenisti's survey and the subject it covers are both so controversial that it behooves us to let the interested reader know that this little book is available. Benvenisti was former deputy mayor of Jerusalem and has for the past few years campaigned to alert anyone who will listen that the Israeli occupation and absorption of the West Bank is rapidly reaching a "point of no return." Such a "point of no return" implies for Benvenisti and many others a permanent condition of "no peace." The study is well documented and Benvenisti is clearly conversant with the details of life in the territories. But like all other statistically based studies, its conclusions are only as good as the assumptions upon which they are based, and here one can — and many have — disputed Benvenisti's alarums. Nevertheless, this is a challenging document, covering in turn demography, the economy, land use, land ownership, civil and legal administration, and the character of Israeli West Bank settlements. A final chapter has a more general tone. Finally, there are very colorful and useful addenda in the form of specialized maps illustrating some of the main findings of the survey.

PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents. Edited by Raphael Israeli. New York: St. Martin's, 1983. 316 pp. $25.00. This unusual collection of classified documents was seized by Israel during the summer 1982 invasion of Lebanon. It sheds light on the far-ranging links that the PLO has with the Soviet bloc, Cuba, and various non-Arab terrorist organizations. One illuminating document reproduces a conversation between Yasir Arafat (Abu 'Ammar) and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, in which the struggle against Israel and the hostage crisis in Iran were discussed; another details Soviet military support for the PLO; and others deal with PLO links in the Third World. The impact of this small sample is to convey the extent of PLO activities and control in southern Lebanon and the multifaceted dimensions of its secret international connections. Specialists on terrorism, the PLO, and Soviet policy in the Middle East will find it especially valuable.

Islam in the Political Process. Edited by James P. Piscatori. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 240 pp. $37.50 ($14.95, paper). A dozen essays — most dealing with Islamic politics in particular countries — on the political dimensions of the Islamic "revival." To the book's credit, essays are included on countries that have received altogether too little attention, particularly Senegal (by Donal B. Cruise O'Brien), Algeria

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(by Jean-Claude Vatin), Indonesia (by Ruth McVey), and Turkey (by Serif Mardin). To its detriment, neither the book's introduction by the editor nor its conclusion by the venerable Albert Hourani gives this multi-authored work any general structure or coherence. Of the other Arab-oriented country studies (on the Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia) and those on Iran and Pakistan, one of the best is the essay by Michael Hudson on the Islamic factor in Syrian and Iraqi politics. This is especially interesting in light of Professor Hudson's former tendency to dismiss the impact of Islam in the Arab world as decisively on the wane.

Between Battles and Ballots: The Israeli Military in Politics. By Yoram Peri. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 344 pp. $39.50. A careful treatment of the role of the military in Israeli politics. Peri starts with the proposition that the common view of the relative autonomy of the military and political spheres in Israel is faulty. But while the myth of military aloofness from politics does not correspond to reality, neither does the countermyth of Israel as a sham democracy, run by a conspiratorial group of warriors. What Peri attempts is to find some nontrivial way to show that neither of these two extremes is accurate, and in doing so he illustrates that no academic model can account satisfactorily for the Israeli experience. This is a good piece of work, likely to prove valuable not only to students of Israeli and Middle Eastern politics, but also to military sociologists.

The Ba'th and Syria: 1947-1982, The Evolution of Ideology, Party, and State. By Robert Olson. Princeton, N.J.: Kingston Press, 1982. 235 pp. No price given. ORBIS usually does not note books that are more than two years old, but we also try to bend a bit to the needs of small publishing houses, even if their distribution systems leave a great deal to be desired. Besides, any even marginally serious book about contemporary Syria is worth a few words, and that is what this book is —marginally serious. Olson reviews the history of Syria in the post-World War II period and attempts a kind of socio-ideological analysis of the Ba'th party as it proceeds. Olson does a reasonably good job, and some of his analysis is suggestive. The book as a whole, however, is rough going and lacks a coherent structure. Moreover, it has an audience problem. It is too advanced for beginners, but it says nothing of real importance for experts that has not already been said by Rabinovich, Devlin, Batatu, and von Dam. Finally, the book is marred by three flaws that are not the author's fault: a tacky typeface, a multitude of typographical errors, and a ven-

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omous, mythologized, and superfluous anti-Israeli introduction by Max Kortepeter. This book is only for those who need or wish to devour all that is written about Syria.

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